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Abstract. 
Safety cases must be produced by offshore operators to assess the risks posed to the personnel 
by potential accidents. On an offshore platform two of the major hazards are fires and 
explosions resulting from an accidental hydrocarbon release. The overpressures generated 
during an explosion can threaten the integrity of the platform structure. It is therefore 
important to be able to estimate the overpressures generated, should an explosion occur, 
and to predict the frequency of such an event. 
A methodology has been developed to predict the frequency of explosions of different magni- 
tudes occurring in a module on an offshore platform. This methodology combines established 
risk assessment techniques, such as event tree analysis and fault tree analysis, with fluid flow 
modelling. Assumptions have been made in the methodology to simplify the calculation pro- 
cedure. These assumptions relate to the conditions under which the leak occurs, the build 
up of gas in air concentration and the probability calculations. 
Frequency predictions are required to be as accurate as possible to enable the acceptability 
of the risk to be determined and reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. 
Hence each of the assumptions within the methodology has been addressed, to determine a 
more complete prediction tool. 
Once an accurate frequency for the explosion occurring has been determined, the risk to 
personnel must be minimised to an acceptable yet practical level. On existing designs it is 
impractical to alter the layout of the platform. However the nature of the safety systems 
may be changed. These safety features include isolation, blowdown, mitigation and detection 
systems. An optimisation study presents three schemes to identify the optimum configuration 
of the safety systems, in terms of the overpressures generated, as a means of reducing the 
risk to the platform. 
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1. Introduction. 
In 1988 a hydrocarbon release developed on the Piper Alpha platform in tile North Sea with 
catastrophic consequences. 167 people lost their lives as fires and explosions engulfed the 
platform generating dense smoke clouds and causing the eventual collapse of the platform. 
An enquiry led by Lord Cullen[171 suggested reforms to the regulations governing offshore 
installations. As a result the Health and Safety Executive introduced the Offshore Safety 
Division which has tile responsibility of overseeing tile submission and assessment of safety 
cases. These safety cases must be produced by offshore operators to assess the risks posed to 
the personnel by potential accidents by demonstrating that all hazards have been identified 
and measures have been taken to ensure the risk is as low as reasonably practicable. 
On an offshore platform two of the major hazards are fires and explosions resulting from 
an accidental hydrocarbon release. The overpressures generated during an explosion can 
threaten the integrity of the platform structure. It is therefore important to be able to 
estimate the overpressures generated, should an explosion occur, and to predict the frequency 
of such an event in order to judge the design acceptability. 
The aim of this thesis is to consider methods to minimise the risk on an offshore platform. 
This has been performed by considering the explosion hazard and the consequences posed 
to the platform from such an event. This chapter introduces the problem and provides an 
outline of the contents of the thesis and the work achieved. 
Tile risk analysis methodology used in this study may be represented as shown in Figure 1.1. 
Hazard identification is first performed on the system, this is followed by determining the 
likelihood of possible scenarios developing through risk assessment techniques such as event 
tree analysis and fault tree analysis. Each possible scenario is considered to determine the 
consequences should a hazardous event occur. On determination of the consequences the 
model parameters are analysed to determine their sensitivity. Tile final stage is to optimise 
the system to ensure that the risks are as low as reasonably practicable. 
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Figure 1.1: A risk analysis methodology. 
Chapters 2 to 5 provide a review of the current literature. Chapter 2 considers risk assessment 
in relation to the offshore process industries. This chapter provides a brief overview of the 
history of risk assessment and considers some of the methods used in the offshore industries. 
More detail is given to event tree analysis and fault tree analysis as these two methods were 
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used in the methodology described in this thesis. Within this chapter a review is given of 
the Piper Alpha disaster and creation of the OSD and its functionality. 
Chapter 3 considers explosions, a major hazard on offshore platforms. This chapter discusses 
the consequences arising from an explosion and the factors that contribute to this. Different 
consequence estimation techniques are employed by different organisations, from experimen- 
tal explosion testing to comprehensive CFD based models. This chapter considers the range 
of techniques used and their effectiveness. 
A factor in determining the consequences of an explosion is the dispersion of the gas prior 
to ignition. The influencing factors for this are covered in Chapter 4 along with a review of 
current modelling techniques employed. 
Chapter 5 considers the optimisation techniques applicable to solving mathematical pro- 
grammes which have the features of the explosion modelling design problem such as no 
objective function and integer design variables. 
The design modelling work in this thesis begins at tile consequence analysis stage of the risk 
analysis methodology. Chapter 6 describes a methodology which has been developed, by 
Andrews and Smith (1994)[3j, to predict the frequency of explosions of different magnitudes 
occurring in a module on an offshore platform. This methodology combines established risk 
assessment techniques, such as event tree analysis and fault tree analysis, with fluid flow 
modelling. Assumptions have been made in the methodology to simplify the calculation 
procedure. These assumptions relate to the conditions under which tile leak occurs, the 
build up of gas in air concentration and tile probability calculations. Requency predictions 
are required to be as accurate as possible to enable the acceptability of the risk to be 
determined and reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. Hence each of 
tile assumptions within the methodology has been addressed within this thesis, to determine 
a more complete prediction 
Chapter 7 addresses the assumptions made in calculating the release flow. A comparison is 
provided between assuming different leak flows in terms of their constituents. A new model 
is provided to calculate the release flow under constant temperature conditions as opposed 
to the changing temperature originally assumed. 
Chapter 8 considers the way in which the methodology calculates the probabilities of events 
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occurring. This method eliminates the major assumption to assess the validity of the original 
modelling. 
Chapter 9 considers the assumption made on the gas cloud build up and provides the infor- 
mation required to effectively employ CFD to determine the gas cloud concentration build 
up with time. This chapter also details a method for integrating such dispersion correlations 
into the frequency modelling. 
Having determined the consequences of an explosion as accurately as possible, the key pa- 
rameters are considered in the sensitivity analysis of chapter 10. The aim of this chapter 
is to determine the magnitude at which slight inaccuracies within the empirical data will 
influence the overall frequency of an explosion occurring. 
Once an accurate frequency for the explosion occurring has been determined, the risk to 
personnel must be minimised to an acceptable yet practical level. On existing designs it is 
impractical to alter the layout of the platform. However the nature of the safety systems 
may be changed. These safety features include isolation, blowdown, mitigation and detection 
systems. An optimisation study, in Chapter 11, presents three schemes to identify the 
optimum configuration of the safety systems, in terms of the overpressures generated, as a 
means of reducing the risk to the platform. 
4 
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regulations. 
2.1 Introduction. 
Risk assessment has been used in some form, within the engineering industry, since the 19th 
century(521 but had no legal standing until 1974. The UK Health and Safety at Work Act 
of 1974 states 
It shall be the general duty of each person who has to any extent control of the 
premises ... to take measures ... so far as it is reasonably practicable, to ensure 
that they are safe and without risks to health. 
Risk assessment techniques were first applied to the hydrocarbon process industries in the 
late 1970s. The application to offshore process facilities dates from the early 1980s. In 1983 
the Royal Society commissioned a study group to consider risk and the assessment of risk. 1561 
This was followed by an updated report in 1992.1571 Both reports stated that there should 
exist an upper and lower bound for the acceptance of risks. A risk exceeding the upper limit 
is not to be tolerated at all. A risk below tile lower limit may still be a risk but warrants no 
resources to lower it further. Between the limits exists tile tolerable region where activities 
are to be tolerated if the means justifies the risk and continuous monitoring of the situation 
is maintained. Risk and tile associated words were fully defined. Risk was defined to be: 
the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of 
time, or results from a particular challenge. 
Where an adverse event is defined to be an occurrence that produces harm. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general overview of risk assessment and its applications 
to the offshore industry. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the Piper Alpha disaster, which 
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was the instigator of the offshore safety regulations reform, and details the current safety 
requirements. Section 2.5 looks at the methods in use within the process industries whilst 
Section 2.6 concentrates on two well documented methods; fault tree analysis and event tree 
analysis, which are employed during the preliminary phase of this project. 
2.2 Tolerability of risk. 
Risks must be as low as reasonably practicable, ALARP. A three tier structure can be used 
to represent the concept of ALARP as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Unacceptable 
Risks 
Continual 
ALARP assessment and 
region cost benefit 
analysis required. 
Acceptable risks 
Figure 2.1: Tolerability of risk: ALARP. 
The width of the pyramid represents the magnitude of the risk involved. The lower region 
corresponds to all acceptable risks where there is no need to demonstrate that the risks are 
ALARP, but it is necessary to maintain assurance that the risk remains at this level. The 
upper region is where the risks are classified as unacceptable and can not be justified except 
in extraordinary circumstances. The central section contains all risks classed as ALARP, 
the risk is acceptable as long as the benefit outweighs the risk. However a cost benefit 
approach is required to compare whether the cost of further risk reduction would reduce the 
risk involved significantly. The higher the risk more, proportionally, must be spent on its 
analysis and consequent reduction. In 1988 the HSE[291 defined the maximum tolerable risk 
to employees to be 1 death in 10' per year whilst the maximum tolerable risk to the public 
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is I death in 10'. The broadly acceptable risks, below which it is not reasonable to insist on 
improvements, is I death in 106 per year for the public exposed to the hazard. 
2.3 Risk assessment in relation to offshore platforms. 
General impressions among the public is that the North Sea offshore oil industry is subject 
to high risk. Factors influencing this perception, given by Tveit (1994)[621, include the 
remoteness of offshore facilities from the shore, the unpredictability of the weather conditions 
surrounding them, the high energy which may be released and the complexity and size of 
the facilities. Establishing risk offshore is difficult due to the uncertainty in extrapolating 
information from past to present risk especially as the offshore activities have a short history 
and have changed a great deal. Consistency in the reporting and calculation of risk was 
lacking until a major incident in 1988 changed the industry's approach and introduced a 
regulating body to oversee all offshore process facilities. 
2.3.1 The Piper Alpha disaster. 
Piper Alpha was the main platform exploiting the oil reservoir in the Piper field. This oil 
field situated east of the Orkney Islands in the North Sea was licenced to Occidental. Piper 
Alpha was linked to three other platforms, Claymore, Tartan and MCP-01, by gas pipelines 
and to the oil terminal at Flotta with an oil pipeline. Tile platform had facilities to drill wells, 
extract, separate and process the well fluids. There were four main production modules on 
the platform; wells, separation, compression and utilities. Above these were various other 
facilities, accommodation blocks and a helideck. 
Production on the platform began in 1976, initially the platform was designed for exporting 
oil to the shore, any gas extracted during processing was burnt at the flare. In 1978 the plat- 
form was altered to conform with the government regulations, whereby gas was compressed 
and sent ashore. Facilities were modified again in 1980,1983 and 1984. 
On July 6th 1988 an initial explosion occurred in the production modules. This was followed 
by more fires, explosions and dense smoke. The public inquiry[171 concludes that a leak of 
gas formed a flammable gas cloud, this found an ignition source causing an explosion and oil 
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leaking from the pipes formed a pool fire. Possible sources of ignition may have been sparks, 
hot surfaces or hot work (maintenance was being carried out in this area). The explosion 
caused other pipes to rupture therefore escalating the situation. Safety protection systems 
existed on the platform but failed to work. The gas was not detected prior to the initial 
explosion. The water spray mitigation system did not activate, had this have activated the 
gas may have been dispersed and the resulting overpressures reduced. The platform should 
have been isolated from its neighbours as soon as the explosion occurred, however it was not 
and more gas was allowed to fuel the explosion and fires. 
Two hundred and twenty six people were on board the platform that night. Only sixty two 
people were working on the night shift, the remainder were in the accommodation blocks. 
One hundred and sixty seven people died. The main cause of death was smoke inhalation. 
2.3.2 Offshore Safety Division. 
After the Piper Alpha disaster[171 the inquiry led by Lord Cullen suggested that reforms 
to the regulations governing offshore installations should be made. Lord Cullen's report 
instigated the formation of the Health and Safety Executive's Offshore Safety Division (OSD) 
to implement the 106 recommendations within the report. 
Previous to this report the regulatory body was the Department of Energy (DoEn), they en- 
sured compliance with regulations made under the Mineral Workings (offshore installations) 
Act (MWA) of 1971 which came about after the collapse of Sea Gem, an exploration rig, in 
1965. Lord Cullen found that the DoEn lacked experience in safety management systems 
and formal safety assessment (FSA). As an example the Norwegian offshore regulatory body, 
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), was examined by Lord Cullen, lie found that 
the NPD used FSA to ensure that risks were identified. Lord Cullen's recommendations 
transferred the regulation of the offshore safety activities to the HSE, their main objective 
was to be a goal setter rather than a regulation enforcer. This goal setting included the 
requirement of safety cases from every company working offshore. 
The safety case ensures that every company produces an FSA to assure itself that its oper- 
ations are safe and secondary to this is the demonstration of this to the regulatory body. A 
safety case should demonstrate 
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that the safety management system of the company (SMS) and that of the installation 
are adequate to ensure that the design and operation of equipment are safe. 
that the potential major hazards of the installation and the risks to personnel have 
been identified and appropriate controls provided. 
that adequate provision is made for evacuation and temporary refuge should a major 
disaster occur. 
Tile Offshore Installations (safety cases) Regulations in 1992 further defined quantitative 
risk assessment 
quantitative risk assessment means the identification of hazards and evaluation 
of the extent of risk arising therefrom, incorporating calculations based upon the 
frequency and magnitude of hazardous events. 
The OSD has the responsibility of overseeing the submission of the offshore safety cases, the 
initial safety cases were due in 1995, and then screening, assessing and discussing the reports 
and requesting modifications if necessary. The OSD currently employs approximately 150 
inspectors to enforce the safety legislation. The inspectors must visit offshore installations 
regularly to inspect all aspects of health and safety, inspect and audit drilling and specialist 
operations, investigate accidents and complaints and assess the content of safety cases. The 
OSD also conducts its own research and development to provide insight and knowledge to 
perform assessment of the safety cases, investigate accidents and generally improve health 
and safety offshore. Their research programme, which is undertaken by over 100 different 
research contractors in the UK, has twenty specific areas of work, five of these have been 
assigned high priority. These topics are 
o fire and blast. 
e evacuation, escape and rescue. 
* occupational health. 
* diver physiology. 
e collisions. 
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The OSD has identified strategic priorities within the category of fire and blast, these be- 
ing explosion suppression and mitigation; fire protection; standardisation of fire tests; gas 
dispersion and smoke migration[361. In 1990 the OSD began an extensive research project 
into offshore explosions with an aim to understanding what they are, how they occur, the 
effects on the installation and how the damage can be mitigated. Phase I was essentially a 
literature review which was sponsored by 28 oil and gas companies. This work resulted in 
26 reports surnmarising the current knowledge on explosion and fire engineering and interim 
guidance notes for the design and protection of offshore structures. Phase II involved con- 
structing a full scale test rig for experiments to be performed in order to gain information 
regarding the characteristics of hydrocarbon explosions and fires. The results gained from 
this phase have been critical in the evaluation of computer models used in the preparation 
of safety cases. Phase III continues to utilise the test rig to develop strategies for reducing 
the effects of explosions, the main considerations are reducing confinement and applying 
water deluge. Modern offshore installations have been constructed on the basis of this and 
other research work. Designers of modern platforms must provide safe refuges to protect 
the personnel from fire and explosion. Older platforms are being upgraded, although due 
to the complicated nature of this task some operators have chosen to install new platforms 
adjacent to the existing ones. In some cases the accommodation section is now completely 
separated from the process platform on another platform. 
2.4 The future of risk assessment in the offshore pro- 
cess industries. 
According to Pitbaldo (1994)[52j QRA studies have not been balanced. This was highlighted 
as a fault on safety cases presented to the HSE. At the Offshore Safety Case Conference in 
1993 the HSE stated that safety management systems and the use of QRA were generally 
acceptable but major hazard identification was not complete. The majority of work was 
concentrated on performing consequence calculations, frequencies and risk results. More 
work was necessary in assessing the needs of the client; identifying possible failures; investi- 
gating alternatives; developing cost effective solutions and then communicating the results. 
Pitbaldo (1994)[521 describes the procedures adopted by DNV Technica for reducing the 
uncertainty in their QRA results. This begins with the risk analysis study structure which 
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is critical in determining the emphasis of the study. If the clients needs are misinterpreted 
inappropriate models may be selected. Risk assessment had been traditionally implemented 
using spreadsheets as a basis. Such methods involve errors as the spreadsheets become large 
as there is no way of identifying any changes made and the formulae are not readily available. 
The OHRA (Offshore Hazard and Risk Analysis) Toolkit was introduced to alleviate some 
of these problems. The basic objectives were that risk studies were constructed in diagram- 
matic form, transfer of data should be easy to identify and well documented, consequence 
models should be well defined and robust, new models should be easily incorporated, qual- 
ity assurance should be straightforward and results should be meaningful and believable. 
The OHRA Toolkit was developed by DNV Technica in conjunction with 13 other spon- 
sors; Amoco Norway Oil Company; Chevron UK Ltd; Conoco UK Ltd; Dovre SikteC; Elf 
Enterprise Caledonia; Mobil North Sea Ltd; Norsk Hydro AS; Phillips Petroleum Company 
Norway; Saga Petroleum; Scandpower AS; Shell SIPM; Statoil and VROM (Netherlands 
Government). 
Miller (1994)[451 also agrees with this view and states that Shell UK aim to improve com- 
munication of the safety principles to design teams and future operators of the platform. 
A time based three-dimensional simulation of the hazards has been developed which veers 
from the traditional approach that assumed all safety systems had equal priority and could 
be considered independently. The new approach is to include more integration and human 
factors to avoid duplication or weak links and to demonstrate that the overall objectives 
are being achieved by improving the realism. Their method consists of generating scenarios 
that cause hazards, manually assessing the response of the outcomes (worst cases only, num- 
ber too large) and then recomputing. Many risk assessment teams are developing similar 
approaches in the way they involve workers in the decisions and consider human factors 
important to their model. 
2.5 Risk assessment methods. 
Rimington (1993)[551 explains the importance of risk assessment. 
Risk assessment is a way of systemising our approach to hazard with a view to 
determining what is more or less risky. It helps to diminish our exposure whilst 
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optimising the benefits. 
Risk assessment is the general term used to describe the study of decisions subject to cer- 
tain consequences. This study is subdivided into risk estimation, risk evaluation and risk 
management. Risk estimation involves identifying the outcomes, estimating the magnitude 
of the associated consequences and the probabilities of the outcomes. Risk evaluation is the 
complex procedure of determining the significance of the identified hazards and the estimated 
risks to those involved. Risk management involves making decisions about working practice 
where risks are concerned. 
The estimation of risks is performed via two methods that should be used in conjunction with 
each other. The first is operability analysis (OA) which is a qualitative method for critical 
examination of hazards and their consequences. The second is quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) which provides a numerical method for calculating the risk. Hazardous activities 
are often compared with historical data to give a comparative risk level with an everyday 
situation. Assumptions made in risk analysis lead to a simplification of the problem which 
may give lower casualty rates. This should always be a consideration when using comparative 
methods to determine a level of risk. Risks are calculated in terms of probabilities which 
removes any confusion regarding dimensions, lience comparisons are immediate. 
2.5.1 Qualitative methods. 
Qualitative risk assessment methods include hazard and operability studies (HAZOP), rapid 
ranking and preliminanj hazard analysis (PHA). 
HAZOP (hazard and operability studies) was introduced into industry by ICI Ltd to de- 
termine the potential hazards in a chemical plant. It is now widely accepted as the most 
complete qualitative method by the British Chemical Industry Safety Council and is used 
throughout the chemical and other potentially hazardous industries. The purpose of a HA- 
ZOP is to examine the operation of a system outside its normal design parameters to deter- 
mine whether this may lead to safety problems. HAZOP is a formal structured method which 
uses clearly defined terms to systematically complete the required worksheets. These terms 
are; INTENTION which defines how the part is expected to function; DEVIATIONS are de- 
partures from the design intention; CAUSES are the reasons why the deviations may occur; 
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CONSEQUENCES are the results of the deviations; HAZARDS are the consequences which 
can cause damage, injury or loss. Guide words are used to clarify the deviations: NO/NOT; 
MORE; LESS; AS WELL AS; PART OF; REVERSE. To avoid failing to recognise potential 
hazards in the system, HAZOP studies are carried out by multi disciplinary teams with a 
wide range of knowledge including plant design and operating procedure. HAZOP studies 
can be adopted at any stage in an industrial plant's life but it is most appropriate at the 
design stage. 
A more cost effective method when dealing with an existing plant which is less time con- 
suming than HAZOP is rapid ranking. This was also developed by ICI with the aim of 
identifying and ranking hazards. Plant areas are ordered in priority of study, such ordering 
is rational and has no subjective basis. 
PHA (preliminary hazard analysis) is the method most widely adopted in the USA. It is 
similar to HAZOP in its disciplined analysis of the potential hazards. The method aims to 
identify the hazards as well as the causes and to assess the severity of the consequences. 
A common ranking scheme is used which are often referred to as criticality categorisations. 
These rank from class I to class IV where class I represents a hazard with negligible effects, 
class II has marginal effects, class III is critical and class IV is catastrophic. In general PHA 
is used as the first attempt to identify the events leading to hazards in a system, this is 
performed during the design stage. 
2.5.2 Quantitative methods. 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methods include Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) and Fault Ree Analysis (FTA) as two of the most common and comprehensive 
methods. QRA involves four stages: 
1. Identification of potential hazards. 
2. Estimation of consequences. 
3. Estimation of probability of occurrence of each hazard. 
4. A comparison of results of the analysis against the acceptability criteria. 
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Although qualitative methods will have fulfilled the criteria of step 1, FMEA and FTA fulfil 
all the criteria. 
FMEA (failure mode and effect analysis) is an upward, inductive procedure which begins 
from a detailed level and evaluates the failure effects of each component, on a component 
by component basis, meaning that the whole system is completely screened. The object 
is to identify the weak areas where modifications are necessary. The method utilises a 
classification system as a means to identify the severity of a failure. FMEA is the first stage 
of an FMECA (failure modes, effects and criticality analysis). FMECA is a procedure for 
identifying the potential failure modes of a system (FMEA) and classifying them according 
to severity (criticality analysis). Structured worksheets make this a systematic approach. 
The following steps are required to complete an FMEA/FMECA study. 
* Define the systern. 
* Construct hierarchical block diagrams. 
9 Identify the failure modes at each level. 
* Assign effects to each failure mode. 
* Define severity of each effect. 
e Incorporate other necessary data. 
o Rank the failures. 
o Analyse and maybe redesign the system. 
The method is time consuming but can be applied at any level of detail. 
Fault tree analysis presents a graphical model illustrating the combinations of faults which 
can lead to the failure of the system. It begins with the undesired event and works downwards 
to find the causes of such an event. Fault trees are initially qualitative models but may be 
evaluated quantitatively. The advantage of using a fault tree to represent the causes of 
failure of a system is that complex systems can be handled with ease. 
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2.6 Risk assessment techniques used in the offshore 
process industries. 
Although each of the above qualitative and quantitative techniques are widely used in haz- 
ardous process industries, this section will concentrate on the two methods employed to 
create the data files for this project. Event tree analysis and fault tree analysis are respec- 
tively methods which pictorially illustrate the sequence and causes of events and both may 
be used as a qualitative or quantitative tool. 
2.6.1 Event tree analysis. 
The method was first applied between 1972 and 1975 to assess the risks associated with a 
light water nuclear power plant. [661 It has since become the most frequently used tool to 
determine and characterise the possible hazardous scenarios. 
Event trees (or consequence tree method[661) provide a pictorial representation of all events 
that may occur in a system. This method is described as a tree due to its nature of fanning 
out like branches of a tree as an increasing number of events are considered. The tree 
begins with an initiating event and is followed, from left to right across the page, by the 
sequence of events which consider the response of safety related systems. The events may 
be considered in any order as long as they do not operate sequentially with respect to each 
other. The paths can be followed to determine whether the consequences are considered 
acceptable or unacceptable. All paths in an event tree are mutually exclusive, if the events 
are independent, so the probability of a path occurring is the product of the probabilities of 
each event leading to the outcome. 
There are usually two states a component may have, success and failure, therefore for an n 
component system there are 2n paths of which 2n -1 are potential accident scenarios. 1261 
Should the component have the capability of residing in more than two states, for example 
limited performance, then the number of paths is even greater. In order to reduce the 
amount of work necessary, reduced event trees may be constructed. 161 The reduced trees are 
constructed by considering the outcome of continuing down a path before the next event is 
considered. If it is known at that stage whether the sequence of events will lead to success 
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or failure of the system irrespective of the following events then that branch is considered 
no further. 
Event trees may be used as a qualitative or quantitative tool. Probabilities of the events 
occurring are assigned to the branches of the tree. The product of these event probabilities 
gives the probability of that sequence of responses being seen. 
An example of the use of an event tree is given in Chapter 6. 
2.6.2 Fault tree analysis. 
Fault tree analysis or the cause tree metliod[66i was developed as a tool for assessing the 
faults of systems with a view to improving the reliability between 1961 and 62 at the Bell 
Telephone Laboratories. The method proved to be successful in identifying the weak points. 
The method was improved into a formalised approach in 1965 by the Boeing company. 
The objectives of the method are to identify the possible event combinations which lead 
to the undesired system outcome occurring, and to represent this graphically. The method 
is frequently used as a qualitative evaluation method to assist the designer and it can also 
be used for quantitative evaluation. A fault tree logic is essentially the reverse of event 
tree logic[61 it uses a downwards deductive approach requiring the identification and the 
definition of an undesired system event. This undesired event is known as the top event. 
Typical top events are explosion, unavailability of safety system and toxic releases. The fault 
tree analysis works downwards to determine the relationship of lower level events causing 
the failure. The fault tree consists of successive levels of events which are connected such 
that each event ensues as a result of events at the level below, where each event is assumed 
independent from the others at the same level. The relationships between the events are 
represented using standard logic gates. The process is continued until the basic events are 
identified, i. e. where the events can not be resolved any further. Typical basic events are 
pump failure and control failure. 
The formalised approach must be performed in strict order: 
1. System definition. 
2. Fault tree construction. 
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3. Qualitative evaluation (obtaining minimal cut sets). 
4. Quantitative evaluation. 
System definition. 
The system must be defined in such a way that the top event and system boundaries do not 
lead to an analysis that is too broad or too narrow to produce useful results. Each fault 
tree considers only one failure mode therefore a system may require many fault trees for full 
analysis. 
Fault tree construction. 
A fault tree is built up using standard symbols to represent the logic gates and events. The 
top event heads the tree and is represented as a rectangle. The tree continues downwards to 
show the causes. The relationships between events are determined by logic gates as shown 
in Figure 2.2. Possible logic gates include AND, OR, VOTING, PRIORITY AND and 
EXCLUSIVE OR. An AND gate is only activated should all inputs to that gate have 
occurred. An OR gate must have at least one of the inputs occurring. For a VOTING 
gate to activate then m inputs out of the n possible inputs must have occurred. Tile 
EXCLUSIVE OR gate may only have one input occurring. The PRIORITY AND gate 
must have all inputs occurring in a set order. The events are resolved as far as possible with 
the underlying events being represented as basic events. 
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Figure 2.2: An example fault tree, showing the types of gates and construction. 
Henley and Kumamoto (1981)[261 state some heuristic guidelines which are desirable for 
constructing fault trees: 
1. Replace abstract events by less abstract events. 
2. Classify events into more elementary events. 
3. Identify the distinct causes for the event. 
4. Couple the trigger event with 'no protective action'. 
5. Find cooperative causes for an event. 
6. Pinpoint a component failure event. 
These guidelines should be coupled with the following rules given by Andrews and Moss 
(1993)[2j: 
1. Write the statements in event boxes as faults. 
* state precisely what the fault is and when it occurs. 
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2. Classify the event as a 'state-of-component' or 'state-of-system' fault. 
* 'state-of-component' faults should be developed into primary failure, secondary 
failure and command faults. 
* 'state-of-system' faults should be developed into immediate, necessary and suffi- 
cient causes. 
3. If the normal state of the component causes a fault sequence then it is assumed that 
the component functions normally. 
4. All inputs to a gate must be completely defined before further development is under- 
taken. 
5. Cates should not be connected directly to another gate. 
The three basic gates used, OR, AND and NOT combine in the same way as the Boolean 
operations of union, intersection and complementation and are used to aid qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation. 
Qualitative evaluation. 
A system must be analysed to eliminate the most likely cause of failure. To do this the 
system failure modes must be identified. 
The cut set is a combination of events which result in the undesirable top event occurring. 
The minimal cut set is the smallest event combination resulting in the undesirable event 
such that removing an event causes the top event not to occur. There may be further 
classifications of minimal cut sets. A first order minimal cut set represents single failures 
causing the undesirable event. A second order minimal cut set represents double failures 
which when occurring together cause the top event. The minimal cut set of the lowest order 
must be identified as these are often the weakest links in the system. To determine a cut 
set the fault tree should be expressed in Boolean form. The Boolean algebra leads to an 
expression for the undesirable event. 
C, + C2 +---+ Cm (2.1) 
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where Tn is the number of cut sets and C1, ---, Cn are the cut sets. Boolean algebra is simple 
to perform for OR and AND gates and computer programs exist to process the minimal cut 
sets. 
The identification of the minimal cut set allows quantification of the fault tree to be carried 
out. 
Quantitative evaluation. 
The probability of the system being unavailable is 
P[F] = P[Cl + C2 +... +C.. 
j 
This can be expressed as 
mm j-1 
P[F] E P[Ci] - 
1: E P[Ci - Cj] + 
i=l j=2 i=l 
m j-1 k-1 
ZZZ P[Ci * Cj'Ck, 1 ----+ (-l)In P[Cl » C2 * ... * Cm] 
j=3 k=2 i=l 
When the elementary probabilities are low 
P[F] P[minimal cut set il 
The probability of the top event occurring has upper and lower bounds such that 
m j-1 
Picil 
-EE 
Pici 
j=2 i=l 
Cj]: 5 P[F] < P[Ci] 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
Advantages/disadvantages. 
This technique can be time consuming and requires the analyst to understand the system 
thoroughly, such limitations may be overcome by employing a team of experts. The final 
result is a diagrammatic view of the causes and the ultimate consequences of a failure con- 
structed in a logical manner which can be used as a qualitative or quantitative tool. The 
major advantage is the ease with which complex systems can be handled. 
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3.1 Introduction. 
Van Wingerden (1994)[641 quotes a review by Garrison concerning accidents, in the hydro- 
carbon process industry, between 1957 and 1986. This showed that 42% of these were due 
to explosions and 35% due to fires, illustrating the need to estimate explosion frequencies, 
their effects and consequences. Estimation of explosion frequencies involves determining: the 
likelihood of the release; the likelihood of the explosive mixture developing; the likelihood of 
the ignition. The likelihood of a release or occurrence of an ignition source is found either 
from publications such as the Hydrocarbon Leak and Ignition Data Base, Report Number 
11.41180[491 (a collation of historical and experimental data) or company data. This does 
not, however, provide the likelihood that the cloud of gas will ignite, factors such as the 
position and strength of the ignition source are important. The likelihood of having an ex- 
plosive mixture depends on the rate and conditions of the release and how the gas is likely 
to disperse within the volume. 
This chapter provides a summary of the literature regarding explosions on offshore platforms. 
It begins by looking at the consequences arising from an explosion and leads on to the factors 
that influence the severity should one occur. Within Section 3.4 existing modelling techniques 
are discussed. 
3.2 Consequences arising from an explosion. 
The two major consequences resulting from an explosion are the high overpressures and 
thermal load transfer onto the structure. Both of these lead to weaknesses being introduced 
to the platform structure. Thermal load is of most concern when considering fires from 
impacting jets. Phase I of the HSEs research into fire and blast provides a comprehensive 
review of the factors affecting thermal load and the modelling techniques available. [30,31,331 
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3.2.1 Overpressures. 
Following ignition in a flammable gas cloud a spherical flame front is formed, providing 
that there are no obstacles to deform it. The flame consumes the unburnt gas ahead of 
it leaving hotter gases behind. These hotter gases have a larger volume than the unburnt 
gases hence causing expansion. If the expansion is restricted then the pressure will rise. The 
rise in pressure above the ambient conditions is known as the overpressure. An alternative 
mechanism for generating overpressures is not related to confinement but to the speed of the 
flame as it propagates through the cloud. The flame effectively acts as a piston generating an 
overpressure wave due to the inertia of the unburnt gas ahead of the flame. This generation 
of overpressures is common in vapour cloud explosions. 
Johnson et al. (1991)[34j state that the magnitude of an overpressure is directly related to 
the speed of the flame propagating through the vapour cloud. Dobashi (1997)[181 estimates 
the overpressure generated in an enclosed volume, if there are no disturbances on the flame 
front as 
CPI S30 
p- Po : -- v (3.1) 
where S is the burning velocity (ms-'), t is the time (s), C is a constant, V is the volume of 
the enclosure (M3), p,, is the pressure at the time of ignition (Pa) and p is the pressure at the 
specified time, t. However the pressure rises more rapidly when the flame front is disturbed, 
factors affecting this are turbulence, non uniform concentration within the enclosure and the 
flame front instability. 
A high overpressure causes the structure to either fail or dramatically weaken, which will 
cause failure at a later date. This illustrates the seriousness of obtaining estimates of high 
overpressures and the need to determine exactly what does cause them and how it can be 
remedied. The extent of flame acceleration and overpressure potential is said to be a function 
of gas concentration, degree of congestion and the fuel type. Geometry and ignition location 
also influence the overpressures produced. 
Catlin et al. (1993)[91 produced a relationship between the overpressure produced and the 
concentration level at which ignition occurred. This relationship was related to the mitigation 
situation, experiments show that when the explosion is mitigated with water sprays the 
overpressures are significantly reduced. 
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3.3 Influencing factors. 
Factors that influence the severity of an explosion include: confinement; turbulence; reactiv- 
ity of the fuel; ignition source; cloud configuration and cloud mixing. 
3.3.1 Flame speed. 
Flames produce high temperature combustion products and therefore cause gas to be unable 
to expand completely, if in an enclosed volume, thus raising the pressure. Flame acceleration 
and speed depend on turbulence, fuel type and its volume concentration within the module. 
The maximum burning velocity is when the mixture is slightly above the stoichiometric 
concentration. 
3.3.2 Geometry. 
When discussing geometry we are considering a combination of congestion and confinement. 
Confinement relates to the walls of the structure and the consequent lack of capability for 
gas expansion. Congestion refers to the process vessels and pipe work within the enclosure, 
commonly referred to as obstacles. In general reducing confinement reduces overpressures, 
similarly increasing congestion increases overpressures. In particular positioning long pipes 
perpendicular to the direction of the flame flow increases the overpressures. If the combustion 
takes place in free space flames proceed at the laminar burning velocity and there is no 
significant change in pressure. On the other hand if there are obstructions turbulence is 
created increasing the flame speed and the pressures within the system. Confinement or 
obstacles allow recirculation to occur causing gas accumulation and higher pressures. [14] 
Offshore platforms have many regions of closely packed pipe work that promotes rapid flame 
acceleration and generation of high pressure levels. Mercx et al. [441 define a loop which 
unless it is broken causes very high flame speeds and overpressures 
Repeated obstacles cause expansion of combustion products behind the flame that 
generates flow over the obstacles ahead of the flame --+ increases flame area --+ increases 
rate of combustion --+ increases flow speed and turbulence --+ .... 
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At a distance from the obstacle the distortion of the flame diminishes and velocity starts to 
decay breaking the chain. Baker et al. (1996)[4] state that the most important parameters 
in determining the effect of obstacles are the blockage ratio and the pitch. The higher the 
blockage ratio is, the higher the turbulence intensity is, therefore there are higher speeds and 
higher overpressures. It has been noted from experiments that there is usually an optimum 
value for the pitch which is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum distance. There 
appears to be an inability to quantify obstacle density but they can be categorised as either 
low, medium or high. 
3.3.3 Ignition sources and location. 
Eckhoff and Thomassen (1994)(191 classify ignition sources into the following groups. 
a source of ignition that occurs continuously or frequently. 
*a source of ignition that occurs only in rare situations. 
ea source of ignition that can only occur in very rare situations. 
Possible ignition sources include open flames, hot surfaces, mechanical sparks, electrical 
sparks, electrostatic discharges, jets of hot gaseous combustion products and shock waves. 
Ignition due to mechanical sparks, electric sparks or hot surfaces produce less severe effects 
than those generated by flame jet ignition. [641 
Samuels (1993)[581 and van Wingerden (1994)[641 state that the highest overpressures are 
generated when the ignition source is at its furthest distance from all ventilation. When 
the ignition occurs close to the ventilation the burnt gases are dispersed therefore reducing 
the turbulence generation and hence keeping the pressure low. Mercx et al. (1993)[431 
concluded from their experiments that the ignition source location only has a minor effect 
on the maximum overpressures generated, the significant changes are in the pressure-time 
histories. Ignition at the rear wall has a peak of overpressures early in time compared to the 
central ignition, which in turn is earlier than the peak when ignition is at the vent opening. 
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3.3.4 Explosion relief. 
There are two main ways of relieving an explosion. The classical method is by ventilation, 
drawbacks to this are the expenses incurred if experiments show that a change is required. 
The most recent method is by mitigation in the form of water sprays. 
Ventilation. 
Ventilation is important, without it the overpressures would continue to rise until the struc- 
tures lose would have lost integrity. The size and location of vents are critical to the effective- 
ness of the ventilation system, but when the vent shape was varied in experimental tests, by 
Mercx et al. (1993) [431, the pressure-time histories did not change. When there is sufficient 
venting close to the ignition point burnt gases are vented, hence turbulence generated is lim- 
ited. However when venting is further from the ignition point a strong turbulent flow field 
is generated, accelerating the flame and so causing high pressures. Therefore venting at an 
early stage is an effective means of reducing flame acceleration. 
[641 Venting the flow ahead 
of the flame causes flame distortion that increases the flame area, increasing the volume 
production and so raising overpressures. 
Ventilation may be natural or forced. Natural ventilation has two components, the external 
flow of the wind around the structure and the internal flow of the air through the structure. 
The external flow is governed by the shape of the structure and the properties of the on 
coming wind. The external flow creates a pressure field at the surface which together with 
the position and size of the vent openings determines the internal flow and hence ventilation 
rate. 114j. Many offshore platforms utilise natural ventilation by having semi enclosed mod- 
ules. However in some cases natural ventilation may not be used effectively and so forced 
ventilation is incorporated. Due to the damage that high overpressures can cause to the 
structure certain strategic walls on offshore platforms are being replaced by failing panels. 
These panels are designed to withstand only a relatively small overpressure, once this is 
reached the panel will fail introducing further ventilation to the system. The failing panels 
should be designed to fail at pressures as low as possible taking into consideration the suction 
due to the wind. [641 
25 
Explosion modelling techniques. 
Mitigation 
Mitigation is a method of suppressing the flammability of the gas cloud, in the past this 
has been achieved with various substances. Halons (halogenated hydrocarbons) were used 
because they chemically interfere with the combustion process. Rather than lessen the 
hazard, lialons presented more of a danger to personnelJ] and to the ozone layer. [321 Halons 
are not favoured on offshore platforms due to hazards posed by them, the major reasons 
being their habit of obscuring the monitoring equipment and the highly accurately timed 
response required in order for them to be effective. 
Water is the main mitigation method used offshore. Water curtains can be effective in 
suppressing an explosion provided that they are positioned strategically, in terms of tile 
likely direction of tile flame front and tile location of electrical equipment. The water curtain 
entrains air which is pumped into tile flammable mixture, this acts as a dilution agent 
and renders the cloud non ignitable. [351 The most prevalent method employed on offshore 
platforms utilises water sprays. Water deluge is ineffective for low flame speeds but at high 
flame speeds the water droplets break up giving a greater surface area that aids the rapid 
extraction of heat. In tile early phases of flame propagation the pressure peak is reached 
earlier with mitigation than without due to tile generation of turbulence caused by the water 
spray, however the mitigated pressure peak is of a lower magnitude than the unmitigated 
pressure peak. Catlin et al. (1993)[91 state that tile water must also be uniformly distributed 
to be effective, local deluge does not have a significant effect. The beneficial effect of the 
water is the effect of the vapour on the burning rate. In order to acquire vapour the water 
droplets must evaporate. For evaporation the droplets must be between I and lOtIm. [64] 
Droplets from standard nozzles are greater than 100tim and do not readilY evaporate, these 
must be broken up. Catlin et al. (1993)[91 define the break up of the droplets to be connected 
to the Eotvos number, E, 
2 dU dý' 
dt a,, 
(3.2) 
where p,, is the density of the water (k_qm-1), A- is the acceleration of the gas flow 
(MS-2) 
, 
dd 
dt 
is the droplet diameter (m) and a,, is the surface tension of the water (Nm-1). Clift suggests 
that no break up occurs if E,, < 16. The size of the droplets decreases as E,, increases, this 
will occur if the surface tension decreases, therefore adding foaming agents to the sprays to 
lower surface tension aids the mitigation effect. Van Wingerden et al. (1995)[651 state that 
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droplet break up occurs when the critical Weber number, W, is reached. 
W pgV2 
dd 
(3.3) 
UW 
where pj is the density of gas (kgM-3 ) and v is the velocity of the gas (ms-'). A relationship 
exists for the critical velocity at which break up occurs, based on experimental results: 
2 M3S-2 vcdd = 0.612 (3.4) 
giving a critical Weber number of 10 if a,, = 73.10-3 and p. = 1.2. These relationships 
show that flow velocities can decrease as the droplet size increases. Therefore for effective 
mitigation from water deluge the droplets must be very small, less than 10/-LM, or large, 
greater than 2001im. [651 
Blowdown. 
Blowdown does not actually provide any relief for an explosion, however it is designed to 
reduce the gas inventory which feeds the gas cloud or leaking jet and reduce the pressure 
driving the release of gas. Blowdown is usually initiated when a leak of gas is discovered, 
valves open which send the gas to be burnt at the flare. To avoid overloading the flare there 
is a systematic ordering system depending on where the gas concentration is detected and 
which parts of the installation are most at risk. Blowdown can occur from vessels or pipes. 
if it occurs from a pipe then a significant pressure and temperature drop is observed. If, 
however, a vessel leaks the pressure drop is insignificant compared to the drop in temperature. 
These drops in temperature are hazardous because contraction of the vessel may occur. [241 
Haque et al. (1992)[24,251 have developed a model BLOWDOWN to predict the pressure of 
the vessel, temperatures and amounts of each phase and flow rates. This model is shown to 
have good agreement with experiments. 
3.4 Modelling and validation. 
With many different groups carrying out experiments using different methods and equipment 
for recording measurements various conclusions could be reached. Generally there appears to 
be a consensus on most variables and factors. However current work could have inaccuracies 
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due to the lack of full scale experimental data and the various approaches taken to validate 
the explosion models. The MERGE project (Modelling and Experimental Research into Gas 
Explosions) which involves the co-operation of eight research institutions in five countries 
should eliminate future inaccuracies and provide an increased understanding of explosions. 
This has been followed by the EMERGE project (Extended Modelling and Experimental 
Research into Gas Explosions). 
3.4.1 Experiments and scaling factors. 
Knowledge of the factors and effects stems from observations made during experiments. The 
models that follow have their variables based on these observations and have had their accu- 
racy validated using the experimental data. Unfortunately due to cost and impracticalities 
very little of the data originates from a full size offshore platform. Instead the data available 
concerns experiments performed on scaled structures that raises doubts about the aPplica- 
bility to full size installations. For this data to be of use relationships between small scale 
and full size geometries must exist, so that a scaled experiment can reproduce the effects 
that could occur on a full size structure. Experiments have the following advantages over 
models, scaled or full sized. [581 
the geometry can be more detailed than with any practicable computational dynamics 
model which use a one metre mesh. 
the fluids and combustion are modelled accurately compared to the simplification of 
numerical models. 
a quantitative pressure-time history at specific locations can be obtained rather than 
an overall maximum overpressure. 
*a detailed insight into the development of the explosion allows critical features to be 
identified. 
The severity of the explosion effects, especially overpressures, are reduced on scaled versions 
due to the smaller distances and lower flame speeds. This has led to research on scaling 
techniques with the objective to give results expected for realistic dimensions. [42j 
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Scaling by oxygen enrichment. 
Turbulence has a dominant effect on combustion and on scaled replicas the magnitude de- 
creases resulting in lower flame speeds and overpressures[341. Controlling the turbulence al- 
lows the flame velocity to reach levels comparable to those expected on a full size structure. 
The main parameter determining turbulence is the Karlowitz number, therefore preserving 
this preserves flame speeds. This is the aim of oxygen enrichment, which is equivalent to 
preserving 
4 
ul = constant 
where A is the integral turbulence length scale and u, is the laminar burning velocity. If 
the length scale is reduced then the burning velocity increases. Oxygen enrichment of the 
fuel/air mixture provides a controllable means of obtaining the required change in burning 
velocity. Experiments show that this type of scaling is successful. 
FYactal scaling. 
This involves consideration of the overall rate of fuel consumption that is given by the product 
of laminar burning velocity and the surface area of tile flame. The hypothesis is that the 
flame area is similar to a fractal of tile Mandelbrot set with dimension D. Details of fractal 
scaling are given by Mercx et al. (1995). [441 1, 'ractal scaling is only appropriate if tile flow is 
effectively incompressible, which is not usually the case with explosions offshore due to the 
obstacles creating turbulence. However using a less reactive fuel, such as ethane, on a small 
scale has been shown to behave like tile more reactive fuels, such as methane and propane, 
on a large scale. 
Scaling with laminar flame speed. 
This utilises the fact that the increase in the flame surface area depends upon the velocity 
ahead of the flame. 
dA) 
Uf'+1 = Uf. 
(1+ 
T 
Where Uf,, is the flame speed before the obstacle is encountered, Uf,,, +, is the flame speed 
after passing the obstacle, A is the flame surface area before the obstacle is encountered 
and dA is the increase in the flame surface area after passing the obstacle. It was observed, 
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by Mercx et al. (1995)[441, that the flame speed at the first obstacle encountered by the 
flame was greater than the laminar flow speed, therefore an enhancement factor, Ef, was 
introduced. 
UP = Ef Ul 
Ef depends on the fuel type and distance between ignition location and the first obstacle. 
This brings a dependence of the reactivity of gas into the model. This model is not in 
common use as very little data exists to quantify Ef. 
3.4.2 Types of models. 
There are three categories of models employed in explosion research, these are[58j 
e Empirical models. These use correlations of experimental data to attempt to extrapo- 
late for real cases. 
e Physical models. These describe the physical processes during an explosion with indi- 
vidual sub models, validated against a wide range of data. 
Computational Fluid Dynamic methods. These simulate the explosion at full scale 
solving numerically the Navier Stokes equations. 
3.4.3 Empirical based models. 
Baker et al. (1996)[41 describe the weakness in the predictions of the pressures in vapour 
cloud explosions to be the subjectivity of the assumptions and judgements. Three of the 
main methods for modelling a vapour cloud explosion are TNT equivalence, multi-energy 
and Strehlow's spherical model which all require an estimate of the energy. 
TNT equivalence model. 
The original model to predict the explosion blast pressures was the TNT equivalence model. [38] 
Vapour cloud explosions are modelled by using an amount of TNT charge that will produce 
an explosion with the equivalent energy. The TNT equivalence model has one parameter 
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which is the mass of TNT used, this basic model is described by the following equation 
WTNT: 
-- 
aWH, 
ETNT (3.5) 
Where ETNT is the energy generated from an explosion of TNT, WTNT is the mass of TNT 
equivalent to the mass of hydrocarbon, W is the mass of hydrocarbon, H, is the heat of 
combustion of the hydrocarbon and a is the yield factor. This model is flawed by the lack of 
clear definition for the yield factor, a. The model can be made more flexible by introducing 
a second parameter, the height above ground level at which the explosion occurs. [391 This 
model has been widely used due to its simplicity, but has limitations and in many ways is 
not applicable to gas explosions on offshore structures. 
* TNT explosions have short duration whereas a vapour cloud explosion has a much 
longer duration. [39j 
Overpressures were overstated. [381 The profile of the peak overpressures from a TNT 
explosion is higher in the near field and lower in the far field than that produced from 
a vapour cloud explosion. 
* Factors such as confinement and turbulence are neglected in the predictions. 
The multi-energy model. 
This model Nvas developed by TNO to replace the TNT equivalence model. The multi-energy 
model uses confinement and obstruction as its major factors in determining blast strength. 
The model assumes a hemispherical, steady flame speed, stoichiometric hydrocarbon-air 
explosion. The major drawback is its inability to model jet releases and dispersed gas 
clouds-[381 The method requires the user to make choices between blast curves to determine 
the energy term on the basis of the degree of confinement, therefore is subjective. [41 
Strehlow's spherical model. 
Strehlow's spherical model is similar to the multi-energy model but requires the user to select 
the blast curve on the basis of the flame speed. 
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The Baker-Strehlow method. 
The Baker-Strehlow method was developed as a combination of the multi-energy and the 
Strehlow models and incorporates correlations with experimental data as guidance for choice 
of parameter. [41 
3.4.4 Physical models. 
CMBWAT. 
Madsen et al. (1994)(401 detail a computer code based on physical principles to analyse 
explosive phenomena, called CMBWAT. They claim that it holds for comparison with data 
sets and is much more accurate than the TNT model. The model was developed specifically 
to analyse the explosive phenomena, both the detonation and the advance of the related 
shock wave with time and distance. The code calculates the initial stagnation temperature 
or the pressure increase and then attenuates the shock wave with distance. The shock wave is 
calculated from the conservation equations of mass, energy and momentum and the pressure 
is a function of the shock wave. The analysis solves for spherical or hemispherical blast waves 
for supersonic shock waves. The code has been validated with experimental results that are 
more appropriate to the nuclear industry than the chemical industry. It is more accurate at 
predicting the overpressures than the TNT model but has limitations. CMBWAT calculates 
the load imparted onto a structure in the reaction zone but does not model the distortion 
effects of obstacles or effects of ventilation. The model is heavily dependent on the database 
of 33 substances that it accesses. 
CLICHE. 
CLICHE (Confined LInk CHamber Explosion model) was designed by British GasIll to pro- 
vide a practicable means of performing offshore explosion hazard assessments. The aim was 
for it to be as fundamentally based as possible so it could be applied to different situations. 
CLICHE simplifies the partial differential equations (PDEs)wllich describe the conservation 
of mass, energy and momentum of the flow to ordinary differential equations (ODEs) for 
ease of solution. This system of coupled ODEs are solved numerically using a general linear 
32 
Explosion modelling techniques. 
multi step algorithm. A fundamentally based combustion sub model is used to determine 
the laminar and turbulent burning velocities. The model is unable to predict the flame 
distortion directly, the flame shape must be described empirically as a function of geometry 
and the volume of unburnt gas it encloses. These approximations are valid when applied 
to a volume with a single vent and when there are no significant spatial pressure gradients. 
This makes the model invalid in many offshore geometries where there are many obstacles 
and vents. 
CHAOS. 
CHAOS (Consequence and Hazard Assessment of Offshore Structures) has been developed 
by British Gas. It consists of a suite of interactive theoretical models which deal with gas 
build up, explosion loading and response and fire loading and response. [511 
The explosion model incorporated in this package assesses the turbulence generated ahead of 
the flame and takes into account the obstacles given in the geometry input file. This affects 
the combustion rate, the effects have been found via experiments. The overpressures are then 
calculated depending on the flame behaviour during the explosion and the fuel air mixture 
in the module. This model is not restricted to the worst case scenario of a stoichiometric 
fuel air mixture, it can also take into account any positioning of the ignition source and 
estimates the effects of the mitigation system. This model has been validated against 1 and 
1 5 scale experiments and applies to cubical modules. 
3.4.5 CFD based models 
Freeman (1995)[211 discusses the validation of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based 
explosion models. Although these models will be cheaper to run than experimental trials 
there are limitations. 
The aim of explosion models is to predict the maximum overpressures generated by the 
explosion, CFD models are also able to predict other quantities of interest such as the flow 
speeds and temperature. Comparing the CFD models to experimental results shows up some 
inaccuracies but using the other quantities predicted, assessment of where the CFD models 
are failing is facilitated. CFD codes use the k-c turbulence model to predict the turbulence 
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within the system. This model was originally developed to model shear layer flows without 
recirculation, however recirculation is likely to exist in confined regions, therefore the k-C 
model is not appropriate. However, as no proven alternative has been found and due to 
its simplicity it is still widely used. Reeman summarises his assessment by saying that 
explosions could be modelled with CFD models if the k-c model is improved or replaced, as 
the turbulence is not adequately addressed and therefore can not be entirely validated with 
experimental results. Due to tile complexity of the offshore geometries using a fine mesh to 
resolve all of tile details is impracticable. 1531 The large difference in scale between the region 
of influence of tile explosion and the relatively much smaller structures within the flame 
and in the wake of obstacles has led to a need for sub grid models. Sub grid models give 
approximate mathematical descriptions of tile finer details, these are then used to produce 
tile overall picture on tile computational grid. 
Hjertager's model. 
Most current models use burning velocity to predict the flame and pressure development this 
is successful if no obstructions lie in the path of the gas or flame. Hjertager (1991)[271 claims 
that it is more useful to model propagation by calculating the rate of fuel combustion at 
different points in the flammable cloud. This is accomplished by utilising the Navier Stokes 
equations and the time-mean evolution of the time-mean values of the dependent variables 
to account for turbulence. The k-e turbulence model is employed. The rate of combustion 
is modelled according to the eddy dissipation concept, involving a turbulent eddy mbdng 
time scale[27j. Due to the complexity of the geometry on offshore platforms, modelling 
every detail would require a fine resolution grid. Instead a Porosity Distributed Resistance 
(PDR) formulation of the governing equations was used which introduces volume fraction 
and resistance factors. A finite volume procedure was then used to solve the equations. 
This theory has been validated by comparison with experimental data but it is not easy to 
implement. Hiertager proposes to improve the combustion model and to develop the PDR 
formulation for high density obstacle fields. 
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FLACS. 
FLACS (FLame ACceleration Simulator) was a code developed by the Christian Michelsen 
Institute as a three dimensional gas explosion and dispersion simulator. 151 FLACS is nu- 
merically intensive requiring a large computer to solve the three dimensional Navier Stokes 
equations. A 1m 3 control volume is used to solve the equations on a fixed grid, using the 
hybrid scheme for the convection terms, and a staggered grid for the velocity incorporating a 
SIMPLE pressure algoritlim. [531 The model accounts for interaction between the gas flow and 
complex geometries. Where geometrical details are too small to be resolved on a numerical 
grid empirical formulae are used to determine factors such as the flame acceleration. Users 
of the model must input initial data such as the gas cloud composition, size and location of 
the cloud, ignition location and specific output parameters required. The model calculates 
the explosion pressure as a function of time and space, velocity, temperature, density, turbu- 
lent parameters and combustion rate. The output data is tabulated and shown graphically 
(pressure-time curves). The results are first order accurate in time and space. Experimental 
data compares well, the code has been validated against more than 2000 experiments. 151 
Although there may be under or over prediction in some instances the results are within 
30-40% of the experimental data. 
/, t FLACS. This is a PC program based on FLACS. It is designed to assist the user in 
making correct decisions to limit the consequences of accidental gas explosions. It is easy to 
use and ideal for sensitivity studies for layouts of plants. It can not be used as a replacement 
for FLACS as it does not have the same level of detail, it works with a reduced spatial 
resolution and simplified definitions of the parameters. [51 
EXSIM, COBRA and REAGAS. 
The MERGE project investigated the CFD explosion models that five of the involved re- 
search organisations had developed. [531 These included COBRA from British Gas, FLACS 
from Christian Michelsen Institute, EXSIM from Telemark Technological Research Develop- 
ment Centre (Tel-Tek), REAGAS from TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory and GEISHA from 
Imperial College. GEISHA is omitted from these discussions as it is a general CFD code 
with no specific intentions. COBRA, FLACS, EXSIM and REAGAS all solve for the Navier 
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Stokes equations; conservation of mass, momentum and energy. All use sub models to de- 
scribe the physical processes which occur at scales below the computational grid, and all 
use the k-e turbulence model. However differences do exist in the solution procedure. 
EXSIM, FLACS and REAGAS solve the energy equation in terms of enthalpy whereas CO- 
BRA solves for total energy. COBRA uses the second order explicit Godunov method to 
solve for the convection terms on an adaptive grid, whilst the others use the hybrid scheme 
incorporating the SIMPLE pressure algorithm on a fixed grid. The varying mathematical 
bases lead to different accuracy levels in the numerical solution. EXSIM and REAGAS are 
first order, FLACS is second order for flame tracking and COBRA is fully second order. 
The models vary most in their empirical sub models (sub models are necessary for modelling 
the flame), the turbulent combustion, the drag and the turbulence. The models have used 
varying techniques and in cases with the same method have used differing constants, in or- 
der to get consistent agreement with the experimental data available to them. Tile models 
were all compared on the same data and all successfully demonstrated a consensus. The 
aim of the work by the MERGE project[531 was to develop a unified approach to explosion 
modelling, therefore the major differences in the sub models have been eliminated, however 
subtle differences do still exist retaining a level of empiricism. 
Commercial Codes. 
Many commercial CFD packages are on the market, such as FLUENT, PHOENICS and 
FLOW31). These are all highly sophisticated three dimensional numerical codes which require 
a lot of computer processor time. The codes are multi purpose with an emphasis on the 
characteristics of flow. Generally the packages have the required data for the main gases and 
water, but the user must be aware of the chemical background of the fluid in question. It 
is possible to model an explosion using these packages but due to their general nature sub 
models do not exist, hence the geometry must be completely resolved on the grid, which 
requires an extremely fine mesh in most cases and extensive computer time. 
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3.5 Discussion. 
The main consequence of an explosion on an offshore platform is the generation of high 
overpressures which may reduce the integrity of the platform structure. Overpressures are 
caused by high flame speeds propagating in confined and congested regions. For any model 
to represent effectively the overpressure generation it must include the following as factors; 
the ignition location, gas cloud concentration, ventilation, mitigation, congestion and con- 
finement. 
The most complete analysis would come from a set of experiments performed on a full Scale 
replica of an offshore platform under varying environmental conditions. However this is 
impractical in terms of resources, therefore scaled versions have been employed incorporating 
various scaling techniques such as those described in Section 3.4.1. 
Empirical based models provide a very general overview of the situation, but such models 
do not account for the complexity of the offshore geometry. 
Physical models use sophisticated mathematical techniques coupled with experimental data 
to model the overpressure generation. In most models assumptions must be made to simplify 
the calculation procedure because it is difficult to account for all the contributory factors 
unless reliable data is known and extensive computer processor power available. 
CFD based models are useful modelling techniques to take account of all factors. However 
these also require reliable data and large amounts of computer processor power. Specific 
CFD codes written for offshore geometries are necessary as commercial codes are unable to 
completely resolve the geometries in a reasonable amount of processor time. 
If an estimate of the overpressure generation is the only variable under consideration during 
an explosion then physical models combining experimental data are adequate modelling 
techniques. 
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4.1 Introduction. 
Emission and vaporisation are followed by the dispersion of the gas to form a vapour cloud. 
When discussing the nature and effects of an explosion an important factor is the contact 
between the ignition source and the vapour cloud. 
On an offshore platform there may be obstacles, confining walls and varying wind speeds and 
directions. Therefore the vapour cloud is unlikely to build up with uniform concentration 
throughout the module. The aim of this chapter is to consider the influencing factors and 
different modelling techniques available in order to determine a concentration profile for a 
module on an offshore platform. 
4.2 Influencing factors. 
Dispersion situations are varied. Lees (1996)[391 provides a comprehensive review of factors 
affecting the dispersion of a gas, these are 
e Fluid buoyancy 
* Momentum 
* Source geometry 
* Source duration 
* Source elevation 
* Meteorology 
e Topography 
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The buoyancy of the fluid depends on the density of the released gas and the initial mixing 
with the air. Cases are said to be neutrally buoyant when their density is close to that of 
air or when the concentration of the gas is low. The dispersion of gases which are neutrally 
buoyant is known as passive dispersion, where the external wind disperses the gas. 
Lighter than air gases have positive buoyancy, these gases have low molecular weights and 
are usually hot gases. Such gases tend to rise rapidly. Denser than air gases have negative 
buoyancy, these gases tend to slump to the ground. 
The momentum of the release is dependent on the release conditions, high pressure releases 
lead to greater momentum. If the release has low kinetic energy then it is likely that a plume 
will be formed which results in the slow mixing of the gas and air. Whereas a high kinetic 
energy release forms a momentum jet with defined shape. A high momentum release will 
increase the amount of air entrained into the gas cloud, which in turn affects the density of 
the cloud. The momentum force will be dominant for a while before the cloud is classed as 
a plume. 
Breaks in pipes cause leaks, these are point sources when the subsequent gas cloud originates 
from the break. Alternatively liquid could drop to form a pool in which case the source is 
referred to as an area source. 
The duration of the leak can be continuous, instantaneous or intermediate. A continuous 
source is usually associated with a constant release rate, as the gas disperses a plume is 
formed. An instantaneous release will only last for a matter of seconds forming a puff. Most 
accidental sources fall into the intermediate category, such releases last for a while but with 
a time variable release rate. From pressurised containers, this flow rate usually follows an 
exponential formula with time. 
[231 
The elevation, of a source is most important if dealing with atmospheric releases. An elevated 
source of buoyant gas is advantageous as it will disperse to atmosphere much quicker. A 
ground level source of dense gas is more hazardous as it will follow the contour of the land 
as it disperses. 
Apart from the above factors, in order to model dispersion accurately the chemical compo- 
sition of the gas must be known. 
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4ý2.1 Source data. 
Hanna and Drivas (1987)[231 state that in order to model the dispersion of a gas the chemical 
composition must be known. This includes knowledge of the molecular weight, diffusivity, 
conductivity, boiling point, thermal conductivity, density and specific heat. In addition the 
release rate is required which is related to the geometry of the source. 
The source of a release on an offshore platform is natural gas, the composition of this is 
approximately 95% methane with tile remaining 5% consisting of denser products such as 
ethane and propane and lighter products such as nitrogen. Methane is a hydrocarbon with an 
explosive range of approximately 5% to 15% gas in air by volume. The density of methane 
is 0.667kgM-3 which means that, with air having a density of 1.2kgM-3 at its ambient 
temperature, natural gas will behave with positive buoyancy. 
The majority of leaks on offshore platforms come from flange failures in pipes, these provide 
high pressure releases from small diameter orifices. Hence the most appropriate scenario is 
a high momentum jet from a point source which will have a decaying release rate and will 
form a plume further away from tile source. 
4.2.2 Geometry and meteorology. 
The build up of gas depends on the release rate and the volume within which it is accumu- 
lating. A release into a fully enclosed region is the worst case scenario, there is no means of 
dispersing the gas cloud. On offshore platforms the leaks will occur into regions which are 
semi confined, include obstacles and are ventilated by the wind. 
Confinement. 
Experiments show that a horizontal jet will widen more rapidly in a confined region than in 
free air. The dilution rate of the released material has been observed to be less in confined 
jets than in free jets. 
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Obstacles. 
Obstacles in the paths of jets leads to modifications in the flow and formation of the gas 
cloud. Important parameters in determining this behaviour are the width and angle of 
incidence of the jet impacting on the obstacle and the dimensions and shape of the obstacle. 
A small obstacle in the path of a large jet will exert little drag on the flow and will have 
negligible effect. However a bigger obstacle may divert the jet. In this case the pressure field 
exerted by the jet will cause the flow to follow the sides of the obstacle. This tendency to 
adhere to the obstacle is greater if the obstacle is smooth. As the flow is passing the rear 
of the obstacle the flow is likely to recirculate into the jet forming a slightly wider flow, this 
will have reduced momentum due to the drag exerted by the obstacle. An obstacle that is 
much larger than the diameter of the jet will cause the flow to form a radial fan or a wall 
jet. 
Ventilation. 
The dispersion of a gas cloud is heavily dependent on the ventilation. The main source of 
ventilation is the wind. The principal characteristics are direction, speed, persistence and 
turbulence. Wind direction and speed are summarised from measurements in a wind rose. 
A wind rose is a polar diagram where the lengths of the spokes depict the frequency of that 
speed occurring in that particular direction. The persistence of the wind is a measurement 
of the directional constancy. If the wind is strongly directional the area over which the gas 
cloud is formed may be reduced in the up wind direction but more complex in the down 
wind direction[23]. Generally the wind is classified in terms of stability, the simplest cases 
are stable, neutral and unstable. Dispersion is greatest in unstable conditions. 
Cleaver et al. (1994)[141 describe two limiting cases between which all release situations fall. 
These are small releases dispersed by the internal flows of the structure and large releases 
which produce flows which will dominate the internal flow. The existence of internal air 
movements ensures that minor leakages do not lead to a substantial build up of gas. 
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4.3 Cloud build-up. 
The release of gas will not immediately form a vapour cloud. Initially the release may be 
described as a puff, plume or jet depending on the momentum of the release. As the release 
continues into an enclosed region a vapour cloud is formed. 
4.3.1 Entrainment. 
When confining surfaces are present entrainment of the external air is prohibited so that 
the gas cloud does not build up uniformly. When the velocity of the release jet is the 
same order as the velocity of the air flow then recirculation regions are set up. The width 
and height ratio of the module directly influence whether recirculation areas can occur and 
whether they will occupy the whole of the module or just a section. Offshore modules contain 
a lot of processors and pipe work as well as confining walls therefore many recirculation 
regions are expected. When recirculation occurs the release material is drawn back into the 
cloud therefore building up the concentration in this area. This is known as a primary cell. 
Depending on the buoyancy of the release further recirculation cells may appear. 
4.4 Dispersion models. 
Hanna and Drivas (1987)[231 state that it is generally assumed that accidental releases of gas 
on an offshore platform will initially form a jet due to the dominant momentum. The jet will 
lose momentum as it entrains air and behave as a plume. Length scales have been established 
to determine the point at which the release ceases to behave like a jet and buoyancy forces 
take over producing a plume. It is normally assumed that if the jet was travelling in a 
horizontal direction it would turn upwards at this point. 
Briggs (1975)[111 calculates the maximum distance travelled by the jet before it turns by 
utilising the wind speed and the initial velocity of the release 
uo, r 
. 8- u 
(4.1) 
where uo is the initial velocity of the release (ms-1), r is the initial radius of the jet (m) (i. e. 
the radius of the release hole) and u is the wind speed (ms-1). 
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Cleaver and Edwards (1990)[131 define the distance the jet will travel before it becomes a 
plume to be 
0 
L2 
9UO 
paU2 
(4.2) 
where p,, and pg are the densities of air and gas respectively. In a further paper by Cleaver 
et al. (1994)[15] the length was defined in terms of the Richardson number, R, 
L= 
3rj 
(4.3) 
N/X. 
However this definition of the length scale uses the mean radius of the jet, rj, which is 
dependent on the wind speed and direction and is typically found experimentally. 
The Richardson number is defined in terms of the densities of air and gas, p,, and pg, the 
gravity, g, the radius of the leak hole, r and the initial velocity of the jet, uO 
rglPa - Pgj 
2 UoPa 
(4.4) 
Considering the Richardson number also determines whether or not dense gas effects can 
be ignored. Richardson numbers less than 10 imply that the flow is buoyant, this is to be 
expected on offshore platforms. 
Once the length scale for changing models has been determined care must be taken to 
ensure that the mass of gas is conserved and that the peak concentrations and the plume 
dimensions match. The plume model should only be used where initial jet effects have 
become unimportant. Hanna and Drivas[231 do not recommend using a plume model less 
than 100m from the source as it can create additional uncertainty when dealing with gases 
that could have dense gas properties. 
4.4.1 Basic models. 
Initial methods for determining the dispersion of gases were based on the fundamental dif- 
fusion equation 
+v 
Dcg CgCg 
+Wac g 
192Cg +K 
ý2Cg 
+K 
ý2Cg 
+UL xyz (4.5) at ax 19Y az aX2 aY2 aZ2 
where K.,, Ky and K., are diffusion coefficients, u, v and w are the mean wind speeds in 
co-ordinate directions x, y and z and q., is the concentration of gas. The diffusion coefficients 
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are found for specific situations experimentally, empirical relations are used to extrapolate 
these to other situations. The following modelling techniques are based on this equation 
and prove to be very limited and basic. They have no means of dealing with obstacles, 
confinement or ventilation and neglect convection. However they were the building blocks 
upon which further advanced models were based. 
Diffusion equation models. 
Gradient transfer models are direct solutions of the diffusion equation. These usually require 
numerical solutions. Statistical models are obtained by representing the diffusion coefficients 
by a constant K. Then an analytical solution may be found. The concentration profiles may 
be represented by a Gaussian distribution which is characterised by the standard deviations. 
These are known as dispersion coefficients, u, uy and o,,,. 
Dimensional models. 
Similarity models consist of an equation derived from dimensional analysis of the rate of 
increase of some characteristic dimension of the cloud. In order to learn anything from this 
model regarding the concentration distribution additional relationships are necessary. These 
are gained empirically. 
Top hat models represent the cloud in the shape of a 'top hat', therefore implying that 
the cloud has a defined height throughout the region. The box model treats the cloud as 
a vertical cylinder with uniform concentration at any given time. The slab model assumes 
that the concentration is a function of distance away from the source. The main application 
of these models is with dense gases. 
4.4.2 Passive dispersion. 
Passive dispersion is the dispersion of neutral and buoyant releases, sometimes referred to 
as atmospheric dispersion. Passive dispersion models include the Roberts model, the Sutton 
model, the Pasquill model and the Pasquill- Gifford model which are based on the basic 
diffusion models described above. These models lead to the Bi-Gaussian distribution for the 
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description of plumes. 
Roberts model. 
This model uses the fundamental equation for diffusion as a basis, developed in 1923 by 
Roberts it was one of the earliest well used models for dispersion. The Roberts model, for a 
continuous point source when the dispersion is anisotropic when W is the source term, gives 
the concentration of the gas cloud as 
[-U (_gý Z2 )] 
C, (x, Y, Z) = exp - (4.6) 47rx (IiiýKy) 2 4x 1 Icy TC, 
There are limitations involved with the Roberts model. Firstly it relates to elevated sources, 
any ground level releases will give double the concentration. Secondly the equations for 
continuous sources are steady state and hence only apply to fully established plumes. Any 
time varying continuous sources are not catered for. Finally the model does not hold with 
experimental results. The Roberts model assumes that c., 0C x-' whereas experiments give 
-1.75 C, q =X 
Sutton model. 
This model, based on Roberts model, was developed by Sutton in 1953. The model incorpo- 
rates a diffusion index, n, and diffusion parameters, C.,, Cy and C-,, which are meteorological 
parameters. The diffusion parameters are functions of the height above the ground and the 
stability conditions. Common values for these are between 0.21 and 0.09 for elevations of 
Om to 50m with wind speeds of 5ms-1. The diffusion index is a function of the stability 
conditions which ranges between zero and one (0 indicating high turbulence and I indicating 
negligible turbulence), on average this is taken to be 0.25. 
Although this model is an improvement on Roberts model by accounting for ground level 
sources and incorporating turbulence as a factor, the other limitations still exist. 
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4.4.3 Plume modelling. 
The models used to describe passive dispersion have led to solutions similar to the Bi- 
Gaussian distribution. Most models for the dispersion of neutral density gases are based 
on this distribution. The Bi-Gaussian distribution is a three dimensional, symmetrical bell- 
shaped distribution and is specifically appropriate for releases of gas into unconfined regions. 
The models may have to be abandoned for confined regions where the cloud grows to such a 
size that entrainment is expected due to the impingement of the cloud on walls and obstacles. 
The Bi-Gaussian distribution is recommended by the American Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)[111 for application to positively buoyant releases of gas. For a continuous 
source 
C9 
W 
Cxp + (4.7) 27ruyo,,, 2 U2 U2 
IYz 
where It is the elevation of the plume centre line above the ground, yo is the lateral cross- 
wind position of the centre line and uy and u-, are dispersion coefficients. The dispersion 
coefficients are defined as functions of the meteorological conditions, release height, surface 
roughness, source distance and time. The dispersion coefficients are different to the diffu- 
sion coefficients in that they account not only for the diffusion of the gas into the air but 
also the convection. When wind is a factor in determining the dispersion it is important to 
consider the convection, therefore models using dispersion coefficients are more appropriate 
than those applying diffusion coefficients. Dispersion coefficients can crudely account for ob- 
stacles due to their dependency on surface roughness, however variations in the coefficients 
are made according to the results of experiments. The dispersion coefficients are sometimes 
estimated directly from turbulence measurements which are made under strict experimen- 
tal conditions with a known release inventory. Vanderborght and Kretzschmar (1984)[631 
consider alternative methods utilising tracer experiments. 
Pasquill and Gifford have modified the Bi-Gaussian dispersion model for instantaneous and 
continuous sources, these models have the origin of the co-ordinate system fixed at the source. 
For continuous sources this model gives 
cg =w exp 
[_ 1 (Z 
+ 
Z2 (4.8) 
7rUyOrz 0,2 
Tý 
yz 
Pasquill (1961) determined uy and o-_, from tracer experiments and wind direction fluctu- 
ations, for specific distances, emission heights and terrain roughness. These results are 
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tabulated, dispersion coefficients for further situations can be found by extrapolation. The 
inclusion of emission height and distance in the calculation of dispersion coefficients accounts 
for the differences between the Pasquill- Gifford model and the Bi-Gaussian model. 
Hbgstrarn (1964) has demonstrated experimentally that 0', is a function of the vertical tem- 
perature gradient and the square of the wind speed and that Uy is dependent on the stability 
of the wind direction and the thermal stability. Bultynck (1972) obtained similar values 
for o-y and a, to Pasquill's . However there were slight differences in the values which was 
emphasised by the concentration profiles obtained. Briggs (1973) suggested formulae for UY 
and o-,, which are dependent on the weather stability, these are of the form 
u= ax (1 + bx)P (4.9) 
These values, gained experimentally, are tabulated according to the terrain and'Stability 
class. Pasquill's stability classes relating to the meteorological situation are used. Here class 
A corresponds to extremely unstable conditions, class D refers to neutral conditions and 
class F has moderately stable conditions. Typical values of a for class D are: 
I 
uy = 0.08x (1 
+ 0.0001X)-2 
u, ý = 0.06x (1 
+ 0.0015X)-21 
4.4.4 Physical modelling. 
The majority of jet modelling has been conducted via physical models. These attempt to 
solve the conservation mass, momentum, energy and species equations by using correlations 
and simplifications. 
Cleaver and Edwards (1990)[131 detail an integral model, designed by British Gas, for pre- 
dicting dispersion and provide experimental data as a comparison. The model predicts the 
dispersion of a turbulent jet which is emerging into a cross flow wind with no obstructions. 
Nine equations concerning nine unknowns require solution in order to determine the concen- 
tration on the centre line of the jet. Various profiles can be used to relate the centre line 
values to the bulk values. The developers of this model have chosen a cosine profile which 
brings in another four equations. The model is only applicable to jets and is therefore appro- 
priate in the 'near field' before atmospheric turbulence dominates, it makes no allowance for 
obstructions and has been designed as a means to model vertical releases. Comparisons with 
experimental results show that the trajectory and concentration decay are in agreement. 
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The model is appropriate for determining the dispersion of gases when they are released 
from vertical stacks. 
Caulfield et al. (1993)[101 build on the previous integral model by introducing the k-6 
turbulence model (this model is discussed in Chapter 9). This is necessary if concentration 
fluctuations are to be predicted, rather than the mean concentrations. The model consists 
of 6 ordinary differential equations which are solved using a Runge-Kutta technique. These 
equations are the conservation of mass, conservation of momentum in the horizontal and 
vertical directions and the k-c transport equations. Predictions of the model agree well 
with experimental data. 
In a totally confined enclosure or one with nominal ventilation not only must the behaviour 
of the jet be considered but also the impact and interaction with the walls. Cleaver et al. 
(1994)[151 state that the behaviour of the jet and the build up of the concentration can be 
calculated from nine parameters; density of gas, p..; density of air, p,,; radius of leak hole, 
r; volume flux, QO; specific momentum flux, w; buoyancy flux, B; volume of enclosure, V,,,; 
cross-sectional area of the enclosure, A,, and the distance from the leak to the wall, x,,,. 
This model assumes that the gas will disperse to produce an upper well mixed layer of depth 
it, which remains at a constant height from the ceiling downwards. Beneath this the gas 
will begin to concentrate forming a layer of depth 112, which increases to a maximum of 
the enclosure's height minus It,. Equations for the conservation of gas are established and 
require solving to gain knowledge of the concentration build up. This model is appropriate 
for enclosures with nominal ventilation provided that they are cubical in shape. It provides 
an accurate representation of the maximum concentrations in the upper layer and a 95% 
accuracy for the depth of the layer. However the model does not account for stratification 
which exists in the lower layer. A more sophisticated approach is required. 
Consequence and Hazard Assessment of Offshore Structures (CHAOS). 
CHAOS is a suite of software developed by British Gas[511. This is designed to assess 
the consequences of the hazards on offshore structures. The package models fires, thermal 
loading, dispersion, explosions and blast loading and looks at the response to such events. 
The dispersion model accounts for jet releases driven at steady or decaying pressure through 
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a circular orifice. The dispersion of the gas with the air is then determined. This model uses 
the technique of Cleaver and Edwards[131 to assess the trajectory of the jet and its interaction 
with obstacles. The build up of gas is considered to occur differently within four zones. The 
module is split into zones and the amount of blockage from obstacles and subsequent levels 
of ventilation are determined for each zone. Therefore this model does not estimate the 
literal concentration build up, however the zone method provides good estimates of the bulk 
concentration build up within a module. 
The model is applicable to releases from hole sizes between 10mm and 50mm diameter into 
modules with aspect ratios of 4: 2: 1 or 2: 2: 1 (length: width: height), the developers 
do not recommend extrapolation for other situations. The model has been tested against 
experimental and observational results, these showed that the release rates were accurate 
however the ventilation rates were not for strong directional high wind speeds. 
PHAST Professional. 
PHAST Professional is a software product designed to give a collection of consequence models 
for hazard analysis. This model may be used at any time in the operation of a process plant, 
however it will have more value in the design and planning stages. Discharge, dispersion, fire 
and explosion effects are modelled mathematically to calculate the consequences of hazardous 
releases. The main emphasis is the dispersion to the atmosphere. Confined releases are 
assumed to uniformly fill the confined region which in turn provides a new source to leak to 
the atmosphere. Hence this package is not appropriate for modelling the dispersion of the 
gas in air within the confined region as required for this scenario. 
4.4.5 CFD modelling. 
Computational fluid dynamics involves solving the conservation equations and the transport 
equations explicitly. 
49 
Dispersion modelling techniques. 
PHOENICS 
McBrien (1993)[411 used PHOENICS to model the dispersion of a high pressure natural gas 
release into crosswinds. The release came from a 13.2mm diameter hole at pressures several 
times greater than the ambient pressure, therefore the scenario initially led to a jet. The 
release was modelled as vertical into crosswinds of speeds ranging between 1.35ms-l and 
3.34ms-1. PHOENICS is a commercial code which was used to numerically simulate the 
dispersion with the continuity, momentum, energy and species equations. These standard 
flow equations provide a simplified version of the model equations required to simulate the 
under expanded sonic jet immediately downstream. The standard PHOENICS flow model 
solves the incompressible form of the equations, hence ignoring turbulence. Incorporating 
any enhancements terms to account for the random variation of turbulence led to less stable 
solutions when compared to experimental data. Assuming that the effects of turbulence, 
viscosity, thermal conductivities and specific heats are negligible limits the applicability of 
the model to situations where the source to atmospheric pressure ratio -L = 2.4. Pa 
The transport equations Nvere solved over relatively large control volumes on a Cartesian grid. 
The model predicts non dimensional concentration values to within ±25% of experimental 
values in the regions of the jet where momentum still dominates the flow. 
4.5 Discussion. 
In order to model effectively the concentration build up of gas on an offshore platform it is 
necessary to either have experimental data for the specific situation or to use a computational 
fluid dynamic approach. In order to use the integral models and CFD we must know the 
dimensions of the module that the gas is leaking into, the meteorological conditions, the 
position of obstacles, the degree of confinement and the potential positions of the accidental 
release in relation to the location of obstacles. 
If there is no effect from the wind and the momentum of the release is low (i. e. a plume is 
expected) then the diffusion equations can be used to model the diffusion of the gas in the air. 
However the wind is of a strength that can not be ignored so convection of the gas is expected 
leading to models which use dispersion coefficients rather than diffusion coefficients. The 
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wind is also of variable direction and invariably creates turbulent effects within the module 
therefore leading to integral/physical models. 
The gas released offshore is predominantly methane, this is a buoyant gas which will tend to 
rise into the atmosphere. A release into an unconfined, obstacle free region could effectively 
be modelled using atmospheric dispersion techniques. This would lead to Bi-Gaussian dis- 
tributions skewed according to the strength and direction of the wind. If the gas contains 
components which imply that the release may have dense gas effects then dense gas mod- 
els would apply. However it is unlikely that the dense gas effects would be strong enough 
to cause the release to slump to ground level. It is expected that the dense gas effects 
would be outweighed by the buoyant effects leading to a predominantly buoyant state or a 
neutral/passive state. 
Due to the momentum of the release from high pressure vessels, the leak will begin as a 
jet. The jet models discussed either do not account for obstacles or have in built coefficients 
based on experimental data for a particular scenario. Recirculation and entrainment occur 
when obstacles are in the near field of the jet. To model this effectively the distance from the 
origin of the leak to the first impact must be known along with the density of the obstacles 
in the region, even if this is known current models do not appear to be able to cope with 
any situation apart from those it was designed to model. 
Once the jet is modelled sufficiently there will be a point when the momentum effects are 
dominated by buoyancy. A such distances a plume modelled must be incorporated, however 
care must be taken to ensure that there is continuity between the two models. 
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5.1 Introduction. 
The design of any engineering system is an iterative process beginning with preliminary 
design followed by analysis, appraisal and redesign. These steps are carried out using en- 
gineering judgement, operational experience and must adhere to relevant system safety re- 
quirements. Once an adequate design is selected optimisation processes may be adopted to 
produce the best design possible. Optimisation is not restricted to the design process, it 
may be carried out at any stage of the life of the system. 
Once an offshore structure is operational it is impractical to consider redesign of the layout as 
a means of minimising the risk it poses. It is reasonable to consider the types of components 
used in the safety systems and determine whether any improvement in their unavailability 
will reduce the risk. The risk to be considered is the exceedence of an overpressure of 3 bar, 
the frequency of which is obtained through the prediction tool SAROS (see Chapter 6). 
Due to the complexity of SAROS, it will be regarded as a 'black box' model. The types of 
components used are identified by integer variables. There will be no algebraic constraint 
function for the problem, although there will be a limit placed on the cost of altering the 
nature of the components. 
This chapter looks at the optimisation process and the various techniques available to op- 
timise a system. The techniques appearing appropriate to the requirements of the problem 
discussed are summarised and evaluated in terms of applicability. 
5.2 The optimisation process. 
Optimisation is accomplished by defining an objective function to approximate the system 
behaviour and minimising this subject to constraints. The solution generated will only be 
optimum within the framework of the assumptions made, design variables selected and the 
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constraints specified. The classical optimisation problem is defined as 
min Q (x) (5.1) 
subject to gi (x) ýý 0i=1, m (5.2) 
hj(x)=O j=1,..., p (5.3) 
The objective function, Q (x), must be minimised subject to the m inequality constraint 
functions, 9 (x), and the n equality constraint functions, it (x), using the design vector, x, 
to provide a solution vector x*. Optimisation problems may be ones of maximisation, these 
can be converted to minimisation problems, as seen in Equation (5.4) and treated in the 
same way as the classical problem. 
max Q (x) = -min -Q (x) (5.4) 
Optimisation problems are typically approached assuming that x* exists and is unique, 
however this does not hold in all situations. It is only practical with most methods to 
assume that the solution located is a local minima ýc and not necessarily the global minima 
x*. The local solution to the optimisation problem satisfies the condition (5.5) 
Q (x) ý: Q (ýc) Vx sufficiently close to Sc (5.5) 
If it is known that the solution found may be local and the global solution is required then 
global optimisation schemes are available. 
The classical theory of unconstrained optimisation finds a minimum of Q (x) where all first 
partial derivatives, 
with a necessary condition 
aQ 
exist Vi C? Xj 
aQ aQ aQ 
= 5XI == DX2 C9X,, 
and a sufficient condition that 
192Q 
19Xjl9Xk 
exists at this point, (j, k=1, n), and the Hessian matrix is positive definite. 
Solving a constrained optimisation problem with equality constraints requires use of the 
Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian is defined for problem (5.1) with constraints of the 
form of (5-3) as 
Q (x) - EAj lbj (x) (5.6) 
Vi 
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The solution must satisfy 
OL OL 
ä -x-, = ... =ä -x-. =, hj (x) =0 (5.7) 
The Lagrangian is used to convert a constrained problem to an unconstrained one. 
Should the constraints include inequalities slack and surplus variables may be introduced to 
convert the problem to one involving equality constraints. The Kuhn Tucker conditions are 
then used to obtain a Lagrangian. 
This classical approach may only be used if an objective function is known. The type of 
objective function and constraints determines the optimisation algorithm employed to obtain 
a solution. 
There are two main areas of optimisation theory; mathematical programming and varia- 
tional methods. Pike (1986)(501 describes the differences in these techniques and provides 
an introduction to the two areas. The differences in these categorisations is the manner in 
which the objective is defined. The objective of mathematical programming is to locate the 
best point that optimises the model of the process. In general these methods are used to 
optimise steady state problems. The objective of variational methods is to locate the optimal 
function that optimises the model, this is typically required of dynamic problems and the 
most common solution method is that of calculus of variations. Extensions to mathematical 
programming are evolutionary procedures which consider the natural evolution of selection 
and optimisation over time as a basis. 
The optimisation problem under consideration requires a point solution rather than an op- 
timal function therefore requires a mathematical programming method or an evolutionary 
procedure. 
5.3 Mathematical programming. 
There exists a variety of mathematical programming methods which can be classified as direct 
or indirect methods. Direct methods include multi-variable searches and linear programming, 
these move from a starting point to an optimum solution. Indirect methods such as analytical 
methods and geometric programming rely on solving a set of algebraic equations to generate 
a solution which may be the optimum of the model. 
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Analytical methods use the classical theory of maxima and minima to identify the extreme 
points of a function. Geometric programming is an extension of this. Both methods require 
a well defined objective function, hence indirect methods must be neglected when no specific 
algebraic objective function exists. 
The basic optimisation methods are direct searches, these are simple techniques which prove 
valuable when solving unconstrained problems. When dealing with constraints one of the 
most common direct mathematical programming methods is linear programming. This 
method requires having a linear objective function optimised with linear constraints and 
is most effectively solved using the SIMPLEX method. If the objective function is quadratic 
but the constraints remain linear then quadratic programming techniques are available. 
These involve converting the problem to a linear programming problem for solution with 
the SIMPLEX method. Dynamic programming is a technique which uses a series of par- 
tial optimisations to solve the problem. When the problem involves a non linear objective 
function or an undetermined function, such as a computer program which uses specified 
inputs to produce an output, non linear programming or multi-variable search methods 
may be used. These are based on simple search methods which begin at a feasible starting 
point and move to the optimum following a search plan. Integer programming is an exten- 
sion of linear programming where the variables take on discrete values, these problems are 
commonly adapted to linear programming problems by techniques such as the branch and 
bound method. Combinatorial programming is often seen as a technique which encompasses 
the other methods, it includes linear, integer and dynamic programming techniques. This 
method is used when the solution involves choosing from subsets of the variables. Tile final 
mathematical programming method discussed is heuristic programming which uses rules of 
thumb to approximate an optimisation technique. 
5.3.1 Simple search techniques. 
Search methods of optimisation are simple to implement and may be used for complex 
problems where the model and constraints are in the form of a computer program rather 
than a specific equation, commonly referred to as 'black box' models. 
Search problems are classified by the number of independent variables and by the presence of 
random error. Deterministic problems have no experimental error or random factors present 
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as they usually are mathematical models of processes where the outputs are calculated by 
computer program from specified inputs. Stochastic problems have random error present 
usually in the form of experimental errors. 
Single variable deterministic problems have powerful solution techniques based on the min- 
imax principle however there are no comparable multi-variable techniques. 
The efficiency of search techniques is reliant on the search plan. This is the set of instruc- 
tions for performing n sets of experiments, these may be simultaneous or sequential. An 
experiment consists of specifying one set of values of the independent variables and deter- 
mining the values of the output. Sequential searches involve the outcome of one experiment 
to determine which experiment to do next. Generally when implementing a simple search to 
optimise a problem the initial interval of the independent variable is known, this is known 
as the initial interval of uncertainty. The search plan involves a procedure to reduce this 
interval of uncertainty, this may be accomplished by placing experiments in a manner that 
will eliminate parts of the initial interval that do not contain the optimum. The best search 
plan is desirable to avoid unnecessary experiment evaluations. A measure of the effectiveness 
of the search plans is necessary, this must be independent of the function being optimised 
to avoid any functional dependencies arising. 
These search plans are extremely effective for problems of one variable, which are unimodal. 
and when the approximate location of the optimum is known. 
5.3.2 Linear programming. 
A typical linear programming problem has the standard form of 
min cixi (5.8) 
n 
subject to aijxi = bj 1, ..., m (5.9) 
and Xi >0i=1,..., n (5.10) 
The standard form has m linear equality constraints and is subject to non negativity condi- 
tions. Should the constraints be inequalities slack and surplus variables may be introduced 
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to convert the problem to the standard form. 
nn 
slack aijxi :5 bj gives aijxi + yj = bj 
nn 
surplus aijxi ý! bj gives aijxi - yj = bj 
where yj > 0. Variables which are not required to be non negative can be transformed via 
Xk -= Uk - Vk k= 1) ... lp 
where Uk ý! 0 and Vk : 'ý 0- Substituting this form retains the linear form of the problem and 
requires all variables to be non negative. This problem now has n+p variables and a degree 
of redundancy since the representation Of Tk is not unique. To rectify this an alternative 
would be to eliminate rk by using a constraint equation and writing Xk in terms of the 
other non negative variables giving the standard linear form with n-p variables and m-p 
constraints. 
The most widely accepted method for solving linear programming problems is the SIMPLEX 
method. This is a Nvell documented technique with specific texts on the method (Murty 
(1976)[471, Lau (1988)[371 & Sultan (1993)[611) and most general texts on basic optimisation 
have chapters dedicated to it (Pike (1986)[501 & Fletcher (1987)[201). 
5.3.3 Non linear programming and multi-variable searches. 
Multi-variable search methods encompass the theory and algorithms of non linear program- 
ming which use algorithms based on geometric or logical concepts to move rapidly from a 
starting point to the optimum. Tile most basic yet time consuming method is that of a 
random search which divides the feasible domain into discrete regions and then places the 
experiments randomly. 
There are essentially six types of procedures to solve constrained non linear optimisation 
problems. Four of which convert the constrained problem to unconstrained ones these are 
penalty or barrier function methods, augmented Lagrangian functions, generalised reduced 
gradients and feasible directions. The other two methods are successive or sequential linear 
and quadratic programming. 
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When dealing with an unconstrained problem simple gradient searches may be used. Quasi 
Newton methods and conjugate gradient methods require the objective function to be a 
differentiable function so that the search can progress in the direction of the lowest gradient. 
Logical methods begin with local exploration and attempt to accelerate in the direction of 
success. 
Successive linear programming begins by selecting a starting point and linearising the model 
and constraints about this point. This is then solved as a linear programming problem to 
obtain an intermediate solution. The model is then relinearised about this point and the 
method repeated until convergence is obtained. Successive quadratic programming works in 
the same manner with the model being transposed into a quadratic model and the constraints 
being linearised allowing quadratic programming methods to be applied. 
5.3.4 Integer programming. 
Integer programming is an extension of linear programming where the variables must take 
discrete values. These variables impose additional constraints on the design problem. Prob- 
lems may be pure integer where all variables must be integer but they are generally mixed 
integer problems in that some of the variables are integer with the remainder being contin- 
uous. All integer programming problems have an associated linear programming problem 
which is identical except for allowing all the variables to take non integer values, these are 
known as the continuous problems. The problems can be represented as 
min Q (x) 
subject to XER xi E Z' Vi E1 (5.11) 
where I is the set of integer variables and R is the feasible region of the continuous problem. 
One method for finding the optimum solution is to solve the continuous problem then assign 
the nearest discrete integer values and check the design for feasibility. This trial and error 
procedure can be adapted to a potentially more accurate method known as an adaptive nu- 
merical optimisation procedure. First the optimal solution must be obtained with continuous 
variables then only the variables close to discrete integer values are assigned as integers. The 
problem is optimised again and this is repeated until all the variables are properly assigned. 
These methods are very simple however they lack efficiency. Tile computer time necessary to 
solve an integer problem is many times greater than that needed for solving the continuous 
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problem. A reasonably successful method for solving the integer problem in terms of the 
continuous problem is the cutting plane method. This method involves the addition of extra 
constraints to reduce the feasible region each time the continuous problem is solved. Due to 
the increasing size of the problem, it has been generally rejected in favour of the branch and 
bound method. 
Commonly investigated integer problems are the travelling salesman problem and the re- 
source allocation problem, which are both covered in many texts on integer programming. 
The multiple choice problem is an integer problem which involves the selection of the correct 
combination. This was defined by Dantzig in 1967 as 
min ex 
subject to Ax -b>0 
E% (MCIP) 
j1 xij m 
Xij e: {O, l} (5.12) 
This formulation relies on having a linear objective function subject to linear constraints 
and the multiple choice constraint (MCIP). To solve this problem explicitly may require 
M investigating [Ji=1 ni combinations, which grows exponentially. The most successful ways 
of solving'such a problem were using branchý and bound techniques combined with linear 
programming. Incorporating Lagrangian relaxation introduces a weighted linear penalty 
function whilst dropping some constraints, however this may fail to give reasonable solu- 
tions when multiple optima exist. Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997)[22] successfully applied 
genetic algorithms to the problem providing a speedier solution method which generates very 
reasonable solutions. However the objective function must be in a linearised form. 
The branch and bound method. 
A reasonably efficient method with wide applicability was introduced by Land and Doig in 
1960, this was named the branch and bound method. The name describes the main features 
of this method used to solve mixed integer linear problems. Problems of the form of Equation 
(5.11) are solved assuming continuous variables. If the minimiser x' exists for the problem 
in the continuous case and it is a feasible solution for the original problem, i. e. the solution 
variables are integer, then it is the solution. If it is not feasible because there exists an iEI 
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for which x, is not an integer then two problems are defined by branching on variable xi. 
These are described as 
branch - min Q (x) .x Ei R xi :5 
[xi] xi GZ Vi Ei 1 (5.13) 
branch + minQ(x): XER xi ý! [xi] +1 xi EZViEI (5.14) 
An optimal solution from problem (5-13) or (5.14) will be a feasible solution for the original 
problem. This branching process may be repeated until an integer solution is found. The 
tree structure generated is not unique as the solution to the continuous problem may violate 
more than one of the constraints giving a choice of variable to branch with. Nemhauser and 
Wolsey (1988)[481 provide a clear algorithm and worked examples of the method. 
This method has wide applicability however a disadvantage is that the number of nodes on 
the tree grows exponentially with the number of variables and may not be finite. Therefore 
it is expensive to examine the whole tree and is usually impossible. For an effective strategy 
two important decisions must be made whilst generating the tree: which problem or node 
should be solved next and which variable should the branch be made on. In most cases a 
partial tree may be considered, concentrating on the most sensitive variables. 
5.3.5 Combinatorial programming. 
Combinatorial programming is a mixture of linear, integer and dynamic programming. Fre- 
quently the variables in a combinatorial problem are binary integers, 10,1}, therefore the 
problems may be represented as integer programming problems. Mfiller-Merbach (1975)[46] 
states that the essence of combinatorial problems is that there are distinct elements of one 
or more sets which have to be ordered or divided into subsets (of selected and not selected 
elements). Generally these are problems whereby any particular kind of combination be- 
tween distinct elements of one or more sets are seeked. The number of different types of 
combinatorial problems is very large and each type requires a tailor made method. However 
a general solution approach may be followed. 
1. State the problem. 
2. Build an integer programming model - solve this using IP methods otherwise proceed. 
3. Estimate the number of solutions feasible. 
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4. Check whether explicit enumeration is an adequate method - enumerate otherwise 
proceed. 
5. Apply tree searches (implicit enumeration) - if too time consuming proceed. 
6. Develop and apply heuristic methods (incomplete enumeration). 
Building an IP is suggested (2) even though such algorithms are highly inefficient because 
they provide an insight into the structure and size of the problem. In building the IP a 
relationship to standard problems, for which solution methods exist, may emerge. However 
only in a few cases are IP methods more efficient than tree searches. 
5.3.6 Heuristic programming. 
Heuristic methods are not subject to precise mathematical criteria therefore there are no 
restrictions regarding the structure. However there are some guidelines as to the aims of a 
good heuristic method[46]. 
* Solutions should be yielded within a reasonable amount of computer time. 
9 Solutions should be close to the optimum, most of the time. 
* The probability of single solutions being far below the optimum should be small. 
Solutions gained from heuristic methods are not necessarily optimal solutions, however good 
solutions can be generated based on intuition. A test of the quality of a particular heuristic 
solution is to try and find a good lower bound which can be used as a guide to assess the 
optimality of the solutions generated by the method. Along side this stopping criteria may 
be introduced which will determine whether the solution generated is close enough to the 
lower bound for the iterative procedure to cease. A common test of an heuristic procedure 
is to try to solve the problem using alternative methods, even if crude, as a comparison. 
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5.4 Evolutionary procedures. 
Evolutionary operation (EVOP) was introduced by Box (1955) [8,71 as an analogy to the 
survival of adolescent lobsters whose survival depends on the combination of their character- 
istics. The evolutionary process demonstrates survival of the fittest. This natural selection 
causes the lobster population to evolve towards the optimum. The term EVOP was adopted 
to describe a process where the systems evolve to their optimum contours of constant re- 
sponse. The main ideas behind EVOP are 
1. Evolution concepts are applicable to experimental response. 
2. Replace the random natural variation with orderly, statistically based variation. 
3. Determine the direction to move from the results obtained. 
4. Kill off all experimental conditions except the ones that produced the most desirable 
result. 
5. Create a new generation of experiments in the desirable direction. 
Improvements have been made in EVOP processes leading to the introduction of genetic 
algorithms. In the 1970s Holland[281 invented the genetic algorithm to mimic the processes 
observed in natural evolution. This technique is more sophisticated than the EVOP methods 
used previously and research into its applications is ongoing. 
5.4.1 Sequential SIMPLEX methods. 
Box chose classical factorial designs to represent the variation in the process, primarily 
because they allow estimates of the interactions among factors. In order to make EVOPs an 
automatic procedure with formalised decisions, Spendley et. al. (1962)[601 proposed using a 
SIMPLEX pattern in an evolutionary scheme. SIMPLEX EVOP (or sequential SIMPLEX) 
has two noticeable advantages over classical EVOR The number of experiments in the initial 
SIMPLEX design is k+1 instead of 2k in the factorial design. The SIMPLEX requires only 
one new experiment to move to an adjacent region whereas the factorial design requires at 
least half of the number of initial experiments. 
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The sequential SIMPLEX uses a geometric figure which has a number of vertices equal to one 
more than the dimensions of the space. The response for each vertex is calculated, the vertex 
with the worst response is rejected. The simplex is reflected through the mid point of the 
hyperface between the next to worst and the best response. The reflected vertex is evaluated 
and the procedure is repeated by rejecting the next to worst response of the previous simplex. 
This method is formalised using standard worksheets, examples of which are provided by 
Walters et. al. (1991)[671. The sequential simplex algorithm may be improved by using a 
variable step size. The variability of the step size is determined by comparing the response 
of the best value of the previous simplex with the response of the reflected vertex. Variable 
sized simplexes are ideal for dealing with a situation where the locality of the optimum is 
unknown. A large simplex covering the whole domain may be used initially as this can then 
collapse onto the optimum. 
Constrained optimisation limits the range in which the simplex can move. This leads to 
boundary violation for the factors. Should the simplex attempt to cross the boundary then 
in the case of a variable simplex the out of bounds vertex must be assigned an infinitely bad 
response therefore forcing a contraction into the feasible region. For a fixed size simplex the 
responses should be set so that the simplex is forced to spin back into the feasible range, 
however this will involve creating a few phantom experiments. 
To find the optimum the simplex must converge. For a multi factor simplex the optimum 
has been found when the simplex spins on the best vertex. Convergence with the variable 
sized simplex may never occur within the time allowed for the optimisation, although the 
region of the optimum will be reached relatively quickly. 
Sequential simplex algorithms may not be used in all situations. Discrete and integer vari- 
ables are incompatible with the simplex method. The method involves evaluating many 
responses within the feasible region. A narrow feasible region will involve many evaluations 
which are outside the boundaries wasting valuable time and resources. 
5.4.2 Genetic algorithms. 
Holland created the genetic algorithm based on the observation that natural evolution op- 
erates on chromosomes rather than the living beings they describe. Natural selection causes 
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the chromosomes that encode successful structures to reproduce more often than those that 
do not. Along with natural selection, mutations occur which cause the chromosomes of the 
children to be different from those of the biological parents. 
A genetic algorithm is a technique for solving difficult problems in a similar way to nature 
by working on the variables rather than the responses in a blind manner. This means 
that the algorithm has no memory, the information about the previous responses is not 
used for producing a new set of variables. A genetic algorithm works on strings of binary 
digits which represent the variables, emulating a chromosome. The genetic algorithm is 
initiated by randomly choosing a population of strings, unlike most optimisation methods 
which initiate their search from a point. The strings are manipulated using processes of 
reproduction, crossover and mutation to produce a new string. Each string is assigned a 
fitness value based on the constraints and the system evaluation, a common utility for the 
fitness value assignment is the biassed roulette wheel. Strings with a suitable fitness value 
are reproduced and placed in the mating pool ready for crossover and mutation. The strings 
in the mating pool are paired ready for parenting, crossover mates the parents at a random 
point, swapping the substring after this point producing two new children. Reproduction 
and crossover effectively combine previous good strings however they may neglect potentially 
useful material and hence mutation is employed to avoid this. Mutation is the occasional 
random change in the value of a string position. The fitness values of the members of this 
population are evaluated. This process is repeated until convergence of the string is obtained. 
Genetic algorithms are naturally unconstrained, however constraints are easily incorporated 
by attaching penalties to any infeasible solutions. Genetic algorithms have the advantage 
of being very robust, covering a wide diversity of optimisation fields and maintain a good 
level of efficiency. A downfall to genetic algorithms is the random quality they possess in 
determining the string, this can lead to many system evaluations being necessary in order 
to optimise the system. 
5.4.3 Simulated annealing. 
Simulated annealing is also known as Monte Carlo annealing, probabilistic hill climbing, 
statistical cooling and stochastic relaxation and may be regarded as a variant of the heuristic 
local neighbourhood search. This method is analogous to physical annealing which involves 
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increasing the temperature of a solid to the maximum value causing the solid to melt and 
then decreasing the temperature carefully until the particles solidify. The analogy is that 
the solutions in combinatorial optimisation problems are equivalent to the states of physical 
systems with the cost being equivalent to the energy of a state. A transition is a combined 
action resulting in the transformation of a current solution to a subsequent solution. This 
transition is applied in two steps; application of a generation mechanism and application of 
acceptance criteria. The transition matrix which consists of the probabilities of moving from 
one state to another is a homogenous Markov chain. 
Unlike local neighbourhood searches this method is not restricted to finding only local op- 
tima. Difficulties in using the method lie in finding a suitable acceptance criteria to decide 
the probabilities of moving from one solution to another and determining the local neighbour- 
hood in which to initiate the search. The method involves long running times to converge 
to an approximate solution, with fine tuning being necessary for a more accurate solution. 
Advantages in using the technique are the ease at which it may be implemented and the 
applicability to most combinatorial problems. An introduction to the method and its appli- 
cations is given in Reeves (1993)[54]. 
5.5 Discussion. 
Tile methods of optimisation described in this chapter were chosen due to their possible 
applicability to the problem. 
The classical theory of optimisation provides the basis for further optimisation schemes. As 
it stands the classical theory is inappropriate as the problem under consideration does not 
have a known algebraic objective function. The problem posed requires a point solution 
therefore mathematical programming methods have been looked at rather than variational 
methods. The problem relies on the evaluation of a 'black box' deterministic model as an 
objective function therefore search techniques appear more appropriate than function reliant 
programming methods. However a search technique requires a search plan. Existing search 
plans are robust for one variable models, when the problem is unimodal and the approximate 
location of the optimum is known. Optimising the safety systems on an offshore structure 
involves many variables therefore a multi-variable search is needed. For this purpose sim- 
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ple gradient searches are common but generally require a well defined algebraic objective 
function. 
Much work has been done on linear programming techniques which require the objective 
function and the constraints to have linear forms. Non linear programming techniques are 
not as common and invariably rely on approaches to linearise the model. A promising 
approach is successive linear programming for which the model should be linearised about 
a point then existing linear schemes are employed to find another point when linearisation 
is again used until convergence is obtained. Linear programming schemes are efficient when 
using continuous variables. The variables in our problem are integer which would require 
the use of integer programming schemes. Integer programming methods allow the integer 
variables to be used within linear programming schemes but such methods can be long 
winded and the computer processor time involved is significantly higher than that used in 
a linear programme. Hence a successive linear programming scheme with integer variables 
will use a vast amount of processor time. 
The main drawback to evolutionary procedures is the randomness of selecting initiating 
points and the many system evaluations required to obtain an optimum. 
There are no methods immediately appropriate to optimising the system described. It ap- 
pears that heuristic techniques may be the best option. 
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6. A methodology for calculating the 
frequency of explosions. 
6.1 Introduction. 
SAROS (Safety and Reliability of Offshore Structures) is a computer program developed at 
Loughborough University by Andrews and Smith[3], to predict the frequency of explosions 
of different magnitudes, arising from an accidental release of gas, occurring in a module on 
an offshore platform. This methodology combines established risk assessment techniques, 
such as event tree analysis and fault tree analysis, with fluid flow modelling. Fault tree 
and event tree methods are used to determine the frequencies of occurrence of all possible 
scenarios resulting from a leak of gas. Each scenario evolves from the initial gas leak from 
a process section which can be isolated. The event tree branch points determine whether 
the gas detection system functions, the relevant isolation and blowdown valves function and 
the deluge system activates. A distribution of leak hole sizes is considered. Using fluid 
flow modelling the gas release rate is computed allowing the variation of the module gas 
concentration with time to be calculated. The frequency of an explosion is calculated by 
combining the time that the concentration is between the flammable limits with the predicted 
ignition rate. The severity of the overpressures generated from the explosion are calculated 
based on an empirical relationship derived by British Gas. 
This chapter provides the background on the platform being considered and the data required 
to use the SAROS program. A general overview of the workings of SAROS is given in Sections 
6.4 and 6.5. The limitations of SAROS are presented in Section 6.6. 
6.2 The platform. 
An example platform is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Divisions of the platform are known as 
modules. Some platforms, as in the example, have a large proportion dedicated to accom- 
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ccommo ation 
wellheads 
separation 
compression 
Figure 6.1: An example of the layout of an offshore platform. 
modation, facilities and service modules which are not of concern. The modules of interest 
are those in which a release of gas could occur. The three most susceptible modules are 
the wellhead, separation and compression modules. The wellhead module is where the well 
bay fluids are pumped from the sea, this mixture consists of gas, condensate, oil and water. 
Within the separation module the water is returned to the sea, the oil is separated off and 
stored for transportation ashore and the gas and condensate mixture carries on to the next 
stage. In the compression module the gas mixture is pressurised ready to be pumped ashore. 
A module contains pipe work, process vessels, storage containers, blowdown and isolation 
valves. Figure 6.2 shows a hypothetical layout associated with a module which exemplifies 
the features. The modules are typically semi enclosed, therefore susceptible to the effects 
of the wind. A module is subdivided into sections. A section is defined, in our study, to 
be the pipe work and process vessels which may be isolated. For example in Figure 6.2 
the first section is between isolation valve ISOM to isolation valve ISOL2, this contains 
the pipe work and compressorl and has blowdown valve BDI connected to it. If a leak 
originates from a particular section, the adjacent isolation valves are assessed to determine 
the potential inventory of the leak. The isolation valves are designed to activate on detection 
of a leak, closing to prevent the inventory of the other sections from contributing to the leak. 
Blowdown valves activate on detection of a leak, opening to provide an escape route for the 
gas. They reduce the available inventory of the leak and the pressure within the section. If 
a leak has occurred on section 1 between ISOM and ISOL2, in Figure 6.2, the gas within 
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the pipes and cornpressorl will influence the leak, with the flow rate being determined by 
the pressure and temperature of the mixture within the section. If ISOL2 has failed then 
the inventory of gas within the pipes up to ISOL3 and that in scrubberl must also be taken 
into consideration. 
Leaks are expected to develop at flange failures on pipe work or process vessels yielding holes 
with diameters of the order of millimetres. The flange failures fall into a range of hole sizes, 
for this methodology the hole sizes have been grouped and the mean of each group taken as 
the hole size for all members of that group. This provides discretised values to work with. 
In these modules three hole sizes are considered. 
6.2.1 The safety systems. 
The isolation and blowdown valves make up an integral part of the safety systems on the 
platform. However these will only operate automatically should the leak be detected, oth- 
erwise manual operation of the valves is required. The detection system installed on the 
platform is very important, it is designed to detect the presence of gas at a level of 20% of 
the lower flammable limit of the gas. The detection system dictates the response of the other 
safety systems. Tile isolation and blowdown valves work together to reduce the inventory of 
gas released into the module. Once the gas is within the module it may come into contact 
with an ignition source which may produce a fire or explosion. Explosions occur when the 
ignition source comes into contact with a gas cloud, hence an effective ventilation system is 
required to disperse the gas from the module before this happens. The platform considered 
has semi enclosed modules, with the module open to the natural effects of the wind speed 
and direction. For the purpose of the methodology the natural effects are described by a 
distribution of air changes per hour. Excessive overpressures, generated during an explosion, 
will damage the integrity of the structure. To suppress the overpressures generated miti- 
gating systems are employed. Water deluge is used on the platform for this purpose. This 
is initiated on detection of the gas presence, however there will be a delay until the water 
reaches the gas cloud. 
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6.2.2 The modules. 
The hypothetical platform being analysed in this thesis contains three modules which are 
divided into sections. Schematic diagrams of the modules may be found in Appendix A. 
The wellhead module contains three sections, labelled 9 to 11, which may leak into this 
module. The actual volume of this module is 3630rn 3 but the effective volume is 907.5rn3. 
This effective volume is 1 of the module volume, it represents the volume in which the gas and 3 
air are assumed to mix taking into account the volume occupied by the process equipment. 
Section 9 is the wellhead and production header line which is connected to 19 production 
wells. This section is at a relatively low pressure of 19.67 bar g, temperature of 71'C and has 
a volume of 1-73'm 3- Section 10 is the gas injection line which is connected to 2 gas injected 
wells. This section is at a pressure of 380 bar g, temperature of 107'C and has a volume of 
3, M3. Section 11 is the gas lift line with 5 gas lift wells. This is at a pressure of 178 bar g, 
temperature of 510C and has a volume of 10.9m 3. The mixture within each of the three 
sections is gas. Leaks in the wellhead module may contain gas, oil or condensate due to the 
connections to other sections in other modules. Section 9 is connected to section 3, within 
the separation module, via isolation valve 33XV001 and to section 14 by wellhead valve 
19. Section 10 is connected to sections 8, in the compression module, and 15 via isolation 
valve 35XV383 and wellhead valve 2. Section 11 is connected to sections 8 and 16 via a non 
return valve and wellhead valve 5. The blowdown valves providing relief to the module are 
34XV031,35XV422 and 35XV382. 
The separation module contains two sections, labelled 1 and 3, which may leak into this 
module. The actual volume of this module is 8000m 
3 with the effective volume being 2000m 3 
Section 1 is the atmospheric separator which is at a pressure of 1.6 bar g and a temperature of 
610C. The section contains both gas and oil, gas occupies 51.49M3 and oil occupies 57.03m 3. 
Section 3 is the inlet separator which is at a pressure of 19.69 bar g and a temperature 
of 710C. This section also contains gas and oil, gas represents a volume of 78.02m 
3 and 
3 oil 88-27m . Section 1 connects to section 
4, in the compression module, with two isolation 
valves 34XV001 and 35XV090, section 5 via 35XV186, section 6 with 35XV092 and section 
12 with 41XV201- Section 1 also connects to section 3 by isolation valve 34XV033. Section 
3 connects to section 5 with two valves 35XV125 and 35XV149 and to section 9 with 
33XV001. There are eight blowdown valves which may provide relief. Should the leak 
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be on section 3 blowdown valve 34XV031 is designed to activate. The other seven valves 
35XV044,35XV103,35XV157,35XV171,35XV277,35XV279 and 41XV002 will only 
provide an escape route for the gas if one of the isolation valves has failed. 
The compression module has four sections, labelled 4,5,6 and 8, which may leak into 
this module. The actual volume of the module is 8000m 3 with the effective volume into 
which a leak may occur being 2000m 3- The sections within the compression module are 
further divided into subsections. Section 4 contains low pressure compressors and scrubbers. 
Section 5 contains medium Pressure compressors, section 6 has medium pressure scrubbers 
and section 8 has the injection compressors. The volume, temperature and pressures of the 
subsections in the compression module are shown in Table 6.1. 
Section Pressure Temperature Volume 
(bar g) (OC) (M 
3) 
4 1.2 61 14.44 (gas) 
5.6 145 1.54 (gas) 
4.65 30 6.94 (gas) 
2.78 (cond. ) 
2.1 147 0.28 (gas) 
1.4 61 0.28 (gas) 
5 19.4 76 1.75 (gas) 
18.3 30 26.15 (gas) 
11.34 (cond. ) 
6 46.1 105 2.75 (gas) 
45.3 30 13.88 (gas) 
4.46 (cond. ) 
44.8 30 10.76 (gas) 
169.5 150 2.63 (gas) 
8 173.5 146 3.11 (gas) 
169.2 38 5.81 (gas) 
380 ill 1.52 (gas) 
Table 6.1: The inventory data for the sections within the compression module. 
Section 4 contains gas and condensate, but leaks may occur which contain oil due to a 
72 
A methodology for calculating the frequency of explosions. 
connection to section 1 via isolation valves 35XVOOO and 34XV001. Section 4 also connects 
to section 5 via 35XV104. The isolation valves and the sections they connect to are tabulated 
in Table 6.2 and the blowdown valves are tabulated in Table 6.3. 
Connecting sections Isolation valve 
1 3 34XV033 
1 4 35XV090 & 34XVOOI 
1 5 35XV186 
1 6 35XV092 
1 12 41XV201 
3 5 35XV125 & 35XV149 
3 9 33XV001 
4 5 35XV104 
5 6 35XV172 
6 7 XVX3 
6 8 35XV306 
6 12 41XV053 
8 10 35XV383 
8 11 NI 
8 13 90XV6/7 
9 14 WELL19 
10 15 WELL2 
11 16 WELL5 
Table 6.2: The isolation valves and the sections they connect. 
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Section Blowdown valve 
3 34XV031 
4 35XV044 & 35XV103 
5 35XV157 & 35XV171 
6 35XV277 & 35XV279 
7 35XV419 
8 35XV382 & 35XV422 
12 41XV002 
13 90XV011 
Table 6.3: The blowdown valves and their locations. 
6.3 Input data. 
The safety systems may fail, this leads to different scenarios occurring. Each isolation valve, 
blowdown valve, detection system and deluge system has a probability of failure. Event 
trees are used to determine the possible scenarios and the frequency of occurrence. Figure 
6.3 shows an event tree relating to a leak on a section which is connected to two other 
sections as shown in Figure 6.4. 
Av 'N B V, Nc 
ISOU ISOL2 
Figure 6.4: An example connection of sections relating to the event tree. 
If the leak is initiated on section B the event tree demonstrates 55 scenarios that may occur. 
The first consideration is whether the gas leak is detected, if it is not none of the other 
safety systems will be initiated giving scenario number 55 with no blowdown valves and 
an infinite inventory of gas. If the leak is detected, we consider whether isolation valve 
ISOM closes, if it does section A does not contribute to the leak so the blowdown on 
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Figure 6.3: An example event tree. 
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section A is not considered. The next consideration is whether the isolation valve ISOL2 
closes, if it does section C does not contribute to the leak and the blowdown on section 
C is not considered. As the leak occurs on section B the blowdown of section B must be 
considered, following this the mitigation system is considered. The mitigation state of the 
explosion affects the severity of the overpressures produced, therefore if the water spray is 
not activated unmitigated explosions occur. Unmitigated explosions may also occur if the 
water spray activates but is not maintained, hence this is the final consideration. 
As an example path 26 in the event tree in Figure 6.3 is obtained by the following events 
occurring. The gas leak occurs and is detected. Isolation valve ISOM fails to close meaning 
that the inventory of the leak includes that from section B and section A. The blowdown valve 
on section A works as designed opening to provide pressure relief for the section. Isolation 
valve ISOL2 also fails to close adding the inventory of section C to the leak. The blowdown 
valve on section C opens to provide further relief. The blowdown valve on section B also 
operates as designed. The water spray mitigation system is activated however this is not 
maintained for the duration of the leak. This leads to the possibility of having a mitigated or 
an unmitigated explosion depending on when the failure takes place compared to the when 
the ignition takes place. This situation involves the leak having the inventory of sections A, 
B and C, but having relief from blowdown valves on all three sections. 
From the initiating event of the gas leak occurring there are eight different events which are 
considered as a success or a failure leading to a possible 55 branches. The events are either 
a total success or a total failure. No partial failures are considered due to the large event 
trees generated for the modules with only the two states, this is justified by the fact that 
the total failure will give the worst case scenario. 
Each of the events has an associated probability of occurrence. Each outcome has a frequency 
of occurrence which can be calculated by taking the product of the probabilities of each 
branch leading to that outcome. The probabilities of the failure of each valve or safety 
I 
system is determined prior to the construction of the event tree by conducting a fault tree 
study. Such a study takes an event such as an isolation failure and considers all possible 
causes, breaking them down until basic events are reached. 
The information provided by the event tree is the topology data file used by SAROS. 
Along with the topology file, SAROS requires data relating to the inventory of the module. 
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This inventory file contains the details of each section on the platform, this includes the Vol- 
ume of gas, condensate and oil, the densities of these, the pressure and the temperature of 
the section. The inventory file also identifies the module being analysed and provides its am- 
bient conditions, the hole sizes expected, their frequency of occurrence and the overpressure 
distribution data. 
The creation of the topology file and the inventory file is done using a program named 
DAVROS (Detailed Analysis and Verification of Realistic Offshore Structures) created by 
Natural Solutions. DAVROS is a windows based program which allows the user to represent 
the platform layout and section connectivity graphically. Pull down menus facilitate the 
input of equipment data. DAVROS checks that it has been given the required data and 
checks that there are no connectivity errors in the platform construction before generating 
the topology and inventory files. This removes the need for constructing large event trees 
by hand which is a process prone to error. 
6.4 Calculation methodology. 
Working with each potential scenario, ie ventilation rate, section within the module, com- 
binations of isolation failure and blowdown failure, the inventory of the leaking section is 
determined. From this a flow rate into the module may be calculated. For an explosion to 
occur the gas must form a cloud. 
The concentration of the gas cloud is assumed to be uniform and fill the effective module 
volume. This concentration is calculated from the flow rate of the gas into the module and 
the ventilation rate, mimicking the natural effects of the wind speed and direction. For an 
explosion to occur the concentration of the gas must be within the flammable region which is 
bounded by the lower flammable limit (LFL) and the upper flammable limit (UFL). Below 
the lower flammable limit the concentration of gas is such that there is not enough fuel for 
ignition to occur. Above the upper flammable limit the concentration of gas is so high that 
there is not enough oxygen for ignition to occur. For natural gas the LFL is 5% and the 
UFL is 15%. The concentration profile may take one of three forms, Figure 6.5. The first 
profile demonstrates the concentration of gas rising to a peak below the flammable region. 
As the concentration never reaches the flammable region an explosion is not possible. The 
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Figure 6.5: Possible profiles for the gas concentration with time within the module. 
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second profile enters the flammable region and peaks blow the upper flammable limit. An 
explosion may occur when the concentration is between the flammable limits therefore an 
explosion is possible between t1 and t4. The final profile shows the concentration rising 
above the UFL before peaking thenfalling back through the flammable region. In this case 
there are two time periods in which an explosion may take place. An explosion is possible 
as the concentration rises, between t1 and t2, and again as it falls, between t3 and t4. 
The concentration level at which an ignition occurs is important when determining the 
overpressure distribution. Figure 6.6, taken from Catlin et al. (1993)[91, shows the correla- 
tion between the magnitude of the overpressure and the concentration level. Hence if the 
frequency of an explosion at a specific concentration level is known the magnitude of the 
expected overpressure can be determined. 
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The flammable region is typically divided into ten equal bands within this range, therefore 
giving 5%-6%, 6%-7% ... 14%-15%. For the 
frequency of an explosion to be calculated 
the times at which these concentration bands is reached is necessary. The overpressures 
generated are dependent on the state of the mitigation system, as can be seen from Figure 
6.6 the greater the amount of mitigation the lower the generated overpressures are. The 
frequencies of explosions occurring are categorised dependent on whether the explosions are 
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mitigated or unmitigated. 
6.5 Operation of code. 
SAROS operation follows the flow chart in Figure 6.7. The code begins by processing the 
data from the input files in the subroutines INITIALISE and SETUP. For each ventilation 
rate, all the sections within the module are considered. For each section the ways that 
the sections combine due to isolation failure are considered in turn, for each combination 
all possible blowdown situations are looked at with each of the discretised hole sizes. This 
determines the situation and the inventory of gas available. 
The subroutine BANG is called to calculate the flow rates of gas into the module and hence 
the concentration of gas within the module. This routine assumes a changing temperature 
scenario which may only be solved using a time stepping process. BANG returns the times 
at which each concentration range is reached. 
For each concentration range the entering and exit times are considered. Depending on 
whether the concentration exceeds the UFL either SITU2 or SITU3 is called. Both sub- 
routines use the times from BANG to calculate the probability of ignition occurring in the 
different mitigation situations. SITU2 calculates the frequency of the ignition if the gas cloud 
enters the concentration range but does not exceed it. SITU3 is based on the concentration 
range being exceeded. 
The frequencies are tabulated according to the section number, concentration range and type 
of explosion. The results for each section are printed to a file within subroutine PRE, S1 and 
for the module in PRES2. The importance measures are printed by PRES3 and PRES4. 
These importance measures give the percentages of the explosion frequency due to different 
sections and scenarios. 
Using the frequencies of explosions at different concentration levels the subroutine OVER- 
PRES calculates the overpressure exceedence distribution. 
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Figure 6.7: The flow chart showing the operation of the code. 
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6.6 Criticism of SAROS. 
The SAROS methodology makes assumptions on the flow rates, concentration build up and 
makes simplifications in the frequency calculations. 
This methodology makes the assumption that should an isolation valve failure occur the 
contents of the connecting section influences the leak. The pressures and temperatures of 
the sections are averaged. This is an assumption that may not be correct, however this has 
not been addressed within this thesis. 
The leaking section may connect to more than one other section, each of these isolation 
valves may fail therefore the situation may involve the contents of a few sections. However 
SAROS does not account for these connecting sections also having isolation valve failure 
leading to further sections. Contributions to the leak may only come from adjacent sections. 
For example in Figure 6.4 a leak initiating on section A may involve the contents from section 
B if ISOM fails, yet the failure of ISOL2 is never considered so the contents of section C 
have no influence. A study has been conducted into expanding the event tree to cover such 
situations by Chew (1995)[121 however the event trees generated were themselves very large 
leading to large data files which greatly increased in the computer processor time without a 
significant degree of accuracy obtained. 
The frequency of an explosion is calculated by assuming a leak hole develops on a section. 
SAROS does not have the capability to calculate the frequency of an explosion should two 
leaks develop simultaneously. A crude approximation to this frequency would be to multiply 
the frequencies of the events together, but this would only be accurate if the events were 
independent. This is clearly not the case as the leaks may share the same inventory, effectively 
increasing the hole size. In any case more than one leak will result in a different concentration 
profile emerging within the module. 
SAROS originally assumed that the leak flow consisted of all the components of the mixture 
within the leaking section, i. e., if 1 of the mixture was gas, 1 condensate and .1 oil then the 236 
flow rate would be in the same proportions. Due to the relative densities of the oil, gas and 
condensate, oil is likely to be at the base of the vessel and therefore would not contribute to 
the leak if the hole appeared at the top. BANG has been modified to allow for leaks which 
neglect oil and leaks which neglect both oil and condensate. Since gas is the main factor 
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within the sections and oil and condensate do not appear in some scenarios, leaks consisting 
solely of oil or condensate have not been considered. Results of this study are presented in 
Chapter 7.6. 
When the leak occurs it is assumed that the pressure and temperature of the leaking section 
drop. There is assumed to be negligible heat input to the system therefore giving constant 
entropy. In reality it is likely that there is an exchange of heat between the section and 
the module. To test this assumption a model has been developed that assumes that there 
is sufficient heat transfer to keep the section at constant temperature whilst condensate 
remains in the section hence retaining the driving pressure during this time. The theory 
of this model is presented in Chapter 7.4. The true scenario should lie between the two 
models, hence an upper and lower bound for the results should be found. The magn itude of 
the bound will determine how appropriate it was to make this assumption. The calculation 
procedure provides an alternative to BANG with EXPLODE. Unlike BANG, EXPLODE is 
a suite of subroutines as shown in Figure 6.8. The flow rates depend upon whether the flow 
is choked or unchoked and constant temperature depends on there being condensate within 
the section. In some cases analytical formulae may be used rather than the time stepping 
process employed in BANG, hence the reasoning for splitting EXPLODE into subroutines. 
The concentration of gas is assumed to be uniform, immediately throughout the effective 
module volume and therefore an ignition source in any location has the same chance of 
igniting the gas. The concentration does in fact have to build up within the module with 
the area around the leak hole being more likely to have a higher concentration than the 
extremities of the module. The speed at which the gas is released and the effects of the strong 
wind speeds may mean that this assumption proves to be correct. However an alternative 
strategy using computational fluid dynamics correlations is presented in Chapter 9. 
The simplification of the frequency calculations means that an explosion at a specific con- 
centration level may occur within the time period that the concentration is at that level 
with no consideration of whether any ignition has occurred previously. New calculations 
take into account this possibility and are presented in Chapter 8. Within the code two new 
subroutines, PROBS1 and PROBS2, are provided as alternatives to SITU2 and SITU3. 
Some of the data used to generate the inventory and topology files comes from observa 
tional and empirical sources. Historical data is common place however offshore installations 
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Figure 6.8: The flow chart showing the suite of subroutines employed in EXPLODE as an 
alternative to BANG. 
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originate from around 1960. Over the past four decades there have been many changes in 
operational procedure and the safety systems installed therefore this data may be unreliable. 
Chapter 10 is a sensitivity analysis on such data, done to show the effects of having errors 
within the data. 
6.7 Discussion. 
This chapter has introduced the makeup of the offshore platform considered within this 
thesis. Accidental hydrocarbon releases may occur in one of three modules: separation, 
compression and wellhead. The schematic diagrams of these modules are provided in Ap- 
pendix A. 
SAROS is a methodology for determining the frequency of an explosion occurring and the 
magnitude of overpressure expected. An outline of the SAROS code has been given, more 
details on the calculations involving the fluid release may be found in Chapter 7 and those for 
the probability calculations in Chapter 8. The limitations of SAROS have been described, 
these will be addressed in the following chapters. 
7 introduces two methods for calculating the leak flow rate ofthe hydrocarbon release. 
7.6 compares the results obtained from SAROS when the leak contribution is varied. 
7.8 provides a comparison between the results from the two temperature state models. 
8 introduces a more accurate method for calculating the frequencies of explosions. 
9 addresses the assumption of assuming uniform concentration throughout the module. 
10 analyses the effects of having small inaccuracies within the empirical data. 
85 
7. Modelling the release. 
7.1 Introduction. 
To calculate the frequency of an explosion resulting from an accidental leak of gas, the nature 
of the release must be determined. Leaks are expected to develop at flange failures on pipe 
work or process vessels yielding holes with diameters of the order of millimetres. The vessel 
may be at high pressure, containing a mixture of gas, condensate and oil. 
Two methods for modelling the release are presented in this chapter. The first model assumes 
no heat input into the system therefore there will be changing temperature throughout the 
duration of the leak. This model was originally developed by Andrews and Smith (1994)[3]. 
The second model addresses this assumption by assuming that there is sufficient heat transfer 
into the system to keep the temperature constant during the initial stages of the release. It 
is expected that in reality the situation will lie somewhere between the two with there being 
some heat input to the system. Hence the models will provide upper and lower bounds for 
the frequency. The differences between these bounds will indicate whether the simplifying 
assumptions made in the original model were valid. Alongside the temperature state of the 
system during the leak, the constituents of the release were varied and their results compared. 
7.2 Calculation procedures. 
Both models share some basic assumptions: 
1. Although the vessel/pipe-work may contain a mixture of gas, condensate and oil (e. g. 
in the separator), only gas and condensate contribute to the generation of the gas 
cloud. (Oil is of more concern when considering fires. ) 
2. Gas and condensate leak in the same proportions as they exist in the vessel. 
3. Gas and condensate have different release speeds, this gives the correct interpolation 
86 
Modelling the release. 
as the gas or condensate left within the vessel approach zero (Andrews and Smith 
(1994)[3j). 
4. The condensate immediately evaporates on contact with the atmosphere. 
5. The gas and air mix perfectly and instantaneously on release providing uniform con- 
centration. 
6. The leak is considered to occur into a fixed specified volume. 
The gas discharge rate is calculated by the laws of gas dynamics and the condensate discharge 
rate is calculated by assuming that there is a reservoir of ideal incompressible fluid. The 
average density of the gas-condensate mixture is 
p =, ap, + (1-0 -P) pi (7.1) 
where 6 is the proportion of the gas (volume), and p. and pi are the densities of the gas 
and condensate (liquid) respectively. The mass of the gas-condensate mixture is M= pV 
and the rate of mass discharge is ! iu- = Vý2 where volume is constant due to there being no dt dt 
contraction or expansion of the vessel walls. 
Rom assumptions 1,2 and 3, the total mass flow rate is 
ßwg + (1.0 - ß)WI (7.2) 
where W. is the mass flow rate of the gas and W, is the mass flow rate of the condensate, 
which may be obtained from the continuity equation 
wg- = pgvq A W, = plvA 
where z/., and v, are the discharge speeds of the gas and the condensate respectively and A 
is the area of the leak hole. 
To obtain the discharge speed of the condensate Bernoulli's equation is used. For an isen- 
tropic flow this is 
2 
Z+ ! ýE 
= constant A2 
where p is the pressure. Within the module the pressure is atmospheric, pa, and the discharge 
speed is vj, at the point of release the speed is zero and the pressure is p. 
V2 p Pa I 
A2 pi 
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Manipulation of this equation gives the discharge speed of the condensate. 
vi = 
(2p 
A 
pa 
Hence the mass flow rate of the condensate is 
1 
Pa) pl) 2 W1 =A (2 (P 5 
This equation will also apply to the mass flow rate of any oil. 
(7-3) 
The discharge speed of the gas is obtained using the laws of gas dynamics. The gas is 
assumed to be a perfect gas 
4=K 
pg 
(7.4) 
where K is a constant and y is the ratio of specific heats -y = cp1c, where CP is the specific 
heat capacity of the gas at constant pressure and c, is the specific heat at constant volume. 
Bernoulli's equation in compressible flow gives to the discharge speed of the gas (Equation 
7.5) which leads to the gas flow rate when the flow is unchoked (Equation 7.6). 
, y- 
pg 
(7.5) vg2 =2) 
ý- 
['. 
0 - 
(-y 
1.0 p 
'y 
2 
2 Kz-lPa 1.0 (7.6) Wg = 
(2A 
-Y 1.0 Pj 
However if the gas reaches its maximum speed, the speed of sound, the flow becomes choked. 
The critical pressure ratio is used to determine whether the flow is choked or unchoked. For 
unchoked flow this is 
p 
,: ý 
(-y + 1.0), y 1.0 (7.7) 
Pa 2 
If there is choked flow the ratio Pa/p has a maximum value of 
'y 
+ -Y 
Substituting this maximum value into Equation 7.5 gives the maximum discharge speed of 
the gas as 
27p 
Vgmax (1.0 + ^J) pg 
This then may be used to give a flow rate for choked flow 
2 
2 3-1.0 Y, 
O+" 
.q 
=A 
(PPJ7 
1.0 + ^1 , 
(7.8) 
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The gas flow rate for choked flow is dependent upon the density. The density of the gas 
changes as the leak occurs. The flow rate may be re-expressed to eliminate dependencies on 
pg. a is introduced to represent a product of constant terms such that 
W9 -- V9 
dpq 
- A(ppg)'2a where dt 
The change in gas density with time is 
dpg 
=A 
(ppg) I 
a. 
dt V9 
I 
2 Y+"O) 
1.0+7 
I 1.0+-t AK! 2p_q 
V9 
Integrating to find the gas density and substituting this into the gas flow rate equation gives 
the flow rate of the gas independent of the change in gas density as 
1 
,2(1.0 - 
-y (AKi 
g(0) 
1.0-, y iat) 
+ pý w9 = AKU 2V2 
(7.9) 
.q) 
""+, y 
The discharging condensate is assumed to evaporate immediately on contact with the atmo- 
sphere. The volume outflow into to the module, W, is 
w 
Pa 
where p,, is the atmospheric density. 
(7.10) 
The volume concentration of gas within the module can be calculated by considering the 
rate of change of the gas volume in the module, V 
.q 
dVg,,, 
= W. - C9 (WI, + W. ) dt 
(7.11) 
where c., is the volume concentration of gas and W,, is the volume ventilation rate. Dividing 
by the total volume of the module, V,,, gives 
dcg 
+ cg 
W" + W. W" (7.12) 
dt 
( 
V. 
) 
V. 
7.3 Changing temperature - no heat input. 
This section gives an overview of the main calculations performed in the model designed by 
Andrews and Smith[31. This model assumes that as a leak occurs the temperature of the 
leaking vessel reduces due to there being no heat transfer within the system. As temperature 
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reduces the pressure also reduces. The ratio of condensate to gas will change as a leak 
occurs, because as the pressure is reduced the condensate evaporates which increases the 
gas/condensate ratio. The gas does not behave adiabatically because an exchange of entropy 
between the gas and condensate phases is assumed. By assuming that there is no heat input 
into the system the total entropy per unit mass is constant. The entropy per unit mass 
between the gas and liquid phases when in equilibrium is given by 
59 - sl (7.13) 
where A is the latent heat and T is the temperature. The total entropy of the system is 
mgsg +'MISI = MS (7.14) 
where M= mq + mi. Manipulating equations 7.13 & 7.14 leads to 
s9 (1.0 - 6) +s T 
(p 
For a two-phase mixture the Clausius-Clapyron equation can be applied 
-dp. -A1- 
1)-1 (7.16) 
dT 
(pq 
Pi 
The gas is assumed to be a perfect gas 
pqRT 
(7.18) 
The change in pressure with respect to time, differentiating equation 7.17, is 
dp dpg dT 
RT + Rpg dt dt Tt 
This is substituted into equation 7.16 to eliminate the temperature which leads to 
dp (l. 
() _E(1_1»= 
Ldpg (7.19) 
dt l\ p9 Pl pg dt 
Assuming that ds = 0, as the change of entropy is negligible due to no heat input, the 
entropy can be eliminated to obtain a relationship between the changes of gas density and 
mixture density. Differentiating equation 7.18 leads to 
dp 
_ 
ip dpg 
-. 
pApl dß ýipA (1.0 _ 0) 
ýp 
_ 
pip, \ (l. 0_ 0) 
dT 
(7.20) 
dt pg dt cTp dt CJP2 dt CJ2 p dt 
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Rom thermodynamics entropy is defined as 
Tds =d- 
dp 
p 
where h is the enthalpy. But ds =0 and A= cpdT giving 
dp 
cv7p dT 
Manipulation of the governing equations leads to 
dp A dpg [1 ))-' 'I + _L 
(1.0 
_E(1_ 
L5, 
dt Tp pg A dt pg A pg PI 
1Pg 
PI 
(PT 
CVIYP AOpl 1 (7.21) 
Pg T (pj - pi)j 
Solving these equations numerically provides new proportions and flow rates at incremented 
time steps. 
7.4 Constant temperature - total heat input. 
This section describes an alternative method to model the release. Consider a pressurised 
container which may contain a mixture of gas, condensate and oil in equilibrium. The 
assumption is made that the mixture is kept at a constant temperature throughout the leak 
process. The leak is assumed to consist of either gas and condensate or gas only. The oil 
is neglected in terms of leak flow and blowdown flow and only serves to reduce the volume 
of the container. To use the original model and consider ! IT- = 0.0 will not suffice, since dt 
density changes are calculated from equations originating from the Clausius Clapyron which 
assumes a change in temperature. Therefore an alternative method must be found. The 
mixture is assumed to be in 2 phase equilibrium, under such conditions the pressure is a 
function of the temperature, hence for a given temperature there is a given pressure. For 
the temperature and consequently pressure to be constant, whilst there is a leak there must 
be evaporation of the condensate to maintain the equilibrium. Once all the condensate has 
evaporated there is no longer a2 phase mixture and the pressure begins to decrease. 
Two situations are considered in the modelling. The first is a gas only release when conden- 
sate is present in the section. The second is a gas and condensate release. When there is no 
condensate within the section the temperature can not be kept constant hence the modelling 
does not change in this case. 
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7.4.1 Gas only leak. 
If the leak is gas only whilst there is condensate in the section the discharge mass flow rate 
is W= Wg. This is a constant flow rate until the condensate has evaporated. The time 
at which all condensate has evaporated can be calculated by considering the changes in the 
volume and mass of gas within the vessel. The new volume of gas after a small time 5t is 
the original volume of gas plus the volume created from the evaporation of condensate. 
VI =V gg+ 
(7.22) 
where 6ml, is the mass of condensate evaporated. 
The new mass of gas after bt is 
I=M (7.23) mg g- bMql - 6Mgb + 6MIe 
where 6m. 1 is the mass of gas leaked and bMgb is the mass of gas blown down. As pg is 
constant whilst liquid remains dividing equation 7.23 by equation 7.22 and rearranging leads 
to the rate of evaporation 
dmi, 
dmgl 
+ 
dmgb 
,= 
dt dt (7.24) 
dt 1.0 - pg pt 
Equation 7.24 will only be true if the blowdown has activated otherwise 
dmgt 
dmi, dt (7.25) 
dt 1.0 - -PP2 
ýMgl. 
-W 
dt 
LMgb 
_W I 
dt 
b 
where Wb is the blowdown flow rate. 
If td is the time at which the blowdown activates then the rates of evaporation are 
t< td dmi, 
dt 
t> td 
dml, 
dt 
Integrating Equation 7.27 with respect to time 
-W (7.26) 
1.0 
- 
pg 
PI 
-W - Wb 
1.0 
- 
pg (7.27) 
PI 
under the condition that the time of ev'apo- 
ration will occur when the mass of the liquid is zero gives the time of evaporation to be 
--P1 MI(O) 
(1-0- 
PI) 
+ Wbtd 
tevap : -- -W+ Wb (7.28) 
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after this time the pressure and the density of the gas will decrease. 
A differential equation exists to give the concentration of gas within the module 
dcg 
+ cg 
W" + W. W" (7.29) 
dt 
( 
VII, 
) 
V. 
where V,,, is the volume of the module, W, is the volume outflow into the module, W,, is the 
volume discharge rate out of the module and eg is the concentration of gas. 
w 
Pa 
Before the condensate evaporates equation 7.29 can be solved analytically 
W" Wl)+W. )t) 
Gg -W- 
[1.0 
e(-( vm (7.30) 
v+W. 
I 
Rearranging will give the time for any given concentration. 
V. 
In 
W, (7.31) W. -+w,, 
I (w, 
' - Cq 
(W" T-W. -)) 
I 
so if t<t,,,, p the limits of the concentration bands (upper and lower flammable limits) can 
be converted into volume concentrations and substituted into equation 7.31 to determine the 
time at which these limits are reached. To determine whether t<t,,,, p then the maximum 
concentration should be calculated. 
-( 
ll'. ývv )tevap)] 
Cg max -WW- 
[1.0 
- e( (7.32) 
v+ 
Wa 
Once the condensate has evaporated W, is no longer constant and so equation 7.29 must be 
solved numerically. 
7.4.2 Gas and condensate leak. 
Under the assumption that both gas and condensate can leak it is assumed that the leak 
flow is a combination of gas and condensate in the same proportions as the contents of the 
section in terms of volume. 
w =, 6wg + (1.0 -, 6) W, (7.33) 
Whilst there is condensate in the section the flow rates of the gas and liquid are constant due 
to the constant density. But due to the evaporation of the condensate 8 will increase with 
93 
Modelling the release. 
time. This time dependence can be determined by considering the changes in the volume 
and mass of gas. The new volume of gas after time bt 
V, V 
67nit 
+ 
&MIc 
+ 
6MIb 
g+A (7.34) 
The new mass of gas after 6t 
1 Mg = Mg - 6M91 - 5M9b + 6Mle (7.35) 
where 5ml, is the mass of the condensate leaked and 5MIb is the mass of the condensate 
blown down. Equations 7.34 and 7.35 only apply if the blowdown has activated, i. e., t> td- 
Because the density of gas is constant, equations 7.34 and 7.35 can be used to determine the 
rate of evaporation. 
*t< td 
dmi, 
, 
pg (1-0 - 
ß) Wi + plßwg 
(7.36) (pl 
- pg) 
0t> td 
dmi, 
= 
Pg (1-0 - ß) (WI + Wib) + Piß 
(Wg + Wgb) 
(7.37) 
dt (pl - pg) 
To determine 6's dependence on time consider the original definition of 8 
volume of gas 
total volume 
and differentiate with respect to time, then equate with either equation 7.36 or, equation 7.37 
depending on whether the blowdown has activated, this leaves a differential equation f6r, 3 
0t< td 
dß 
- 
ßwg + (1-0 - ß) Wi (7.38) 
dt v (pl - pg) 
'0 t> td 
dß 
_ß 
(Wg + Wgb) + (1-0 - ß) 
(WI + Wib) 
(7.39) 
dt v (P, - pg) 
These can be solved to give 
t< td 
13(o) +-W, 
)e(7, ý, 
I 
=-,, Vý )t)W, (7.40) 
W9 - W, W9 - W, 
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*t> td 
Wl + Wlb 
(W9+! ýgb-M-Wit (td-t) (3(td) 
+ 
Wg + Wgb - 
Wl 
- 
Wlb 
)e 
V(pl-pg) 
Wl + Wlb 
Wg + Wgb - Wl - Wlb 
These are now substituted into the mass flow rate which is not constant hence a time stepping 
process is necessary to calculate the concentration of gas in the module. 
The change in the volume of gas in the module is 
dVg,, 
=W_ (W+w dt v 
cg v (7.42) 
This gives the new volume of gas in the module which allows the calculation of the concen- 
tration. 
As soon as there is only gas remaining in the section the pressure and densities will decrease. 
This means that the flow rate is solely gas where W9 is either of the form of equations 7.9 
or 7.6 depending on the flow being choked or unchoked. As the flow is not constant time 
stepping is again required. 
7.5 The leak flow inventory. 
The leaking sections can contain any mixture of gas, condensate and crude oil. The original 
model, (model 1), assumes that gas, condensate and oil all leak into the module in pro- 
portion to the mixture left within the leaking section. The condensate evaporates within 
the atmosphere and is considered along with the gas to effect the gas concentration of the 
module. The leakage of oil is considered to change the volume and proportions within the 
section, but has no effect on the concentration of gas in the module. Model 2 considers the 
leakage of gas and condensate. Oil is neglected and is only considered to reduce the volume 
within the leaking section. The leak is again assumed to be in proportion to the gas and 
condensate in the section. Model 3 considers a leak of gas only. Whilst gas is leaking the 
condensate is evaporating providing further gas. 
Models 4 and 5 are constant temperature models. Model 4 considers the leakage of gas 
and condensate. Oil is neglected and is only considered to reduce the volume within the 
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leaking section. The leak is again assumed to be in proportion to the gas and condensate 
in the section. Model 5 considers a leak of gas only. Whilst gas is leaking the condensate is 
evaporating providing further gas. In all models whatever is considered to be the leak flow 
is also the blowdown flow. 
The results are presented in three sections. The first section compares results from running 
the changing temperature model with different leak flow inventories. The second section 
compares the results of the constant temperature model with different leak flow inventories. 
The third section compares the two temperature state models with the most appropriate 
leak inventory. 
7.6 Leak inventory comparison with the changing tem- 
perature model. 
The 3 models considered in this section assume a change of temperature during the leak 
flow, relating to the decreasing pressure. The models differ only in the contents of the leak. 
(The form of the mixture blowing down to flare is assumed to mimic the form of the leak. ) 
Model I Gas, Condensate and Oil all leak into the module in proportion to the mixture 
left within the leaking section 
Model 2 Gas and condensate leak into the module in proportion to the gas and condensate 
mixture left within the leaking section. Oil is neglected from the leak flow, but is 
considered to reduce the volume of the leaking section. 
Model 3 Gas leaks into the module. The condensate is assumed to evaporate within the 
leaking section producing more gas and again the oil serves only to reduce the volume. 
7.6.1 The separation module. 
A leak detected in the separation module originates from either section 1 or section 3, the 
atmospheric and inlet separators. The volume of section 1 is 108.52 M3 of which gas occupies 
51.49 M3 with oil occupying the remaining 57.03 m 3. Section 3 has a volume of 166.29 M3 
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with 78.02 m' of gas and 88.27 rn3 of oil. Due to the amount of oil in the sections it is 
expected that model 1 will have significantly different results to models 2 and 3. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.25564X 10-6 
0.30446x 10-7 
0.14318x10-10 
0.34135x 10-5 
0.17768 x 10-6 
0.73086x10-7 
0.61201x10-11 
0.23206x 10-5 
0.25054x 10-6 
0.25966x 10-7 
0.18384x10-10 
0.33492x10-1 
Total explosion frequency 0.36996xlO-' 0.25714xlO-5 0.36257xlO-, 5 
Table 7.1: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 1 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Section 1 may connect to sections 3,4,5,6 and 12. Should an isolation valve fail between 
sections the inventory of the leak will include the contents of the section adjacent to that 
valve. Sections 4,5,6 and 12 all contain a mixture of gas, oil and condensate therefore 
significant differences were expected between the different leak inventory models. 
The gas only release, model 3, generates similar results to the gas, condensate and oil release, 
model 1. For section 1 the gas and condensate model, model 2, has the lowest explosion 
frequency. However the frequency of explosions prior to mitigation is higher than the other 
models with the frequency of mitigated explosions being lower. 
Tile gas cloud within the module is formed from the leaking gas and condensate, assuming 
instant evaporation of the condensate. The leak is assumed to be in proportion to the 
contents of the contributing sections. For model 1 oil leaks but does not contribute to the 
gas cloud, however its proportion must be taken into account. The flow rate of the gas cloud 
mixture is 
, 
3g Wg +, 31 W1 where 'ag + 
ol +, 60 =1 
For model 2 the oil does not leak so the proportions of the oil is taken to be zero. The 
values of the proportions of the gas and condensate are therefore higher leading to a higher 
leak flow rate than model 1. For model 3 the oil and condensate do not leak therefore the 
... 
Due to the flow rate of the condensate being much higher flow rate consists of gas only, W 
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than that of gas the flow rate of model 3 is much lower than that of model 2. The possible 
inventory combinations connected with section 1 do not have a high proportion of condensate 
compared to those of the oil and gas so the flow rate for model 1 are dominated by the flow 
of gas. This leads to similar results between models 1 and 3. The higher flow rates of model 
2 cause the gas cloud to build up quicker allowing more chance of an explosion prior to 
mitigation. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.27343 X 10-6 
0.80344 x 10-7 
0.43493x10-11 
0.36032x10-5 
0.28291 x 10-6 
0.27506xlO-G 
0.36246x10-11 
0.35363x 10-5 
0.28252xlO-' 
0.24376x 10-6 
0.43620x10-11 
0.35633xlO-' 
Total explosion frequency 0.39570x10-5 0.40942 x 10-5 0.40885 x 10-5 
Table 7.2: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 3 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Section 3 connects with sections 5 and 9. Section 5 contains gas, condensate and oil, whereas 
section 9 contains gas only. For section 3 the gas and condensate release model has the 
highest explosion frequency. As for section I the frequency of explosions occurring prior to 
mitigation are greatest for model 2 and the frequency of mitigated explosions are lowest. 
Model Module explosion frequency 
1 0.76566 X 10-5 
2 0.66656 X 10-5 
3 0.77142 x 10-5 
Table 7.3: The total explosion frequencies for the separation module (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
From Table 7.3 it can be seen that model 2 the gas and condensate release produces the 
IoNvest explosion frequency for the module with model 3 the gas only release producing the 
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highest frequency. The gas and condensate release leads to lower frequencies of explosions 
occurring due to a leak on section 1 but higher frequencies for explosions due to leaks on 
section 3. 
Since the contents of sections 1 and 3 is a mixture of oil and gas it would be expected that 
there would be no significant difference between models 2 and 3, but isolation valves are 
not failsafe. A failure of isolation valves leads to the contents of other sections affecting the 
leak. Sections 1 and 3 are connected via such valves to sections 4,5,6,9 and 12 which do 
contain condensate, leading to the difference in the models. Table 7.4 shows the importance 
of failures of the isolation valves in their contribution to an explosive situation. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 1 model 2 model 3 
13 34XV033 2.75 2.88 2.49 
14 34XV090/001 22.31 8.67 21.36 
15 35XV186 16.42 13.95 15.23 
16 35XV092 6.80 7.49 5.89 
1 12 41XV201 2.26 6.44 2.19 
35 35XV125/149 17.34 16.10 13.84 
39 33XVOOI 2.78 3.10 2.67 
Table 7.4: The importance of the isolation valves in the separation module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
Isolation valves 34XV090 and 34XV001 connect section 1 to section 4, these are the most 
critical valves in the module for models 1 and 3. Over 20% of explosions occurring in the 
separation module are due to leaks on section 1 combined with the inventory of section 4 due 
to isolation failure. This is significantly reduced for model 2, this may be due to the high 
flow rates produced which leave less time within the explosive range. The isolation valve 
with the lowest contribution in models 1 and 3 is 41XV201 with an importance of 2.26% and 
2.19% respectively. Using model 2 this increases to 6.44%, leaving valve 34XV033 between 
sections 1 and 3 as the least critical. 
The criticality of each of the blowdown valves is tabulated in Table 7.5. Tile blowdown valve 
on section 3,34XV031 is the most important for each model. Blowdown valves act to reduce 
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the pressure within the leaking section, should they fail there is no escape route for the gas 
or any relief to the pressure apart from through the leak hole. The different release models 
allow the mixture of blowdown fluids to be in the same proportion as the leak flow. The 
gas, condensate and oil release has an effectively reduced blowdown hole due to the oil, as 
soon as oil is restricted from blowing down the gas may depressurise faster as more of it can 
escape. The failure of the valve then becomes more critical. 
Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 1 model 2 model 3 
3 34XV031 3.21 8.29 7.40 
4 35XV044 0.429 0.163 0.482 
4 35XV103 0.408 0.158 0.443 
5 35XV171 0.636 0.555 0.558 
5 35XV157 0.875 0.698 0.844 
6 35XV277 0.207 0.226 0.179 
6 35XV279 0.230 0.203 0.195 
12 41XV002 0.169 0.039 
Table 7.5: The importance of the blowdown valves in the separation module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
The isolation valves and blowdown valves will not always fail. The percentages of explosions 
originating from leaks on sections 1 and 3 when tile isolation and blowdown systems work 
as designed are shown in Table 7.6. Many more explosions are attributed to section 3 when 
tile isolation and blowdown systems work than section 1, indicating that sections adjoining 
section 3 have less influence on explosion frequency than those connected to section 1. For 
model 2 more importance is given to both sections under these categories suggesting that 
the importance of the isolation valves failing becomes less critical. Using model 1 1.18% of 
explosions occur due to a leak on section 1 when blowdown and isolation work, therefore 
most occasions when a leak occurs on this section, tile contents of other sections influence 
the leak. 
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Model Section Importance 
1 1 1.18 
3 29.5 
2 1 2.89 
3 34.79 
3 2.5 
30.06 
Table 7.6: The importance of the sections in the separation module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage) - comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
Table 7.7 shows the percentage of explosions attributed to each of the mitigation categories. 
Mitigated explosions contribute the most to the explosion frequency calculations. For each 
model leaks on section 3 have a greater likelihood of resulting in an explosion. For model 2 
the importance of section 3 decreases. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
1 1 3.339 0.398 0.187X 10-3 44.58 
3 3.571 1.049 0.568x 10-4 47.06 
2 1 2.666 1.049 0.918 x 10-4 34.82 
3 4.244 4.127 0.544 x 10-4 53.05 
3 3.25 0.336 0.238x 10-4 42.42 
3.66 3.16 0.565x 10-4 46.18 
Table 7.7: Total importance measures for the categories of explosions in the separation 
module (percentage) - comparison of models 1,2 and 3. 
The range of overpressures generated is depicted in Figure 7.1a. The range of overpressures 
generated and the magnitude of the exceedence frequencies are similar for each model. Figure 
7.1b shows the lower overpressures generated which have fairly high exceedence frequencies. 
The gas, condensate and oil release model, model 1, generates higher exceedence frequencies 
for this range of overpressures than the other two models, with model 2, gas and conden- 
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sate release, having the lower exceedence frequencies. However the critical overpressures 
are around 3 bar, at which point the platform may collapse or have its integrity seriously 
damaged. Figure 7.1c shows the exceedence frequencies of the higher overpressures. There 
is no structure to which model produces the higher and lower exceedence frequencies of the 
overpressures. At around 3 bar the gas and condensate model has the lowest exceedence 
frequency and the gas model has the highest. 
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a) The range of overpressures generated 
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of the overpressure exceedence for the separation module using 
models 1,2 and 3. 
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7.6.2 The compression module. 
Sections 4,5,6 and 8 (all compressors) can leak directly into the compression module. 
Pressures of these sections are high, sections 4,5 and 6 are divided into subsections relating to 
different pressure values, some of these subsections contain a mixture of gas and condensate. 
Section 8 is also divided into subsections but these contain only gas. Model 3 therefore is 
expected to produce different results for all sections except section 8. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.36978 x10-' 
0.33777x 10-6 
0.50945x10-11 
0.60035 x 10-5 
0.36976 x 10-6 
0.34156x 10-6 
0.49201 x 10-11 
0.59993X 10-5 
0.42794xI0-6 
0.31923 x 10-7 
0.16899xlO-10 
0.73067x10-' 
Total explosion frequency 0.67111 x 10-5 0.67106xlO-5 0.77666x10-5 
Table 7.8: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 4 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Models I and 2 produce similar results for section 4. Isolation valve 35XV104 connects this 
section to section 5 which contains gas only. Valves 34XV090 and 34XV001 connect to 
section 1 which has a mixture of gas and oil. Therefore a leak on section 4 may involve gas, 
condensate or oil. The contribution of the oil to the leak must be negligible as the results for 
models 1 and 2 are very similar. However model 2 does appear to have a higher flow rate, as 
before, leading to a higher frequency of explosions occurring prior to mitigation activating 
and lower frequency of mitigated explosions. The failure of the valves between sections 1 and 
4 contributes approximately 2% to the frequency of explosions within the module bearing 
out the assumption of a negligible oil contribution. Model 3 neglects the condensate leaking, 
this leads to lower flow rates which steadily increase the gas cloud and therefore the chance 
of an explosion. For section 4 the gas only release model, model 3, has the highest explosion 
frequency, with model 2 having the lowest. 
Section 5 connects to sections 1,3,4 and 6, leading to combinations containing gas conden- 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.75120x10-1 
0.68405 X 10-' 
0.13361 x 10-10 
0.12198 x 10-4 
0.74552 x 10-1 
0.70662x 10-6 
0.12659xlO-10 
0.12078 x 10-4 
0.80911 x 10-' 
0.34384xlo-G 
0.21450x10-1' 
0.13530x 10-4 
Total explosion frequency 0.13633x 10-4 0.13530x 10-4 0.14684x 10-4 
Table 7.9: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 5 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.45962 x 10-6 
0.63053X 10-6 
0.43807x 10-11 
0.72514xlO-' 
0.46250 x 10-6 
0.63419xlO-r' 
0.43852xI0-11 
0.72972xlO-5 
0.50918X10-6 
0.59489xlo-6 
0.70311X10-11 
0.81369X10-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.83416x10-5 0.83939XIO-5 0.92409x10-1 
Table 7.10: Explosion frequency contribution from leaks on section 6 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
sate and oil hence there are differences between the results of the three models. Model 2 
has the lowest explosion frequency contribution and model 3 has the highest. With model 
3 the flow rate is reduced, prolonging the length of time it takes to exhaust the gas, so that 
the concentration stays within the explosive range for a longer period. The lower flow rate 
also means that it takes longer for the gas cloud to build up to a flammable concentration 
level. This may account for the low frequency of explosions occurring prior to mitigation 
and high frequency of mitigated explosions and those occurring if the mitigation fails to be 
maintained, with model 3 compared to models 1 and 2. The higher flow rate of model 2 
yields a greater frequency of explosions occurring prior to mitigation and a lower frequency 
of the other categories. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.11795x 10-6 
0.76433x 10-6 
0.31731 X 10-12 
0.12584x10-5 
0.11795X 10-6 
0.76433x 10-6 
0.31731 X 10-12 
0.12584 x 10-5 
0.11808 X 10-6 
0.76538x 10-6 
0.31833X 10-12 
0.12596xlO-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.21407x 10-5 0.21407x 10-5 0.21431 x 10-5 
Table 7.11: Explosion frequency contribution from leaks on section 8 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Section 6 connects to sections 1,5,7,8 and 12 which again gives combinations with mixtures 
of gas, condensate and oil. As for section 5 model 3 has the highest frequency of an explosion, 
however the lowest is generated by model 1. In this case the explosions prior to mitigation 
have a higher frequency of occurrence with model 2 than with model I due to a higher release 
rate, but unlike other cases the mitigated explosions are not reduced. This indicates that the 
concentration profile from model I did not reach the flammable region in some cases whereas 
the higher release rates of model 2 cause the concentration to be flammable. Explosions when 
the mitigation system fails to activate are dependent upon the whole time the concentration 
is within the flammable region, hence for the frequency of such explosions to be larger for 
model 2 than model 1, the time within the explosive range must be larger. Section 8 connects 
to sections 6,10,11 and 13. None of these sections contain oil hence a leak on section 8 
will make the same contribution to the explosion frequency whether using models 1 or 2. 
However there is condensate in section 6, the failure of isolation valve 35XV306 will join 
the inventory of section 6 to that of section 8, introducing condensate to the leak flow. The 
removal of condensate from the leak flow, model 3, generates slight differences in the results. 
For section 8 model 3 leads to the highest explosion frequencies. Table 7.12 shows the total 
explosion frequencies for the module. Overall model 2 has the lowest explosion frequency and 
model 3 has the highest. This follows the pattern demonstrated for the separation module. 
Since sections 4,5,6 and 8, the sections that may leak directly into the compression module, 
contain only gas and condensate, it would be expected that models 1 and 2 would produce 
the same results. However these sections are connected by isolation valves to other sections 
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Model Module explosion fre 
1 0.30827x 10-4 
2 0.30776x 10-4 
3 0.33835 x 10-4 
Table 7.12: The total explosion frequencies for the compression module (per year) - compar- 
ison between models 1,2 and 3. 
that also contain oil. The percentage of explosions that occur in the compression module 
when the isolation and blowdown systems work as designed are shown in Table 7.13. Due 
to the individual sections containing no oil the percentage of explosions occurring when the 
isolation and blowdown work are identical for models 1 and 2. For model 3 more importance 
is given to sections 4 and 6. 
Model Section Importance 
1 4 16.6 
5 34.3 
6 17.5 
8 6.1 
2 4 16.6 
5 34.3 
6 17.5 
8 6.1 
3 4 18.7 
5 32.8 
6 17.7 
5.5 
Table 7.13: The importance of the sections in the compression module when the isolation 
and blowdown works as designed (percentage)- comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
In all cases leaks on section 5 are the most critical. Since over 30% of explosions occur 
due to leaks on section 5 when the safety systems activate this suggests that the sections 
connecting to section 5 have less influence on the explosion frequency for the module than 
107 
Modelling the release. 
those connecting to the other sections. Table 7.14 shows the importance of the isolation 
valves. High importance shows that the explosion frequency is influenced by that connecting 
section. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 1 model 2 model 3 
41 34XV090/001 1.907 1.908 0.350 
45 35XV104 3.70 3.67 4.83 
51 35XV186 1.15 1.03 1.49 
53 35XV125/149 2.43 2.21 2.00 
56 35XV172 4.96 4.92 6.33 
61 35XV092 0.487 0.657 0.347 
67 XVX3 2.92 2.94 2.80 
68 35XV306 0.360 0.360 0.321 
6 12 41XV053 0.503 0.508 0.506 
8 10 35XV383 0.016 0.016 0.015 
8 11 NI 0.060 0.060 0.055 
8 13 9OXV6/7 0.303 0.303 0.277 
Table 7.14: The importance of the isolation valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
Isolation valve 35XV172, connecting sections 5 and 6, is the most critical valve. Failure of 
this valve contributes approximately 5% to the frequency with models 1 and 2. This value 
increases for model 3 with a decrease in the importance of valves 34XV090 and 34XV001 
between section 1 and 4. The importance of the isolation valves within the compression 
module are insignificant compared to those in the separation module. Due to the high 
pressures within sections 4,5,6 and 8 in the compression module, explosive scenarios are 
produced without the addition of further material making the importance of the isolation 
failures insignificant. 
The pressures driving the leak flow may be diminished with the aid of blowdown valves which 
act to relieve the pressure of the section. The criticality of these valves is shown in Table 
7.15 
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Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 1 model 2 model 3 
3 34XV031 0.073 0.075 0.057 
4 35XV044 1.23 1.23 1.26 
4 35XV103 1.19 1.20 1.21 
5 35XV171 2.32 2.32 1.89 
5 35XV157 2.69 2.69 2.02 
6 35XV277 2.68 2.68 2.43 
6 35XV279 2.77 2.78 2.54 
7 35XV419 0.062 0.062 0.062 
8 35XV422 0.419 0.42 0.38 
8 35XV382 0.302 0.300 0.280 
12 41XV002 0.01 0.01 0.01 
13 9OXV011 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Table 7.15: The importance of the blowdown valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
Blowdown valve 35XV279 on section 6 is the most critical, although the percentage of 
explosions attributed to its failure are negligible compared to those which occur when the 
blowdown works. 
The mitigation state of the explosion is identified in the frequencies, this is also the case 
in Table 7.16 where the percentages of the explosions occurring in each section are listed 
according to the mitigation status. 
In all models leaks on section 5 contribute the most to the explosion frequency. Leaks on 
section 8 appear to be negligible compared to other sections 
Figure 7.2a shows the range of overpressures generated within the compression module when 
a gas cloud builds up. The exceedence frequencies of the overpressures are similar for each 
model, although it does appear that the gas only release, model 3, generates lower exceedence 
frequencies of the overpressures than the other two models. Figure 7.2b shows a close up 
of the lower overpressures generated. The lowest overpressures have a higher frequency of 
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Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
1 4 1.19 1.09 0.165 x 10-4 19.48 
5 2.44 2.22 0.433 X 10-4 39.57 
6 1.49 2.04 0.142x 10-4 23.52 
8 0.383 2.48 0.103 X 10-5 4.08 
2 4 1.20 1.10 0.159 X 10-4 19.49 
5 2.42 2.29 0.411 X 10-4 39.25 
6 1.50 2.06 0.142 x 10-4 23.71 
8 0.383 2.48 0.103xlO-' 4.08 
3 4 1.26 0.09 0.499 x 10-4 21.6 
5 2.39 1.02 0.634 x 10-4 40 
6 1.50 1.76 0.208x 10-4 24.05 
8 0.35 2.26 0.941 x 10-6 3.72 
Table 7.16: Total importance measures for the categories of explosions in the compression 
module (percentage) - comparison of models 1,2 and 3. 
exceedence when using model 3, until approximately 0.025 bar. Any overpressures above 
this value have a lower frequency of exceedence for model 3 than models 1 and 2. The gas 
and condensate release, model 2, closely mirrors the 'exceedence frequency distribution of the 
overpressures generated by model 1, however the exceedence frequencies with model 2 are 
slightly higher. Figure 7.2c shows the exceedence frequencies of the overpressures centred 
around 3 bar. 
110 
Modelling the release. 
0f 
a) The range of overpressures generated 
ISE45 ----. ----- -- -. -.. -. -- -- .-... I -, ,I 
-G-Gs c-b-Im I 
IOE45 ý W, 
ým I 
-W- gý* rd 
21Eý -A-g. 3 
2. OE-OS 
I. OE45 
6 OEý 
0 0E, 00 
0 06 1 1.6 2 ZS 3 31 
Overpressure (bar) 
b) The lower overpressures generated 
LSE-05 
2 OEý 
1.5E. 06 
I OEý 
6 OE-08 - 
0 OE. 00 4 
0 
ý6 ýj 
0.16 0.2 02S 03 0.36 04 0.45 
Overpressure (bar) 
c) The higher overpressures generated 
4E-06 "ID', 111. lofidf AS&W 
2E-06 Q a Ad d a sale 
. DE-06 
CE-07 
CE-07 
OE-07 
OE-07 
)E. 00 - 
2.2 24 26 29 332 34 
Overpt4ssurs (bar) 
Figure 7.2: Comparison of the overpressure exceedence for the compression module with 
models 1,2 and 3. 
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7.6.3 The wellhead module. 
Leaks in the wellhead module originate in section 9,10 or 11, each of which contains only 
gas. Via the failure of isolation valves these sections may connect to sections 3,8,14,15 
and 16. Sections 3 and 14 contain a mixture of gas and oil, therefore neglecting oil from the 
model is expected to have some influence on the results. Sections 8,15 and 16 contain only 
gas. In any combination there is no condensate available to leak into this module, lience 
models 2 and 3 should produce identical results. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.10630 X 10-7 
0.14597x 10-7 
0.42827x 10-12 
0.23093x 10-6 
0.99635 x 10-1 
0.12174xlo-7 
0.39648 x 10-12 
0.21795xlO-' 
0.99635 x 10-1 
0.12174xlO-7 
0.39648x 10-12 
0.21795 x 10-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.25615X 10-6 0.24008X 10-6 0.24008xlo-G 
Table 7.17: Explosion frequency contribution from leaks in section 9 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Section 9 connects to section 3 via isolation valve 33XV001 and section 14 via valve WELL19, 
these sections contain oil therefore giving differences between models 1 and 2. As there is no 
condensate in these sections there is no difference between models 2 and 3. All the models 
generate a flow rate entirely dependent on the flow rate of gas multiplied by the proportion 
of gas within that section. For models 2 and 3 this proportion is 1, but for model 1 it de- 
pends on the proportion of oil therefore giving a lower flow rate for model 1. As the results 
for all categories of explosions are higher for model 1 than models 2 and 3 this suggests 
that the higher flow rates lead to a gas cloud concentration outside the flammable region 
whereas the lower flow rate of model 1 generates a gas cloud whose concentration remains 
within the explosive region for a longer period of time. The results from the three models 
are identical for section 10, this is because the only possible connection is to section 8 which 
also contains only gas. Section 11 connects to sections 8 and 16 which only contain gas 
therefore leading to identical results between the models. It can be seen that the explosion 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency, 
Original, modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.12951 x 10-7 
0.48445 x 10-8 
0.25378x 10-12 
0.29427x 10-6 
0.12951 x 10-7 
0.48445 x 10-13 
0.25378x 10-12 
0.29427x10-r' 
0.12951 X 10-7 
0.48445xlO-' 
0.25378x 10-12 
0.29427x 10-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.31207x 10-6 0.312ON10-6 0.31207x10-r' 
Table 7.18: Explosion frequency contribution from leaks in section 10 (per year) - comparison 
of models 1,2 and 3. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised leak flow 
model 1 model 2 model 3 
mitigation fails to activate 
prior to mitigation 
mitigation not maintained 
mitigated 
0.26400xlo-7 
0.11970xlO-8 
0.10228x 10-12 
0.59777x 10-6 
0.26400x10-7 
0.11970 x 10-8 
0.10228 x 10-12 
0.59777x10-' 
0.26400xlo-7 
0.11970x 10-8 
0.10228x 10-12 
0.59777xlO-' 
Total explosion frequency 0.63614x 10-6 0.63614xlO-6 0.63614 x 10-' 
Table 7.19: Explosion frequency contribution from leaks in section 11 (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
Model ý Module explosion frequency 
1 0.12044xlO-5 
2 0.11883xlO-'5 
3 0.11883xlO-5 
Table 7.20: The total explosion frequencies for the wellhead module (per year) - comparison 
between models 1,2 and 3. 
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frequency contributions only change for section 9 as this is the section connecting to the 
oil. Changes in the model have no influence on the contributions from sections 10 and 11 as 
these sections involve only gas. Table 7.20 shows the explosion frequencies for the module 
using each model. As predicted models 2 and 3 give identical results. The overall explosion 
frequency for the module is reduced when the oil is removed from the model. 
The differences in the models comes from failure of isolation valves 33XVOOI and WELL19. 
Table 7.21 shows the contribution that explosions when the valves fail make to the overall 
exPlosion frequency for the module. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 1 model 2 model 3 
93 33XVOOI 15.78 14.64 14.64 
9 14 WELL19 0.272 0.267 0.267 
10 8 35XV383 0.063 0.063 0.063 
10 15 WELL2 0.032 0.032 0.032 
11 8 N1 52.82 53.53 53.53 
11 16 WELL5 0.160 0.160 0.160 
Table 7.21: The importance of the isolation valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
When oil is neglected from the model the percentage of explosions due to leaks on section 
9 when the isolation fails is reduced. In all models the failure of the non return valve N1, 
connecting section 11 to section 8, accounts for over 50% of the explosions. The isolation 
may work as designed therefore meaning that a leak on section 9 involves only the contents 
of section 9. Table 7.22 gives the percentage of explosions which occur when this is the case. 
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Model Section Importance 
1 9 _ 5.24 
10 25.82 
11 0.0 
2 9 5.31 
10 26.17 
11 0.0 
3 9 5.31 
10 26.17 
11 0.0 
Table 7.22: The importance of -the sections in the wellhead module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage)- comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
If the isolation valves work as designed and a leak occurs on section 11 then there is no con- 
tribution to the explosion frequency due to the gas cloud never building up to concentration 
levels within the flammable region. 
The pressure of the section is relieved using blowdown valves should a leak occur. The 
importan6e of these valves is given in Table 7.23. 
Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model I model 2 model 3 
3 34XV031 0.439 0.386 0.386 
8 35XV422 1.93 1.96 1.96 
8 35XV382 1.11 1.13 1.13 
Table 7.23: The importance of the blowdown valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 1,2 and 3. 
Tile blowdown valve 35XV422 on section 8 is the most critical, since the majority of the 
explosions occur when the gas cloud is influenced by the contents of this section it would be 
expected that this valve is important. Blowdown valve 34XV031 reduces in importance when 
oil is removed from the model. This valve is on section 3 which contains oil and therefore has 
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Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
1 9 0.883 1.21 0.356x 10-4 19.17 
10 1.07 0.40 0.211 X 10-4 24.43 
11 2.19 0.99 0.849X10-4 49.63 
2&3 9 0.838 1.02 0.334x 10-4 18.34 
10 1.09 0.40 0.214x 10-4 24.76 
11 2.22 1.01 0.861 X 10-4 50.31 
Table 7.24: Total importance measures for the categories of explosions in the wellhead 
module (percentage) - comparison of models 1,2 and I 
less influence on the explosion frequency when oil is not considered. The blowdown valves 
in the wellhead module are not as critical as those in the other modules, the reliability of 
the isolation valves is much more important. 
Table 7.24 shows the percentages of explosions categorised according to the type of explosion. 
The most explosions occur due to leaks originating on section 11. 
The frequency of the exceedence of the overpressures produced are shown in Figure Ma 
these appear to be very similar for each model. The close up of the lower overpressures, 
Figure 7.3b, does indeed show the frequencies of exceedence to be identical, however the 
larger overpressures, Figure 7.3c, have a lower frequency of exceedence when oil is neglected 
from the model. 
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1,2 and 3. 
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7.6.4 Conclusion of the leak inventory comparison with the chang- 
ing temperature models. 
Model 2 generates higher release rates therefore in most cases the concentration rises rapidly 
through the flammable region earlier than model 1. Due to this the explosions prior to the 
mitigation activating have a higher frequency of occurrence than for model 1. In general the 
total explosion frequency is lower for model 2 than model 1, although this does depend on 
the inventory combination within the sections leaking. Model 3 involves only gas releasing 
which has a lower exit speed than the condensate hence the concentration is slower to rise 
and slower to leave the flammable region leading to a higher explosion frequency. 
Models 2 and 3 appear to provide the upper and lower bounds for the explosion frequency. 
Model I is a feasible model but is also the least likely scenario. The relative densities of 
gas, condensate and oil mean that oil is most likely to settle at the base of the vessel and so 
reducing the likelihood of a leak involving oil. Since oil is not a consideration in the explosive 
mixture contributing to the gas cloud this model is neglected, in favour of model 2 or 3. 
Model 3 provides higher frequencies of explosions due to the longer time taken to release the 
gas, hence it may be sensible to opt for this model as it errs on the side of caution. However 
a leak of condensate contributes to the gas cloud by evaporation and so to ignore this in the 
leak could reduce the amount of mixture within the gas cloud. Therefore model 2, the gas 
and condensate release, is taken as the standard model for future work in this project. 
7.7 Leak inventory comparison ýwith the constant tem- 
perature model. 
These results are obtained when the program is altered to assume that there is constant tem- 
perature in the leaking vessel throughout the leak process. The modelsl under consideration 
are models 4 and 5, a leak inventory including oil has been neglected. . 
Model 4 Gas and Condensate leak into the module in proportion to the gas and condensate 
mixture left in the leaking section. Any oil in the section serves to reduce the volume 
of the section. 
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Model 5 Gas leaks into the module. Condensate evaporates during the leak process. 
7.7.1 The separation module. 
The separation module can have an explosive concentration of gas within it due to leaks from 
sections 1 and 3, the atmospheric and inlet separators. These sections contain only gas and 
oil, therefore at first glance it could be suggested that the 2 models will not differ due to a 
lack of condensate, however sections 1 and 3 connect, via isolation valves, to sections 4,5,6, 
9 and 12 which do contain condensate. Failure of an isolation valve will lead to condensate 
being introduced, hence differences between the models. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.25166XJO-G 0.25126xlO-6 
prior to mitigation 0.72961 X 10-7 0.22343x 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.89196xlO-" 0.20164xlO-10 
mitigated 0.33173x 10-5 0.33625 x 10-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.36419X 10-5 0.36361 x 10-5 
Table 7.25: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks in section 1 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
The gas and condensate release of model 4 provides a higher frequency of an explosion 
occurring due to a leak on section 1 than the gas only release of model 5. The frequency 
of explosions prior to mitigation are higher for model 4, but the mitigated explosions and 
explosions when the mitigation is not maintained have lower frequencies of occurrence. The 
frequencies of explosions when the mitigation fails to activate are directly dependent on the 
time spent within the flammable region. As the frequencies are very similar for both models, 
this indicates that the time spent within the explosive range is the same for both models. 
The frequency of explosions prior to mitigation being higher for model 4 suggests that more 
time is spent within the explosive range before the mitigation activates but less is spent after 
this. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.37588xlO-6 0.34997x 10-6 
prior to mitigation 0.28162xlO-6 0.24785xIO-I 
mitigation not maintained 0.64599xlO-" 0.69053xlO-" 
mitigated 0.47821 x 10-5 0.44669xIO-I 
Total explosion frequency 0.54396xlO-' 0.50647xlO-5 
Table 7.26: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks in section 3 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
For section 3 the explosion frequency contributions are higher for model 4 than model 5 for 
all categories of explosions except those when the mitigation is not maintained. 
Model Module explosion frequency 
4 
5 
0.90815xlO-'5 
0.87009xlO-, 5 
Table 7.27: The total explosion frequencies for the separation module (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
The total explosion frequencies for leaks into the separation module are shown in Table 7.27 
for models 4 and 5. It can be seen that the gas and condensate release of model 4 produces 
higher explosion frequencies than the gas only release of model 5. The explosion frequency 
results demonstrated for the separation module with the constant temperature model con- 
tradict those gained for the changing temperature model. With constant temperature the 
driving pressure remains constant whilst condensate remains in the section. For this to oc- 
cur evaporation of the condensate must take place, once the condensate has evaporated the 
pressure reduces. With a gas only release the flow rate is lower as there is no contribution 
from the condensate which has a higher release rate than gas. With a lower flow rate the 
time for the condensate to evaporate is slower therefore the pressure remains constant for 
a longer period. Therefore a gas and condensate release expels the fluids quickly initially 
then the pressure drops off and the flow rate reduces, however tile gas only release starts off 
slower but remains at constant pressure for a longer period. Such a scenario could result in 
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the gas only model exhausting its supply faster and therefore spending less time within the 
explosive range. The percentages of explosions due to each section are illustrated in Table 
7.28, categorised into types of explosions. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
4 1 2.77 0.803 0.982x 10-4 36.53 
3 4.14 3.10 0.711 X 10-4 52.66 
5 1 2.89 0.257 0.232x 10-3 38.65 
I 
3 
I 
4.02 
--- I 
2.85 
--I 
0.794x10-4 
- ---- --- I 
51.34 
Table 7.28: Total importance measures for the category of explosions in the separation 
module (percentages) - comparison between models 4 and 5. 
The majority, over 50%, of explosions occur in the separation module due to leaks in section 
3. With model 5 the importance of section 3 falls as that of section I rises this indicates 
that the condensate has more effect for leaks from section 3, so that when this is removed 
the importance of section 3 decreases. 
With the isolation and blowdown system working as designed section 3 contributes over 30% 
to the explosion frequency, see Table 7.29. This sections contribution increases when the 
leak ignores the condensate as sections containing condensate reduce their importance when 
it is neglected. Leaks occurring on section 1 with no contribution from another section due 
to closure of the isolation valves do not generate gas clouds within the explosive range for 
either model. 
Model Section Importance 
4 1 0.0 
3 30.76 
5 0.0 
32.10 
Table 7.29: The importance of the sections in the separation module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage) - comparison between models 4 and 5. 
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Due to model 5 neglecting condensate from the release it is expected that the isolation valves 
that connect to those sections containing condensate would reduce in their importance. 
However from Table 7.30 it can be seen that this is not strictly the case. Section 4 contains 
condensate yet its importance increases dramatically when condensate is removed from the 
leak. Unlike the changing temperature models, when the section contains condensate yet 
the release is gas only the constant temperature model still relies heavily on the amount of 
condensate. The condensate keeps the pressure constant and therefore in most cases provides 
a higher flow rate and so exhausts the section quicker. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 4 model 5 
13 34XV033 2.74 2.58 
14 34XV090/001 7.92 19.69 
15 35XV186 17.63 14.81 
16 35XV092 9.18 6.01 
1 12 41XV201 7.03 2.00 
35 35XV125/149 16.55 12.97 
39 33XV001 2.98 2.87 
Table 7.30: The importance of the'isolation valves in the separation module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 4 and 5. 
Isolation valve 35XV186 between sections 1 and 5 is the most critical valve for model 4, 
followed by 35XV125 and 35XV149 between sections 3 and 5. For model 5 these valves 
are still important however the most critical valves are 34XV090 and 34XV001 between 
sections 1 and 4. 
As section 3 contributes the most to the explosion frequency it is not surprising that the 
blowdown valve on this section is the most critical. When using the gas only release of 
model 5 the importance of the blowdown valves on section 4 increase. The percentages of 
explosions occurring when blowdown valves fail are compared in Table 7.31. 
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Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 4 model 5 
3 34XV031 10.88 11.42 
4 35XV044 0.156 0.447 
4 35XV103 0.148 0.409 
5 35XV171 0.631 0.523 
5 35XV157 0.788 0.802 
6 35XV277 0.278 0.185 
6 35XV279 0.270 0.226 
12 41XV002 0.196 0.036 
Table 7.31: The importance of the blowdown valves in the separation module (percentage) 
- comparison between models 4 and 5. 
The exceedence frequencies of the overpressures generated are depicted in Figure 7.4a over 
the whole range of those generated. The higher exceedence frequencies are associated with 
the lower overpressures as seen in Figure 7.4b. It appears that the majority of the time the 
gas only release of model 5 generates higher exceedence frequencies of overpressures. The 
critical overpressures are the higher ones shown in Figure 7.4c. 
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7.7.2 The compression module. 
Leaks in the compression module originate from sections 4,5,6 and 8. These sections contain 
gas and condensate, hence due to the presence of condensate it is assumed that the 2 models 
will produce significantly different results. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.49557X 10-6 0.42877x 10-7 
prior to mitigation 0.34172xlO-G 0.22474xlo-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.76631 X 10-11 0.17333xlO-10 
mitigated 0.81566 x 10-5 0.73304xlO-, ' 
Total explosion frequency 0.89939X10-' 0.77817xlO-5 
Table 7.32: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks in section 4 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
The frequencies of explosions on section 4 are higher for model 4 than for model 5. This is 
due to section 4, and section 5 which it may link with, having condensate within them. This 
means that not only will the pressure be constant but the flow rate will be larger due to the 
influence of the condensate. The frequency of explosions when the mitigation fails to activate 
is higher for the gas and condensate release of model 4 indicating that with this model the 
gas concentration remains within the flammable region for a longer period of time than the 
gas only release of model 5. The frequency of explosions occurring prior to mitigation is also 
larger for model 4, therefore the concentration rose into the flammable region earlier than 
for model 5. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.14860xlO-5 0.87152 x 10-1 
prior to mitigation 0.70692xlO-' 0.29603X 10-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.46248x10-10 0.24730xlO-" 
mitigated 0.24776xlo-4 0.14650x10-1 
Total explosion frequency 0.26968 X 10-4 0.15817x 10-4 
Table 7.33: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 5 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
For section 5 the explosion frequency for model 4 is higher than that for model 5. Again the 
results indicate that the concentration of the gas cloud is within the explosive range for a 
longer period of time and enters it earlier. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.98743X10-' 0.71837x10-1 
prior to mitigation 0.63425 X 10-6 0.56297xlO-' 
mitigation not maintained 0.15379X10-10 0.13465 x 10-10 
mitigated 0.16279 x 10-4 0.11756xlo-4 
Total explosion frequency 0.17921xlo-4 0.13038xlo-4 
Table 7.34: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 6 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
For section 6 the explosion frequencies of each of the categories is higher with model 4 than 
with model 5. This indicates a longer period within the explosive range and also higher 
concentration level generation. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.12114xlO-6 0.12088xlO-rl 
prior to mitigation 0.76016x 10-6 0.76106xlo-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.40518 x 10-12 0.40190xlo-12 
mitigated 0.13172xlO-' 0.13119xlO-' 
Total explosion frequency 0.21985X10-' 0.21938xlO-' 
Table 7.35: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 8 (per year) - comparison 
between model 4 and 5. 
Explosions occurring due to leaks on section 8 have similar frequencies of occurrence with 
models 4 and 5. This is due to the low amounts of condensate that may contribute to the 
leak. The condensate does affect the calculation of the release rate. It appears that the 
higher release rate causes the condensate to evaporate rapidly dropping the pressure of the 
leak and the flow rate whereas the lower release rates do not lead to such a quick evaporation 
and hence keep the leak at constant pressure longer, therefore in turn leading to a quicker 
exhaustion of the gas. Model 4 keeps the concentration level within the flammable region 
for longer, however the high release rates send this concentration above the upper flammable 
limit before mitigation activates. With model 5 the upper flammable limit is not exceeded 
as quickly, hence giving a higher frequency of explosions occurring prior to the mitigation 
activating with model 5 rather than with model 4 as seen in previous cases. 
Model I Module explosion frequency 
4 
5 
0.56081 X 10-4 
0.38830x 10-4 
Table 7.36: The total explosion frequencies for the compression module (per year) - compar- 
ison between models 4 and 5. 
The explosion frequencies are higher when using model 4 than for model 5. This suggests 
that neglecting the condensate will affect the concentration levels. 
The percentages of explosions due to a leak in each section are illustrated in Table 7.37, 
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categorised into types of explosions. In both models leaks occurring on section 5 have the 
greater importance. For model 5 this importance reduces whilst the rest of the sections 
increase in their percentage contribution. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
4 4 0.884 0.609 0.137x 10-4 14.54 
5 2.65 1.26 0.825 x 10-4 44.18 
6 1.76 1.13 0.274x 10-4 29.06 
8 0.22 1.35 0.722 x 10-6 2.35 
5 4 1.10 0.058 0.446 x 10-4 18.88 
5 2.24 0.762 0.637x10-4 37.72 
6 1.85 1.45 0.347x10-4 30.28 
8 0.31 1.96 0.104x10-5 3.38 
Table 7.37: Total importance measures for the category of explosions in the compression 
module (percentages) - comparison between models 4 and 5. 
The contributions of each of these sections takes into account any adjacent sections if the 
isolation valves have failed. Table 7.38 gives the percentage of explosions which occur when 
the safety systems are working so any explosive mixture produced is solely down to the 
section with the leak. 
128 
Modelling the release. 
Model Section Importance 
4 4 12.04 
5 37.51 
6 21.16 
8 3.25 
5 4 16.29 
5 30.34 
6 21.26 
8 4.69 
Table 7.38: The importance of the sections in the compression module when the isolation 
and blowdown works as designed (percentage)- comparison between models 4 and 5. 
Section 5 has the highest contribution to the frequency of explosions when its safety systems 
work as designed. As this section generates explosive gas clouds on its own the isolation 
valves connecting it to other sections are likely to be critical as further leak inventory may 
prolong the time at which the concentration is within the explosive range. From Table 7.39 
it can be seen that this hypothesis was correct. 
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Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 4 model 5 
41 34XV090/001 1.35 0.313 
45 35XV104 3.66 4.32 
51 35XV186 1.61 1.37 
53 35XV125/149 2.32 2.10 
56 35XV172 5.51 6.99 
61 35XV092 0.93 0.419 
67 XVX3 2.93 4.07 
68 35XV306 0.398 0.439 
6 12 41XV053 0.569 0.613 
8 10 35XV383 0.012 0.017 
8 11 N1 0.058 0.084 
8 13 9OXV6/7 0.223 0.322 
Table 7.39: The importance of the isolation valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- comparison between models 4 and 5. 
Isolation valve 35XV172 connecting sections 5 and 6 is the most critical for both models. Tile 
blowdown valves act to reduce the pressure of the section therefore reducing the frequency of 
an explosion. As most explosions are likely to occur from section 5 and the isolation valves 
are the most critical between sections 5 and 6, then it follows that the blowdown valves in 
section 5 and 6 are the most important, Table 7.40. 
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Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 4 model 5 
3 34XV031 0.093 0.063 
4 35XV044 0.712 1.11 
4 35XV103 0.682 1.06 
5 35XV171 2.28 1.76 
5 35XV157 2.88 1.89 
6 35XV277 2.57 2.99 
6 35XV279 3.08 3.36 
7 35XV419 0.068 0.096 
8 35XV422 0.279 0.401 
8 35XV382 0.194 0.279 
12 41XV002 0.012 0.013 
13 90XV011 0.002 0.002 
Table 7.40: The importance of the blowdown valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- comparison between models 4 and 5. 
The frequency of exceedence of the overpressures is shown in Figures 7.5a, b, c. The gas and 
condensate release of model 4 yields a higher frequency of exceedence of the overpressures 
throughout the range. This observation is in contrast to that of the separation module. 
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of the overpressure exceedence for the compression module with 
models 4 and 5. 
132 
06 1 16 2 
2.6 3 
Overpressure (bar) 
b) The lower overpressures generated 
Modelling the release. 
7.7.3 The wellhead module. 
The wellhead module has sections 9,10 and 11 that can leak directly into the module. These 
sections contain only gas and have no links to sections containing condensate therefore there 
are no differences between models, 4 and 5. The following tables have been inserted for 
reference as no comparison may be made apart from to state that both models provide 
identical results. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 4 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.10069x 10-7 
prior to mitigation 0.11958x 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.40976 X 10-12 
mitigated 0.22061 X 10-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.24263xlO-' 
Table 7.41: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 9 (per year) - comparison 
between models 4 and 5. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 41 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.12920xlo-7 
prior to mitigation 0.44783 x 
10-8 
mitigation not maintained 0.25423 X 
10-12 
mitigated 0.29393X 10-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.31133xlO-6 
Table 7.42: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 10 (per year) - compar- 
ison between models 4 and 5. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 41 model 5 
mitigation fails to activate 0.26194x 10-7 
prior to mitigation 0.11770 X 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.10098X10-11 
mitigated 0.59322xlo-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.63119x 10-6 
Table 7.43:. Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 11 (per year) - compar- 
ison between models 4 and 5. 
Approximately 50% of the explosions originate from leaks in section 11. 
Model Section Explosion Type 
Mitigation Prior to Mitigation Mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
4,5 9 0.850 1.01 0.346x 10-4 18.61 
10 1.09 0.378 0.215x 10-4 24.8 
11 2.21 0.993 0.852 x 10-4 50.06 
Table 7.44: Total importance measures for the category of explosions in the wellhead module 
(percentage) - comparison between models 4 and 5. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves M del 5 
93 33XV001 14.89 
9 14 WELL19 0.267 
10 8 35XV383 0.064 
10 15 WELL2 0.032 
11 8 N1 53.26 
11 16 WELL5 1.64 
Table 7.45: The importance of the isolation valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 4 and 5. 
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The failure of the non return valve NI accounts for over 50% of the explosions in the wellhead 
module. 
Model Section Importance 
4,5 9 5.32 
10 26.17 
0.0 
Table 7.46: The importance of the sections in the wellhead module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage)-, comparison between models 4 and 5. 
Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 41 model 5 
3 34XV031 0.479 
8 35XV422 1.94 
8 35XV382 1.11 
Table 7.47: The importance of the blowdown valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
comparison between models 4 and 5. 
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7.7.4 Conclusion of the leak inventory comparison with the con- 
stant temperature models. 
The conclusion must be drawn from the results of the separation and compression modules 
as there were no differences between the models on the wellhead module. 
In general the gas and condensate release of model 4 yields higher frequencies of explosions 
than the gas only release of model 5. The condensate evaporates within the module to 
augment the gas cloud build up, therefore ignoring it may diminish the build up of the gas 
cloud within the module. Since model 4 generated higher frequencies, opting for this as the 
standard constant temperature model is erring on the side of caution. 
7.8 Temperature state comparison. 
In the comparison of models 1,2 and 3 and that of models 4 and 5 the conclusion drawn is 
that the models with a gas and condensate release are more appropriate than the others. It 
was also apparent that different patterns were emerging for the changing temperature releases 
and the constant temperature releases. Therefore a comparison sliall be made between the 
two temperature state models using models which both assume the same leak flow: gas and 
condensate release. These two models are models 2 and 4. 
Model 2 Gas and Condensate release assuming a Changing Temperature scenario. 
Model 4 Gas and Condensate release assuming a Constant Temperature scenario. 
7.8.1 The separation module. 
The separation module may have an explosion if a leak occurs from either section 1 or 3. 
The leak inventory may be augmented by the contents of sections 4,5,6,9 and 12 which 
connect via isolation valves. The primary sections contain only gas and oil, however the 
secondary sections involve condensate. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.17768x 10-6 0.25166x 10-6 
prior to mitigation 0.73086x 10-7 0.72961 X 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.61201 x 10" 0.89196xlO-" 
mitigated 0.23206x 10-5 0.33173xlO-' 
Total explosion frequency 0.25714 X 10-5 0.36419x10-1 
Table 7.48: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section I (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
Leaks on section 1 may involve a combination of gas and oil and, if the valves fail, condensate. 
The condensate in the leak causes the temperature to be kept constant for model 4, if 
there is no condensate the temperature and pressure can not be kept constant and the two 
models would produce the same results. The constant temperature model has a higher 
overall explosion frequency for the section. The frequency of explosions occurring when the 
mitigation is not activated is higher for the constant temperature model, since this depends 
only on the time spent within the flammable region, this model must generate concentrations 
which remain within the flammable limits for a longer period of time than those from the 
changing temperature model. The frequency of explosions occurring prior to mitigation is 
slightly lower for the constant temperature model, since the driving pressure of the release is 
initially constant this suggests that the concentration rises above the flammable limit prior 
to this time and before the changing temperature model therefore leaving less time for this 
type of explosion to occur. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.28291 X 10-6 0.37588 x 10-6 
prior to mitigation 0.27506 x 10-6 0.28162x 10-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.36246xlO-" 0.64599xlO-" 
mitigated 0.35363 x 10-' 0.47821 x 10-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.40942x10-1 0.54396xlO-' 
Table 7.49: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 3 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
The frequency of explosions due to a leak on section 3 is higher for the constant temperature 
model than the changing temperature model. Explosions when the mitigation fails to activate 
have a higher frequency of occurrence indicating that more time is spent within the explosive 
region with the constant temperature model. As the explosions prior to mitigation have a 
higher frequency with the constant temperature model, this model must cause the gas cloud 
to reach flammable concentrations before the changing temperature model. 
Model Module explosion frequency 
2 
4 
0.66656xIO-5 
0.90815 x 10-5 
Table 7.50: Total explosion frequencies for the separation module (per year) - temperature 
state comparison. 
The overall explosion frequencies for the module, Table 7.50, show that keeping the temper- 
ature constant results in a large increase. 
The models will not differ if the isolation valves work as designed preventing any condensate 
affecting the leak. The percentage of explosions occurring when this happens are shown in 
Table 7.51. With the constant temperature model such explosions reduce their importance 
indicating that the condensate is more important in the constant temperature model. 
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Model Section Importance 
2 1 2.89 
3 34.79 
4 0.0 
30.76 
Table 7.51: The importance of the sections in the separation module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage) - temperature state comparison 
The importance of the isolation valve failure is given in Table 7.52. The most important 
valves for both models are 35XV186 and 35XV125 and 35XV149 connecting sections 1 
and 3 with section 5 implying that section 5 has a high release rate. With the constant 
temperature model the valves that connect to sections with condensate increase in their 
contribution to the explosion frequency. Isolation valves 34XV033 and 33XVOOI decrease 
in'their contribution due to containing no condensate. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 2 model 4 
13 34XV033 2.88 2.74 
14 34XV090/001 8.67 7.92 
15 35XV186 13.95 17.63 
16 35XV092 7.49 9.18 
1 12 41XV201 6.44 7.03 
35 35XV125/149 16.10 16.55 
39 33XV001 3.10 2.98 
Table 7.52: The importance of the isolation valves in the separation module (percentage) - 
temperature state comparison. 
The contribution to the explosion frequency made by failure of the blowdown valves is shown 
in Table 7.53. 
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Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 2 model 4 
3 34XV031 8.29 10.88 
4 35XV044 0.163 0.156 
4 35XV103 0.158 0.148 
5 35XV171 0.555 0.631 
5 35XV157 0.698 0.788 
6 35XV277 0.226 0.278 
6 35XV279 0.203 0.270 
12 41XV002 . 169 0.196 
Table 7.53: The importance of the blowdown valves in the separation module (percentage) 
- temperature state comparison. 
The percentages of explosions occurring are split into category of explosion and originating 
section in Table 7.54. It can be seen that the constant temperature model yields a larger 
percentage of explosions due to leaks on section 1 and a lower percentage for those on section 
3. This may be because section 1 involves leaks with a greater proportion of condensate. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
2 1 2.67 1.10 0.918 X 10-4 34-82 
3 4.24 4.13 0.544x10-4 53.05 
4 1 2.77 0.803 0.982x 10-4 36.53 
3 4.14 3.10 0.711 X 10-4 52.66 
Table 7.54: Importance measures for the categories of explosions in the separation module 
(percentage) - temperature state comparison. 
The frequencies of exceedence for the overpressures are depicted in Figure 7.7. The con- 
stant temperature model has a higher frequency of exceedence over the whole range of the 
overpressures. 
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7.8.2 The compression module. 
The compression module has explosive situations developed from leaks on sections 4,5,6 
and 8. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.36976X 10-6 0.49557xlO-' 
prior to mitigation 0.34156x 10-6 0.34172 x 10-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.49201XIO-11 0.76631xlO-" 
mitigated 0.59993x 10-5 0.81566xlO-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.67106X 10-5 0.89939 x 10-5 
Table 7.55: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 4 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
Section 4 contains gas and condensate and may connect to sections 1 and 5 due to isola- 
tion failure, where section 5 also contains gas and condensate. The explosion frequencies 
are higher for the constant temperature model due to the large proportion of condensate 
available. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.74552XIO-' 0.14860xIO-I 
prior to mitigation 0.70662xlO-6 0.70692 x 10-1 
mitigation not maintained 0.12659xlO-" 0.46248xlO-" 
mitigated 0.12078x 10-4 0.24776xlo-4 
Total explosion frequency 0.13530x 10-4 0.26968 x 10-4 
Table 7.56: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 5 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
The explosion frequencies for sections 5 and 8 are higher for the constant temperature model. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.46250 X 10-6 0.98743 x 10-6 
prior to mitigation 0.63419 x 10-6 0.63425x 10-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.43852XIO-11 0.15379xlO-" 
mitigated 0.72972xIO-I 0.16299 X 10-4 
Total explosion frequency 0.83939 X 10-5 0.13038x 10-4 
Table 7.57: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 6 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
Type of explosion , Explosion frequency 
model 2 model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.11795 X 10-6 0.12114xlo-6 
prior to mitigation 0.76433X 10-6 0.76016x10-1 
mitigation not maintained 0.31731 X 10-12 0.40518xlo-12 
mitigated 0.12584xlO-5 0.13172x10-1 
Total explosion frequency 0.21407xlO-5 0.21985xlo-5 
Table 7.58: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 8 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
The constant temperature model produces the highest explosion frequencies for section 8. 
However due to the low proportion of condensate that may leak from this section there is 
negligible difference between the models. 
Model Module explosion frequency 
2 0.30776x 10-4 
4 0.56081 x 10-4 
Table 7.59: The total explosion frequencies for the compression module (per year) - temper- 
ature state comparison. 
The explosion frequencies are higher when using model 4 than for model 2. This suggests 
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that the condensate has a greater effect when using the constant temperature model. The 
condensate within the section keeps the pressure constant hence driving the release at a 
greater rate and causing more time to be spent within the explosive range. 
The percentages of explosions due to a leak in each section are illustrated in Table 7.60, 
categorised into types of explosions. In both models leaks occurring on section 5 have the 
greater importance. For the constant temperature model this importance increases along 
with the percentage of section 6 whilst the sections 4 and 8 decrease in their percentage 
contribution. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
mitigation prior to mitigation mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
2 4 1.20 1.10 0.159x10-4 19.49 
5 2.42 2.29 0.411 X 10-4 39.25 
6 1.50 2.06 0.142xIO-4 23.71 
8 0.383 2.48 0.103xlO-5 4.08 
4 4 0.884 0.609 0.137x 10-4 14.54 
5 2.65 1.26 0.825 x 10-4 44.18 
6 1.76 1.13 0.274x10-4 29.06 
8 0.22 1.35 0.722x10-1 2.35 
Table 7.60: Total importance measures for the category of explosions in the compression 
module (percentages) - temperature state comparison. 
The contributions of each of these sections takes into account any adjacent sections if the 
isolation valves have failed. Table 7.61 gives the percentage of explosions which occur when 
the safety systems are working so any explosive mixture produced is solely down to the 
section with the leak. 
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Model Section Importance 
2 4 16.60 
5 34.35 
6 17.52 
8 6.05 
4 4 12.04 
5 37.51 
6 21.16 
8 3.25 
Table 7.61: The importance of the sections in the compression module when the isolation 
and blowdown works as designed (percentage)- temperature state comparison. 
Section 5 has the highest contribution to the frequency of explosions when its safety systems 
work as designed. As this section generates explosive gas clouds on its own the isolation 
valves connecting it to other sections are likely to be critical as further leak inventory may 
prolong the time at which the concentration is within the explosive range. Table 7.62 shows 
the percentage of explosions occurring due to isolation failure. 
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Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 2 model 4 
41 34XV090/001 1.908 1.35 
45 35XV104 3.67 3.66 
51 35XV186 1.03 1.61 
53 35XV125/149 2.21 2.32 
56 35XV172 4.92 5.51 
61 35XV092 0.657 0.93 
67 XVX3 2.94 2.93 
68 35XV306 0.361 0.398 
6 12 41XV053 0.508 0.569 
8 10 35XV383 0.016 0.012 
8 11 N1 0.060 0.058 
8 13 90XV6/7 0.304 0.223 
Table 7.62: The importance of the isolation valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- temperature state comparison. 
Isolation valve 35XV172 connecting sections 5 and 6 is the most critical for both models. 
The blowdown valves act to reduce the pressure of section therefore reducing the frequency 
of an explosion. As most explosions are likely to occur from section 5 and the isolation valves 
are the most critical between sections 5 and 6, then it follows that the blowdown. valves in 
section 5 and 6 are the most important, Table 7.40. 
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Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 2 model 4 
3 34XV031 0.075 0.093 
4 35XV044 1.23 0.712 
4 35XV103 1.20 0.682 
5 35XV171 2.32 2.28 
5 35XV157 2.69 2.88 
6 35XV277 2.68 2.57 
6 35XV279 2.78 3.08 
7 35XV419 0.062 0.068 
8 35XV422 0.420 0.279 
8 35XV382 0.30 0.194 
12 41XV002 0.01 0.012 
13 90XV011 0.002 0.002 
Table 7.63: The importance of the blowdown valves in the compression module (percentage) 
- temperature state comparison. 
Figure 7.8 shows the frequency of exceedence of the overpressures produced when an explo- 
sion occurs in the compression module. Th roughout the range of overpressures produced the 
constant temperature model has a higher frequency of exceedence. 
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Figure 7.8: Comparison of the overpressure exceedence for the compression module with 
models 2 and 4. 
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7.8.3 The wellhead module. 
The wellhead module contains section 9,10 and 11. These sections only contain gas and 
no connecting sections contain condensate. As there is no condensate in the sections the 
constant temperature model can not use the evaporation of the condensate as a means of 
keeping the temperature and hence pressure constant. This should mean that the results are 
identical as both models act as changing temperature models. However different calculation 
procedures are employed giving slightly different results. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Model 2 Model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.99635 X 10-8 0.10069xlo-7 
prior to mitigation 0.12174X 10-7 0.11958x 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.39648X 10-12 0.40976xlo-12 
mitigated 0.21795X 10-6 0.22061 x 10-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.24008X 10-6 0.24263x 10-6 
Table 7.64: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 9 (per year) - tempera- 
ture state comparison. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Model 2 Model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.12951 X 10-7 0.12920x10-1 
prior to mitigation 0.48445 x 10-1 0.44783xlo-8 
mitigation not maintained 0.25378 x 10-12 0.25423x 10-12 
mitigated 0.29427xlO-' 0.29393xIO-I 
Total explosion frequency 0.31207xlO-' 0.31133xIO-I 
Table 7.65: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 10 (per year) - temper- 
ature state comparison. 
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Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Model 2 Model 4 
mitigation fails to activate 0.26400x 10-7 0.26194xlo-7 
prior to mitigation 0.11970xlo-7 0.1177x 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.10228xlO-" 0.10098x10-11 
mitigated 0.59777x 10-6 0.59322xlO-6 
Total explosion frequency 0.63614xlo-6 0.63119xlo-6 
Table 7.66: Explosion frequency contributions from leaks on section 11 (per year) - temper- 
ature state comparison. 
Model Module explosion frequency 
2 
4 
0.12044xlO-' 
0.11852xlO-' 
Table 7.67: The total explosion frequencies for the wellhead module (per year) - temperature 
state comparison. 
The explosion frequency for the changing temperature model is higher in the wellhead mod- 
ule. 
Connecting Isolation Importance measure 
sections valves model 2 model 4 
93 33XV001 14.64 14.89 
9 14 WELL19 0.267 0.267 
10 8 35XV383 0.063 0.064 
10 15 WELL2 0.032 0.032 
11 8 N1 53.53 53.26 
11 16 WELL5 0.160 1.64 
Table 7.68: The importance of the isolation valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
temperature state comparison. 
The failure of the non return valve NI accounts for over 50% of the explosions in the wellhead 
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module. 
Model Section Importance 
2 9 5.31 
10 26.17 
11 0.0 
4 9 5.32 
10 26.17 
0.0 
Table 7.69: The importance of the sections in the wellhead module when the isolation and 
blowdown works as designed (percentage) - temperature state comparison. 
Section Blowdown Importance Measure 
valve model 2 model 4 
3 34XV031 0.386 0.479 
8 35XV422 1.96 1.94 
8 35XV382 1.13 1.11 
Table 7.70: The importance of the blowdown valves in the wellhead module (percentage) - 
temperature state comparison. 
Model Section Category of explosion 
Mitigation Prior to Mitigation Mitigated 
fails to activate mitigation not maintained 
2 9 0.838 1.02 0.334x 10-4 18.34 
10 1.09 0.40 0.214x 10-4 24.76 
11 2.22 1.01 0.861 X 10-4 50.31 
4 9 0.849 1.01 0.346 x 10-4 18.61 
10 1.09 0.378 0.215 X 10-4 24.8 
1 
11 
1 
2.21 
1 
0.993 0.852x 10-4 50.06 
Table 7.71: Importance measure for the categories of explosions in the wellhead module 
(percentages) - temperature state comparison. 
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The frequency of exceedence of the overpressures are shown in Figure 7.9. The changing tem- 
perature model has a slightly higher frequency of exceedence than the constant temperature 
model. 
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Figure 7.9: Comparison of the overpressure exceedence for the wellhead module with models 
2 and 4. 
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7.8.4 Conclusion of the temperature state comparison. 
Model 4 has constant temperature with a release initially driven by constant pressure. The 
pressure is constant whilst condensate remains in the section. Therefore the gas concentra- 
tion in the module rises quicker with model 4 than with model 2, hence explosion frequencies 
using model 4 for the separation and compression modules are higher. For module 6 this 
is not the case because the driving pressure does not remain constant as no condensate is 
present. Sections which include more condensate account for more of the explosions when 
using model 4. Model 4 on the whole takes longer to run than model 2, but this is, not a 
reason to reject it. 
The true scenario will lie between the changing temperature model, which assumes that there 
is no heat transfer throughout the leak duration, and the constant temperature model, which 
assumes that there is total heat transfer. Results suggest that the constant temperature 
model produces higher explosion frequencies due to having a constant driving pressure for 
a period of time. Since reality lies between the two cases it is natural to assume that the 
explosion frequencies generated would lie between the results of these two models. This gives 
the constant temperature results as an upper bound for the frequencies of explosions with 
the changing temperature results being the lower bound. 
7.9 Discussion. 
This chapter has presented two models to calculate the leak flow rate into a module. The first 
model assumes that there is no heat transfer within the system, the theory behind this model 
is briefly discussed in Section 7.3. An alternative to this model is the constant temperature 
model discussed in Section 7.4. This model assumes that there is constant temperature 
within the section as the leak occurs. The results of the two models are compared in section 
7.8. The results obtained are not dissimilar, however the constant temperature model does 
in general generate higher frequencies of explosions. The situation may actually involve 
some heat transfer taking place but not necessarily enough to retain a constant temperature 
throughout the leak. Hence the results obtained may be used as an upper and lower bound 
for the true situation. 
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The modelling assumes that the leak inventory is composed of the components of the leaking 
section in proportion to their presence. This assumption may not hold in all cases, for 
example if the oil has settled on the base of the vessel and a leak occurs at the top of 
a vessel then it may be unreasonable to assume that the oil will leak out. Sections 7.5 
and 7.7 compare the results of running the changing temperature model and the constant 
temperature model when the leak inventory is altered. Tile leak inventory was assumed to 
consist of gas, condensate and oil releasing in proportion, gas and condensate with the oil 
acting only to reduce the volume of the section and a gas only release. Comparison of these 
models lead to a selection of the gas and condensate release as being the most appropriate. 
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explosion. 
8.1 Introduction. 
The models presented assume that once the leak occurs, the condensate evaporates on contact 
with the atmosphere, therefore contributing to the gas cloud. The gas concentration within 
the fixed volume is uniform throughout due to the assumption of immediate perfect mixing. 
The concentration is affected by the gas being released and the ventilation rate representing 
the wind effects. Initially the concentration profile is dominated by the release, at the peak 
of the profile the ventilation takes precedence and in the latter stages of the tail the change 
is solely due to the ventilation. 
Ignition may only occur if the concentration of gas is between the flammable limits. If perfect 
mixing occurs and the gas concentration within a fixed volume is assumed constant then the 
concentration time history may be one of 3 forms. The situation shown in Figure 8.1 could 
not result in an explosion, as the concentration of gas does not build up to the flammable 
region. In Figure 8.2 ignition may occur between t1 and W. However in Figure 8.3 ignition 
may occur in two time periods, between t1 and Q whilst the concentration is rising and 
again between t3 and t4 as it falls back between the flammable limits. 
Figure 8.1: Time-concentration history, concentration below explosive range. 
157 
Modelling the frequency of an explosion. 
Figure 8.2: Time-concentration history, concentration reaching explosive range. 
Figure 8.3: Time-concentration history, concentration exceeding explosive range. 
Due to the uniform concentration within the module the ignition source is assumed to occur 
at a constant rate. The probability density function for the ignition source, fi(v), is therefore 
represented by the exponential distribution as shown in Equation 8.1. 
fi(v) = Aie-Ajv 
where Ai is the constant ignition rate. 
(8.1) 
There are two categories of explosions dependent on the availability of the water spray 
system; mitigated and unmitigated. Mitigated explosions occur when the water spray is 
operational, for this we must consider the case when: 
1. The water system is initiated then fails prior to the gas concentration decreasing below 
the LFL and there is an ignition prior to the deluge failure. 
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2. The water spray functions throughout the critical time period and an ignition occurs. 
Unmitigated explosions occur when: 
1. The water spray system fails to activate when the gas is detected and ignition occurs. 
2. The water spray activates but the gas ignites during the delay time (prior to mitiga- 
tion). 
3. The water spray system activates and is fully operational but then fails followed by 
ignition of the gas (mitigation not maintained). 
The frequency of an explosion will take one of the following forms depending on whether the 
water spray initially activates. 
fe ---" P(S)ALP(E)P(WSFA) (8.2) 
fe --` P(S)ALP(E) (1 - P(WSFA)) (8.3) 
Where P(S) is the probability the event sequence, from gas detection upto but not including 
water spray activation, AL is the frequency of the gas leak, P(E) is the probability of ignition 
and P(WSFA) is the probability that the water system fails to activate. 
Initial modelling assumed that an ignition may occur in the first or second time period, 
taking no account of previous conditions. The new approach assumes that if an ignition 
takes place then there can not have been a previous ignition neither can there be another 
ignition afterwards. Consider a scenario which involves the concentration of gas entering a 
specific concentration band at time tl leaving at t2, reentering at M and leaving at M (Figure 
8.4). The original modelling assumes that 
P(E) = P(ignition between tl & t2 OR ignition between t3 & M) (8.4) 
The simplest case is when the mitigation system is not activated. The probability of ignition 
is then dependent on the probability density function of the ignition source, fi(v), and the 
time within the flammable region giving 
t2 M 
P(E) fi (v)dv + fi(v)dv (8.5) 
3 
159 
Modelling the frequency of an explosion. 
The new modelling accounts for the ignition being dependent on previous ignitions. In this 
case we are concerned with the times at which the flammable region is reached and exited 
as well as those times specific to the concentration band of interest. The times relating to 
the flammable region are represented as T1, T2, T3 & T4 where T1 is the time that the 
lower flammable limit is reached and the explosive region entered, T2 is the time that the 
upper flammable limit is reached and the explosive region is exited as the gas concentration 
continues to rise. As the gas concentration begins to fall the explosive region is reentered at 
T3 and left at T4. For this case the probability of ignition takes the following form 
P(E) =P ((ignition at v between tl & t2 AND no ignition between TI & v) OR 
(ignition at v between t3 &M AND no ignition between Tl & v)) (8.6) 
Figure 8.4: Time-concentration history, concentration rising and falling through a specific 
concentration band when the concentration exceeds the explosive range. 
Considering an ignition occurring when the mitigation system is not activated for the situ- 
ation depicted in Figure 8.4 when the concentration exceeds the upper flammable limit, the 
probability of ignition occurring is 
t2 v 
P (E) = 
it:.,, A (v) 
JT, 
I 
fi (s) ds] dv + 
M T2 v Jt3l 
fi(v) 
1 
fi (s) ds - fi (s) ds] dv (8.7) 
T TT3 
I 
160 
Modelling the frequency of an explosion. 
Figure 8.5: Time-concentration history, concentration rising and falling through a specific 
concentration band when the concentration is within the explosive range. 
When the concentration does not exceed the upper flammable limit, Figure 8.5, T2 & T3 do 
not exist therefore the probability of ignition occurring becomes 
P(E) 
t2 
AM 1-V fi (s) ds] dv + 
ft 
11, 
IT1 
IMfV 
fi (s) ds] dv (8.8) AMT 
V31 Ti 
The explosions may be categorised depending on the mitigation situation. This allows the 
overpressure distribution to be calculated. The mitigation situations considered are 
1. Mitigation systems fail to activate 
2. Prior to mitigation systems activating 
3. Mitigation system begins but is not maintained 
4. Mitigation system activates 
8.2 Explosions when the mitigation system fails to ac- 
tivate. 
The frequency of explosions occurring when the mitigation system fails to activate is given 
by 
fe --` P(S)ALP(E)P(WSFA) (8.9) 
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The probability of ignition occurring depends only on the time period within the explosive 
range and the probability density function of the ignition source. For the original modelling 
it does not matter whether a previous explosion has occurred, therefore the times used 
are those relating to the concentration band being analysed. The probability of ignition 
occurring in concentration band j is 
tj2 tJ4 
P(E) fi(v)dv + fi(v)dv 
ftj 
I 
(8.10) 
For the revised modelling the probability of ignition occurring in a specific concentration 
band is dependent on whether any previous explosions have occurred, the situation in Figure 
8.4 gives the probability of an ignition occurring in concentration band j as 
P(E) 
tj2 
AM 
11- 1v 
fi (s)ds] dv + 
fti 
1 TT1 
t j4 I T2 
fi (s) ds -v fi (s) ds] dv 
Ti T3 tj 37 
17 
(8.11) 
This equation represents the probability of an ignition, in concentration band j, occurring 
if ignition has occurred at time v between tjl and tj2 given that ignition has not occurred 
previously (i. e. from entering the flammable region at TI until v) or ignition has occurred 
at v between tj3 and tj4 given that it has not already occurred (Le between T1 and T2 and 
between T3 and v). 
For the situation in Figure 8.5, where the concentration level never exceeds the upper 
flammable limit T2 and T3 do not exist so the probability of an ignition occurring in band 
is 
P(E) 
tJ2 
A (v) 
v 
fi (s) ds] dv + 
fT 
1 
ti fti 
34A 
(v) 
v 
fi (s) ds] dv 
J Tl 
When band j is the band where the concentration ceases to rise and begins its descent there 
is only one time period in which an ignition may occur giving the probability of an ignition 
occurring as 
P(E) 
tJ4 [v fi (s) ds] dv (8.13) 
TI 
Iti 
I 'T 
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8.3 Explosions prior to the mitigation systems activat- 
ing. 
The frequency of explosions occurring prior to the activation of the mitigation system is 
given by 
fe::: -- P(S)ALP(-E)(1 - P(WSFA)) (8.14) 
The form of P(E), the probability of ignition, is dependent on the activation time of the 
mitigation, t,,. 
For the situation of Figure 8.4 where each concentration band j has times tjj, tj2) tj3 and 
tj4 associated with it and the flammable region is entered and the upper flammable limit 
exceeded giving times, T1, T2, T3 and T4, there are certain situations which need to be 
considered separately, these involve when activation takes place. 
if t, < tjl 
P(E) =0 (8.15) 
An ignition may not occur in this concentration range as it was not reached prior 
to the mitigation system activating. 
if til "ýý ta < tj2 
t. 
P(E) = 
Ita 
AM 
11 
- TV 
fi(s)ds] dv (8.16) 
tj' 
I 
Ignition may only occur after tj, and prior to ta but must not have occurred 
previously under any conditions. 
if tj2 < t, < tj3 
P (E) 
tj2 
1- 
fV fi (s) ds] dv (8.17) 
IJ 
Tl 
jtj 
1 'T 
Since activation has occurred after the concentration band has been exceeded but 
prior to it being reentered, ignition may occur between tjl and tj2. 
if tj3 < ta < tj4 
P (E) 
t2 
AM 
11 
-V fi (s) ds] dv + 
ftj "j fTl 
ft4 
AM 
11 
- 
T2 
fi (s) ds -v fi(s)ds] dv (8.18) 
t., 
j fT 
I 
TT3 
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Ignition may occur between tjl and tj2 or between tj3 and t,,. 
if tj4 < ta 
P(E) 
tj2 
fi(v) 1- 
(v 
fi(s)ds] dv + 
JT1 
tj4 
AM f 
T2 
fi(s)ds - 
IV fi(s)ds] dv 
T tj 3 71 T3 
(8.19) 
Ignition may occur at any period within the concentration band as the mitigation 
system does not activate until after the concentration has dropped below this 
range. 
For the situation in Figure 8.5 there is no exceedence of the upper flammable limit so T2 
and T3 do not exist. When band j is exceeded the probabilities of ignition are as above with 
2v 
1- fi (s) ds -v fi (s) ds replaced by 1- fi(s)ds] 
I JT T, fT3 II 
When band j is the band where the concentration ceases to rise and begins its descent the 
probabilities of ignition are 
if t, < tjl 
P(E) =0 (8.20) 
if tjl < ta < tj4 
tj T 
P(E) fi(v) fi(s)ds dv (8.21) 
III 
vi 
if tj4 < ta 
P (E) 
tj4 
fi (V) 
V 
fi (s) dsl dv (8.22) 
til J Tl 
8.4 Explosions when the mitigation begins but is not 
maintained. 
These explosions depend on the activation time, t,, and on the probability density function 
of the mitigation failure, f,,, (u). The failure of the mitigation system is assumed to be a 
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constant rate so the probability density function of the mitigation failure takes an exponential 
form as shown in Equation 8.23. 
f,,, (u) = A,,,, e-Awau (8.23) 
The activation time in relation to the entrance and exit times for the concentration bands 
must first be considered to determine whether the mitigation has begun. Secondly each time 
period within the calculation is considered to assess whether the mitigation system fails. 
if t, < tjl 
P (E) f", (U) fi (V) f 
T 
fi (s) ds] dv+ 
tJ4 Jtj3 
A (v) 
I T2 
TI 
fi (s) ds - 
v 
fi (s) ds d du 
fT3 I 
VI 
tj2 tj2 
7 
f. 
ý, 
(u) 
11 
fi(v) 
f fi(s)ds] dv+ 
Iti 
1-1ý 7T1 
tj4 T2 v 
fi (v) 1-1 fi (s) ds - fi (s) ds] dvj du + 
3j 
Iti 1 
71 T3 
ti3 j4 
1-1 
T2 
fi (s) ds -f" fi (s) ds d du + 
l 
f. 
ý, 
(u) - fi (v) 
Ti T3 
VI 
77 tj 2 
[ltjt3 
tj4 t14 
fi(v) 
T2 
fi(s)ds- 
'fi(s)ds]dv]du 
(8.24) 
Iti 
3 Ti T3 
The failure of the mitigation system must be considered in all time periods from t,, 
to tjl through to tj3 to tj4- If the mitigation system has failed during one of these 
time periods then ignition may occur at any reasonable time period following this 
provided it has not previously occurred. For example the mitigation system may 
fail between the activation time and the time at which the concentration level is 
reached, so an ignition may occur at any time within the concentration range. 
The mitigation system may fail between tjl and tj2 and therefore ignition may 
occur at any time from this point whilst the concentration is within the explosive 
range. 
if tjl < ta < tj2 
P (E) 
tj2 
f.., (U) 
tJ2 , If ft 
AM 
11 
-Iv 'IT 1 
fi(s)ds] dv+ 
u . 
f tj4 
AM 
c 31 tj 
T2 f 
Ti 7 
fi (s) ds - 
v 
fi (s) ds dv du + 
fTv3 II 
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ti 3 j4 
f. 
ý, 
(u) 
[lt t3 
fi (v) 
2 
it 
1-1 
T2 
fi (s) ds - fi (s) dsj 7 Ti 
173 
dv] du + 
j i 
ti 
34f.., 
(u) 
tj4 
fi (V) 
Iti Ilu 
1- 
17 T2 
fi (s) ds -v fi(s)dsj 
1 
Ti 
ITv3 
dvj du (8.25) 
If the mitigation system is not activated until after the concentration has entered 
the explosive range then it can not fail until after this reducing the amount of 
time in which this type of ignition may occur. 
if tj2 < ta < tj3 
tJ3 tj4 
P(E) = f. (U) AM 
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Ift T2 v 
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tj4 
AM 
fti 
3 
Ifu I 
1-f 
T2 
fi(s)ds -v fi(s)ds] 
7 Ti 
13 
dv] du (8.26) 
if tj3 < ta < tj4 
tj4 tj4 T2 
u 
P (E) f.., (u) 
[f 
fi (v) 1 fi (s) ds - fi(s)ds] dv] du (8.27) 
uT Tý 
ft., 1113 
if tj4 < ta 
P(E) =0 (8.28) 
The mitigation system has been activated after the concentration has dropped 
below the lower flammable limit for this concentration range, therefore an ignition 
can not occur when the mitigation has been activated but not maintained. 
For the situation in Figure 8.5 explosions in band j are as above with 
T2 U 
I_f fi (s) ds - fi (s) d replaced by 1-f fi(s)ds 
T7 
S1 
TI 
11 JTV3 
71 
When band j is the band where the concentration ceases to rise and begins its descent the 
probabilities of explosions are 
if t, < tjl 
P (E) 
tj, 
f--ýM 
tj4 
fi (v) v fi(s)ds] dv] du 
it'. ' [ltj 
11T1 
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+ fWS(U) 
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lt 
ýU tjl 
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if til < ta < tj4 
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(U) 
t4 
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11 
-v fi(s)ds] dvl du P(E) = 
it., j fT, 
I 
if tj4 < ta 
P(E) = 
8.5 Explosions when the mitigation is activated. 
(8.30) 
(8.31) 
These explosions again depend on the activation time and the failure frequency of the mitiga- 
tion systems. If the mitigation system has failed then ignition must have occurred previously 
for a mitigated explosion to take place, therefore each time range must be considered to de- 
termine when the failures occur. 
For the case depicted in Figure 8.4 
if t, < tjl 
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tj4 
fwS (U)du 
[ tj2 
fi (V) fv fi(s)ds] dv 
1 Tj 
fta It, 
7 j 
tj4 
+1 fi (v) 1- 
t 
1 T2 ( 
JT1 
v 
fi (s) ds -. 
T3 
fi (s) ds dv 
f7 11 
j, 3 
t 
f., ' (u) t 
r. 
1 fi (v) 1-1v fi (s) ds] dv du T jl 
ti3 
+ f, "s(U) t tý 
lt 
ý 
ti2 
fi(v) lt, 
t 1 
fi (s) ds d du 
li 1 
VI 
Tl j2 
t J, 
f. (U) 
tj3 
j 
t2 
fi (v) 
tj 
v 
fi (s) ds dv 
+U fi(V) 
Iti 
3 
1 T2 
fi(s)ds - 
f" fi(s)ds] dv] du 
7 
1T1 
T3 
(8.32) 
The first term in this equation represents there being no failure of the mitigation 
system whilst the concentration is within the specific band, hence an ignition is 
possible throughout the range. The remaining terms consider the possible periods 
that failure may occur and determine the probability of an ignition appropriately. 
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if tj4 < ta 
P(E) =0 (8.36) 
The mitigation system has not activated whilst the concentration was between 
the flammable limits therefore a mitigated ignition can not occur. 
For the situation in Figure 8.5 explosions in band j are as above with 
T2 vv 
fi (s) ds - fi (s) ds replaced by 1 -1 fi (s)ds 
JTv3 II 
Ti 
I 
When band j is the band where the concentration ceases to rise and begins its descent the 
probabilities of explosions are 
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if t, < tjl 
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if til < ta < tj4 
JtJ4 
P(E) 1- 
I 
f,,, (u)dul 
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if tj4 < ta 
P(E) =0 
8.6 Results. 
(8.39) 
The new calculations should increase the accuracy of the model as the frequency calculations 
now take into account previous ignitable situations. The simplification made in the original 
model of ignoring the previous conditions of the gas cloud with respect to the ignition source 
has been replaced with a more complex method accounting for previous conditions. The 
new method introduces a dependency into the calculations, ruling out the chance that more 
than one ignition may occur within the same gas cloud. The new method is physically 
correct but leads to more complex calculations which rely on knowing the entrance and exit 
times corresponding to the flammable region and not just those for the specific concentration 
bands. The results are presented for each module; separation, compression and wellhead. 
The revised probability modelling was combined with both temperature state models. Model 
2 was the changing temperature state with a gas and condensate release and model 4 was the 
constant temperature release with the gas and condensate release. Due to the relatively small 
differences between the probability models the explosion frequency tables for the modules 
are shown instead of those for the individual sections within the modules. 
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8.6.1 The separation module., 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.46059x10-6 0.46043 x 10-6 
prior to mitigation 0.34814x 10-6 0.34814x 10-6 
mitigation not maintained 0.97447X10-11 0.97360xlO-" 
mitigated 0.58569 x 10-5 0.58547x1O-I 
Total explosion frequency 0.66656X 10-5 0.66633xIO-I 
Table 8.1: Explosion frequency for the separation module (per year) with the changing 
temperature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.62753X10-' 0.62725x10-1 
prior to mitigation 0.35458 x 10-6 0.35458xlO-G 
mitigation not maintained 0.15380X10-10 0.15363xlO-10 
mitigated 0.80994 x 10-5 0.80956xlO-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.90815x 10-5 0.90775xlo-5 
Table 8.2: Explosion frequency for the separation module (per year) with the constant 
temperature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
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8.6.2 The compression module. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.16957x 10-5 0.16954xIO-I 
prior to mitigation 0.24467x 10-5 0.24467xlO-' 
mitigation not maintained 0.22282x10-10 0.22262xlO-" 
mitigated 0.26633x 10-4 0.26627xlo-4 
Total explosion frequency 0.30776x 10-4 0.30769 x 10-4 
Table 8.3: Explosion frequency for the co mpression module (per year) with the changing 
temperature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.30901 X 10-5 0.30889xlO-, 5 
prior to mitigation 0.24431 x 10-5 0.24430xlO-5 
mitigation not maintained 0.69696x10-10 0.69624xI0-II 
mitigated 0.50548X 10-4 0.50528xlo-4 
Total explosion -frequency 0.56081 x 10-4 0.56060 x 
10-4 
Table 8.4: Explosion frequency for the compression module (per year) with the constant 
temperature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
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8.6.3 The wellhead module. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.49314x10-1 0.49307x 10-7 
prior to mitigation 0.28988 x 10-7 0.28988x 10-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.16730xlO-" 0.16728xlO-" 
mitigated 0.1110OX10-1 0.11098xlo-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.12044xlO-5 0.11881xlo-5 
Table 8.5: Explosion frequency for the wellhead module (per year) with the changing tem- 
perature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
Type of explosion Explosion frequency 
Original modelling Revised modelling 
mitigation fails to activate 0.49184 X 10-7 0.49177xlo-7 
prior to mitigation 0.28206x 10-7 0.28206xlo-7 
mitigation not maintained 0.16738xlO-" 0.16736xlO-" 
mitigated 0.11078X10-5 0.11076xlO-5 
Total explosion frequency 0.11852x 10-5 0.11850x10-1 
Table 8.6: Explosion frequency for the wellhead module (per year) with the constant tem- 
perature model - comparison of the two probability models. 
8.7 Discussion. 
This chapter has presented a new approach for determining the frequencies of explosion 
based on the times at which the concentration is between tile flammable limits and tile 
constant ignition rate. The original modelling assumes that as long as the concentration is 
between the flammable limits an ignition can occur. The new approach takes into account 
previous ignitions. For an ignition to occur there can have been no previous ignitions, if 
there have been ignitions resulting in explosions then the gas cloud no longer remains. Such 
an approach is more accurate in its modelling and is expected to produce lower explosion 
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frequencies. 
For all three modules and both models there are negligible differences between the frequen- 
cies gained with the original probability modellingýand those with the revised probability 
modelling. The more accurate modelling of the revised probability calculations yields slightly 
lower explosion frequencies than the original calculations as expected. Hence the original 
modelling was providing an over estimation of the explosion frequencies. Since this model 
takes less computations and provides an upper bound, it is reasonable to say that the sim- 
plification assumption was valid. 
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9. Modelling the, dispersion of the 
flammable gas cloud. 
9.1 Introduction. 
A current assumption in the SAROS modelling is that when the gas is released it immediately 
mixes perfectly with the air in the module to provide a uniform concentration throughout 
the module. The concentration is dependent upon the gas release rate, relative volume of 
the module and the ventilation rate. As long as the concentration is within the flammable 
limits and an ignition source occurs an explosion is possible. This is an over simplification, 
it would be more accurate if the dispersion of the gas within the air could be modelled. The 
larger the gas cloud the greater the chance of encountering an ignition source. 
The only way to effectively model the gas dispersion from a time dependent release source 
into a semi confined region full of obstacles, of the detail required on an offshore platform, 
is through computational fluid dynamics (CFD). CFD is the analysis of fluid flow, heat 
transfer and related phenomena using numerical techniques and computers. CFD plays a 
major part in engineering design due to its ability to predict the behaviour of designs prior to 
construction, therefore it can save time and money by reducing the need to build prototypes. 
CFD begins by setting up the equations necessary to solve the specific problem. It is based 
on solving the time dependent Navier Stokes transport equations. These equations have the 
form 
a 
(poi) + V. (poju) - V. (]PiVoi) = source 5t- 
These are solved by converting them to a numerical form using a discretisation scheme and 
employing a suitable solution algorithm. 
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9.2 Defining the problem. 
The problem that requires solution is calculating the concentration levels of gas within a 
module which has a volume of magnitude of the order of thousands of cubic metres. The gas 
source is a leaking pipe or pressurised vessel, the magnitude of the leak hole is of the order 
of millimetres. 
For simplicity the assumption is made that the release is only gas, but this can be expanded 
to include liquid. The gas is natural gas in the context of offshore platforms. The composition 
of natural gas is approximately 95% methane with the other 5% made up of various denser 
products, for simplification we assume that we are dealing with a methane release. The 
module contains air at atmospheric pressure ( 101325 Pascals). 
The species transport equation requires solving to determine the concentration, this has the 
following form 
(Pmj) + V- (Pmju) - V- (FjVmj) = source (9.2) 
where mj is the mass fraction of species j. When there are n species, (n - 1) species transport 
equations require solution due to 
(n-1) 
Mnýl- 
EMj 
j=l 
(9.3) 
In this case there are 2 species, air and methane, so only one species transport equation 
requires solution. The source term is the volume flow rate into the module. rj is the diffusion 
coefficient which is a constant relating the transport of a species to the concentration gradient 
ensuring that the total net transport of molecules is zero. As there are 2 gases the binary 
diffusion coefficient is employed which takes into account the properties of both species. By 
Ficks law of diffusion, that states that the current density of the flow past a plane normal 
to the gradient is proportional to the gradient. Tile diffusion coefficient is 
3) 12 22 2 (k )l T3 (9.4) 
3 70 2m,, 2Mb Uý+Ub 
2 
P( 2) 
Where k is the coefficient of thermal conductivity, a&b are subscripts for the respective 
species, o, is the molecular diameter and m is the molecular weight. The Lennard Jones 
parameters can be used to estimate the molecular diameters, for air 0' = 3.689 and for 
methane u=3.796. 
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The species equation 9.2 incorporating equation 9.4 involves the velocity, u, the density, 
p, the temperature, T, and the pressure, p, as unknowns. To solve for the velocity the 
momentum equations are used. The general transport equation in terms of momentum is 
19 (pui) + V. (puiu) - V. (riVui) = source Ot 
Ut (pui) + V. (puiu) is the rate of increase of momentum of a fluid particle. This is equal 
to the sum of forces on the fluid particle, of which there are surface forces and body forces. 
Surface forces include viscosity, shear stresses and pressure, whilst the body force is gravity. 
V. (riVui) + source = -Vp - pg + effects of stresses (9.6) 
0 
g0 
9 
where 
197xx 7, T. +ýX, for the x component of momentum (9.7) effect of stresses -+ý, -XY Ox ay (9Z 
The gas is likely to be compressible, therefore the continuity equation is 
op 
F V. (pu) =0 (9.8) at 
The gas is taken to be an ideal gas, i. e., one which obeys Boyle's law where the pressure is 
inversely proportional to the volume. The equation of state for an ideal gas is 
pRT 
(9.5) 
(9.9) 
In order to solve for the temperature the energy transport equation for entlialpy requires a 
solution. 
(ph) + V. (phu) - V. (IP1, Vh) = source (9.10) 
In this case the diffusion coefficient is the coefficient of thermal conductivity, the source 
includes pressure, body forces and stresses. 
a 
(ph) + V. (phu) - V. (kVh) 
ýP- 
+ V. (u-T) - p9 it- at 
The stresses are part of a matrix, T 
Tx x Tx y Tx z 
T -ryx 7-yy -ry. 
Tzx Tzy Tzz 
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The temperature is then found from 
mf,, Hf,,, 
Ep 
where Tnp, is the mass fraction of the gas, Hf. is the calorific value of the fuel. 
(9.12) 
T 
T- Tef 
fT,, 
ef 
cpdT (9.13) 
where 
cp =E mjcj Vi cj is the specific heat capacity of species j at constant pressure. 
(9.14) 
The flow may be turbulent, which means that the velocity components vary very rapidly 
in both space and time. Therefore the flow behaviour is random and chaotic. In order to 
determine whether flow is turbulent the Reynolds number is calculated 
Pvref Re = (9.15) 
where D is the characteristic length, usually taken to be the inlet diameter, v,, f is the 
characteristic velocity, usually the velocity at the inlet. If Re > 1000 then the flow is 
assumed turbulent, requiring turbulent transport equations to be solved. 
The turbulent flow is assumed to be homogeneous, which means quantitatively the turbulence 
has the same structure in all parts of the flow field. All variables relating to the fluid can be 
divided into a mean component and a randomly fluctuating component. 
Oi = ýi Oi (9.16) 
where the mean component is calculated using space averaging for homogeneous turbulence. 
Both the average and the fluctuating components satisfy the continuity equations. Solv- 
ing the original Navier Stokes equations, using ui, and capturing the effects of turbulence 
would require a very fine mesh and a vast number of iterations. With the present computing 
resources available it would take billions of years to obtain an accurate and converged solu- 
tion. To overcome this problem semi empirical turbulence modelling techniques are employed 
which involve solving the appropriate transport equations with equation 9.16 substituted. 
Applying the averaging forms of variables in the general scalar transport equation introduces 
a turbulent diffusive flux. 
pu (9.17) 
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Physically this means that the major effects of turbulence are to enhance the mixing of the 
fluid. 
A turbulence model must be chosen which fulfils the following required attributes. 
Accuracy the degree of closure and empiricism 
Wide applicability to a number of flow scenarios and flow speeds 
Simplicity for easy coding and understanding 
Economical to reduce computational time and effort 
The most effective turbulence model available is the k-c turbulence model which assumes 
that the turbulent transport is analogous to molecular transport. This is the most commonly 
used model due to its ability to most closely match the criteria. Two equations along with 
empirical constants are employed in this method, due to the models wide usage experimen- 
tally derived and validated constants are well known and utilised. k is the turbulent kinetic 
energy which provides a measure of the velocity fluctuations and is defined by 
1 -,, -Uiui 2 
(9.18) 
c is the viscous dissipation 
/, I Dui Oui (9.19) 
P axj Dxj 
The turbulent viscosity, tit was defined by Prandtl Kolmogorov to be 
tit = CAP 
k 
c 
where C,, is a constant. 
The transport equations for k and c are 
(9.20) 
apk 
+a (pk9j) = ý0- ju + 
ak 
+p- PC (9.21) 
at axi xi O'k 
ýX 
ÜPE 
+0 (peffi) = 
d9 (tl + ýýt 
) 06 
+ 
C1P6P C2PPE 2 
(9.22) 
et ä -x- -i äxi U, äxi -k k 
The constants have been determined via computer optimisation by considering 2 dimen- 
sional wall boundary layers. These are C, = 1.44 C2 = 1.92 CM = 0.09 O'k. = 
1.0 o,, = 1.3. 
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Solving for k and c gives pt which is used in the Reynolds stresses 
(9 (Ptl9ai) 
=a 
(PT,. 
U-, . U. 
) 
(9xi axi Oxi 
(9.23) 
This gives 9i and ui and hence give ui allowing the applicable set of transport equations to 
be solved. 
9.3 Discretising the transport equations. 
The Navier Stokes transport equations are partial differential equations which must be solved 
numerically over the whole domain of interest. The transformation of the partial differential 
equations to a numerical analogue of the equation is done using the finite volume method. 
This method divides the domain of interest into discrete control volumes. Rectangular 
Cartesian coordinates or cylindrical coordinates may be used to setup the nodal points, 
ensuring that all geometries can be modelled effectively. The control volumes are setup 
around each node, with the boundaries of the volumes being midway between adjacent 
nodes. In three dimensions there are six neighbouring nodes, east, west, north, south, top 
and bottom as seen in Figure 9.1. 
T 
w 
S 
B 
Figure 9.1: A conventional node in 3 dimensions. 
N 
E 
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In each control volume the partial differential equations are discretised to algebraic form 
relating the variables to the values in the neighbouring volumes. These equations can then be 
solved numerically. Scalar variables such as pressure, density, temperature etc., are evaluated 
at the nodal points. If the velocities are defined at the scalar grid nodes the influence of 
the pressure is not properly represented in the discretised momentum equations[591, so a 
staggered grid centred around the control volume faces is used to calculate the velocity. An 
interpolation scheme must then be utilised to define the velocity at the nodes. 
A discretisation scheme requires conservativeness, boundedness and transportiveness to en- 
sure that the numerical solutions are realistic. 
Conservativeness: For the variable under consideration, 0, to be conservative for the whole 
solution domain the flux of 0 leaving a control volume must be equal to the flux of 
0 entering the adjacent control volume through the adjoining face. Hence the flux 
must be represented in a consistent manner, i. e., by the same expression in each pair 
of adjacent control volumes. Overall the fluxes must cancel out leaving a net flux of 
zero. 
Boundedness: When solving equations for 0 the process begins with an estimate then an 
iterative technique is used to converge to a correct solution. Matrix coefficients should 
therefore be diagonally dominant, for this to be the case the source terms must be 
negative. If there are no source terms 0 should be bounded by the boundary values. 
For boundedness all coefficients of the discretised equations should have the same sign. 
If a discretisation scheme does not satisfy boundedness then the solution may never 
converge or may take a long time to do so. 
'JPransportiveness: This is the relationship between the magnitude of the Peclet number 
and the direction of the flow. The Peclet number is the ratio of convection to diffusion 
Pe = 
pubx 
r 
where bx is the characteristic length, p is the density, u is the velocity and Ir is the 
diffusion coefficient. When Pe =0 the flow is still and the contours of 0 are concentric 
circles centred around P, the central node in the control volume. This is because 
diffusion spreads 0 equally in all directions. As Pe increases, i. e., convection increases, 
the contours become elliptical and the direction of spread is influenced by the direction 
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of flow. The effects of convection, diffusion and direction of flow, i. e., transportiveness, 
must be integrated into the discretisation scheme to obtain correct solutions. 
Discretisation schemes include differencing schemes; central, upwind and hybrid. The central 
differencing scheme is not transportive and is therefore an inadequate scheme. The upwind 
and hybrid schemes are improved schemes however the accuracy is only first order. The power 
law scheme and the exponential scheme are alternative discretisation methods, however they 
are also first order accurate. The QUICK (quadratic upwind differencing) scheme uses a 
three point weighted quadratic interpolation for the cell face values and is therefore third 
order accurate and possesses the three attributes required. 
9.4 Solving the transport equations. 
Once the partial differential equations have been discretised an algorithm for solving them 
is required. The equations are highly non linear therefore requiring an iterative solution 
scheme. A SIMPLE algorithm[591 is used for the solution procedure, where SIMPLE is an 
acronym for Semi Implicit Method for Pressure Linked Equations. This is an iterative 
solution strategy adopted to solve coupled pressure and velocity equations which invariably 
occur when a flow is incompressible. Initial guesses for the velocity and pressure fields are 
made which must be improved. 
The SIMPLER (SIMPLE Revised) and SIMPLEC (SIMPLE Consistent) are improvements 
to the SIMPLE algorithm. The SIMPLE algorithm however is relatively straight forward 
and used in most commercial packages. Tile SIMPLER and SIMPLEC algorithms increase 
the amount of computations necessary, but improvements in convergence usually reduce the 
computer time. Tile number of iterations can not be predicted before the solution procedure 
begins. It will be dependent on the dimensions of the solution grid, the initial conditions, 
initial estimation of variables and the nature and complexity of the flow being modelled. 
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9.5 Use of commercial CFD packages. 
To model the dispersion of the gas commercial paclmges were employed, due to the infeasi- 
bility of writing a specific code within the time allowed. Both FLUENT and CFX FLOW3D 
were used in an attempt to model the situation. 
On an offshore platform the geometry is complex due to the congestion of pipe work and 
process vessels within a module. Because of this complexity an initial simpler model was 
set up. The simpler model involved the meshing of a large module which has dimensions 
40m x 20m x 10m with a small inlet hole of diameter 50mm representing the flange failure 
of a pipe. The module was assumed to be semi confined with two solid walls and two open 
faces. The two open faces allowed for the ventilation effects. One was represented as an inlet 
with wind speeds of 1.7ms-1 (equivalent to 4mph) and the opposite face was represented 
as the outlet. The inflow was assumed to be methane with air as the ambient background 
fluid with the atmospheric pressure at 101325Pascals. The CFD packages required the 
physical composition of methane and the ambient fluid. From this data, Table 9.1, the binary 
dispersion coefficient could be calculated and the nature of the fluids could be assessed. 
Property Methane 
Density (k. glrn3) 1.22 0.667 
Gas constant (JlkmolK) 287 518 
Molecular weight (kglkmol) 28 16 
Specific heat capacity (JlkgK) 1004.5 2136.75 
at constant pressure 
Specific heat capacity (JlkgK) 718 1675.55 
at constant volume 
Thermal conductivity (mkg/S3 K) 1.4 1.3 
Viscosity (kglms) 1.8 x 10-5 1.34 x 10-1 
Table 9.1: The physical data for methane and air. 
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9.5.1 General limitations. 
Using both FLUENT and CFX FLOW31) problems were encountered. These problems were 
due mainly to divergence occurring because of the relative scales of the leak hole specified 
and the module dimensions. Adaptive meshing was employed when using CFX FLOW31) 
as a measure to rectify this. However the processor power available was not sufficient to 
gain convergence over more than two iterations. To simulate the release into the simplified 
domain was a lengthy process, a simulation of a few seconds required hours of real time. 
The problems arising on a simplification of the model prohibited attempts at the more 
complex cases. Therefore the resources available, in terms of computer processor power and 
time, proved to be major limitations in what could be achieved using commercial codes 
which had no specific sub models for such a simulation. Without the CFD expertise it was 
infeasible to write specific sub models in the time allowed. Hence correlations relating the 
volume to the concentration levels were not produced for a realistic scenario. 
9.6 Integrating dispersion correlations into the frequency 
modelling. 
Modelling the dispersion of the gas within the module will enable us to establish correlations 
for the time variation of the volume occupied by a specific concentration range of gas. The 
concentration contours produced as the gas enters the module will change position and shape 
with time. The volume encased within each concentration band will change with respect to 
time, such as that shown in Figure 9.2 for a specific concentration band. The exact form of 
this relationship will change for each scenario. 
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Figure 9.2: An example of the expected growth and decay of the volume within a concen- 
tration band, using the lognormal function. 
In this example the volume builds up rapidly at first due to a fast release rate. Once the 
leak has exhausted the volume reduces as determined by the ventilation rate. It is possible 
that the variation may be represented by a skewed function such as a lognormal function of 
the form 
V(t) =1 exp 
(-I (In (t) _ 0)2) (9.24) 
Ut 2 or 
Where 0 and u are the function parameters. Such a function is capable of representing the 
increase of volume as the gas is released and the decrease as ventilation dominates whilst 
the gas is exhausted. 
To calculate the frequencies of explosions an ignition density is used rather than an ignition 
rate. In this case the probability of ignition is dependent on the ignition density and the 
dispersion and concentration of the gas cloud. For a specific concentration band, m, the 
volume of gas follows a function, V,, (t). The ignition rate is then 
Aiv", (t) (9.25) 
Where Ai is the ignition rate per unit volume. This leads to a probability density function 
for the ignition source occurrence times of 
0 0 
AiV, (t) exp Aj 
lt 
V (u) du) (9.26) 
The modelling provides the times at which each concentration band develops and then dis- 
appears and the volume within this band. It is assumed that the lowest concentration band 
is the first to be reached and the last to be left, and that the highest is the last to be reached 
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and the first to be left. Therefore if tE77-i is the time band m is entered and tLm is the time 
band m is left, the following must apply 
tEl < tE2 < ... < 
tL2 < tLI (9.27) 
As with the probability calculations described previously, this method assumes that an ig- 
nition will only occur at time t if it has not occurred previously whilst a gas cloud existed 
which was within the explosive range. Previous calculations involve integrating the proba- 
bility density function for the ignition source using limits of integration that relate to the 
times of entry and exit for each concentration band over the flammable region. In this case 
however it is more complex. Each concentration range has its own probability density func- 
tion that depends on the volume of the gas cloud within the concentration band limits. We 
must therefore consider each time interval in Equation 9.27, i. e. tEl to tE2) tE2 to tE3, etc.. 
These are illustrated in Figure 9.3 where the variation of volume with time for each band is 
assumed not to intersect. 
Figure 9.3: Representation of the volume variation for each concentration band with time. 
Considering first the probability of a gas cloud ignition at time v 
n-1 tE(k+l) k 
P(E) fi,,, (v) 1 fij (s) ds) dv 
k=m 
ItEk 
j=l t-, j 
tLn n 
+ 
ItEn 
AM Mj E=l 
I 
Lv; i 
fij (s)) dv 
I' 
n-1 tLk 
M 
nt i k 
fij (s) ds - 
v 
fil (s) ds dv(9.28) 
I 
k=m (k+l) t Ei j=k+l 
tE, 
Where n is the number of concentration bands, P(E) is the probability of ignition whilst 
the concentration is in band m and fij is the probability density function for the ignition 
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source for band j. The first term considers the intervals between the entering times for 
each concentration band, for example if only the first concentration band has been reached 
then it is unnecessary to consider the ignition density function relating to the other bands 
as ignition can not yet occur within those ranges. However as the gas release develops and 
the higher concentration bands are entered more terms are added to account for the other 
ignition density functions of the other bands. The second term considers the time interval 
between entering and leaving the last band within the flammable limits. The final term 
accounts for the time intervals between the exit of each band this reduces the number of 
density functions that need to be considered. 
To evaluate the proportions of these explosions that are unmitigated we need to consider 
the situation where the ignition happens before the water spray activates. The calculations 
for this will be as in Equation 9.28 with the limits changed to account for the time in the 
release at which the deluge activates. Explosions occurring after the failure of the activated 
water spray depend on the activation time and the failure rate of the water spray system. 
The deluge failure rate is assumed to be a constant leading to the failure density function of 
Equation 9.29. 
f,,, (u) = A,,, exp (-A,,,,, u) (9.29) 
The activation time with respect to the limiting times of each band is considered. 
For the case when td < tEm the probability of ignition in band m at time v is 
t n-1 E(k+l) 
k 
P(E) = 
fEmf,,, (u) 
t 
fij (s) ds) dv] fi. (V) t, j=1 tEj 
ft 
tE + I'Ln fi.. (V) 
v 
fij (s) ds dv+ 
tnv 
n j=1 
ftEvi 
n-1 Lk n tLj v E A. (V) 1-1: 
1 
fij (s) ds -E 
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j=k+l 1=1 
fit (s) ds) dv] du 
1jtL 
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n-I t E(J+l) n-1 E(k+l) 
kv 
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£ tLn tLn nv 
+ f.., (u) 
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fi. (v) 1-Z fij (s) ds dv+ 
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(9.30) 
For all other intervals Equation 9.30 is used with a change of integration limits. Similarly for 
ignition occurring when the water spray is active the probability of ignition whentd < tEm 
is: 
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kv 
P(E) 1 f,,, (u) dEA. (v) fij (s) ds dv Ul k=m 
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tLn nv 
+ fi. (V) fij (s) ds dv+ 
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JtEj 
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(9.31d 
9.7 Discussion. 
This chapter has outlined the work necessary to use CFD proficiently applied to an offshore 
platform and the attempts to simplify this procedure. CFD correlations of the volume of gas 
enclosed at specific concentration levels with time would allow us to specify different ignition 
sources at different positions in time and space. Should correlations of the concentration 
growth with time be provided by CFD or other means, Section 9.6 provides the equations 
that have been developed to allow for an ignition rate density dependent on the concentration 
level rather than a constant ignition source within a perfectly mixed volume. 
It is expected that these equations will provide a better approximation to the frequency 
of an explosion as they allow for a more realistic scenario to develop. However no useful 
correlations were obtained for numerical estimates to be obtained due to the convergence 
limitations and time restrictions. Although the results are likely to be more accurate, we 
can not state whether these will be higher or lower than those currently available. As the 
current modelling assumes that the concentration is uniform, it not only ignores the fact 
that there will be areas with a lower concentration but also areas with intense concentration. 
Therefore in some cases the results could presently be underestimated in others they may 
be overestimated. 
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10.1 Introduction. 
Analysis has been carried out on the consequences of varying key parameters in the model 
to determine the most sensitive. This analysis will highlight the effects produced should any 
of the data have any inaccuracies in it. The key parameters were identified to be: 
& The frequency of ignition. 
* The probability that the deluge system fails to operate. 
e The activation time of the deluge system. 
9 The leak hole size distribution. 
e The frequencies of occurrence of the leak holes. 
* The distribution of ventilation rates. 
* The failure frequency of the deluge once the deluge is operational. 
The values of these parameters were varied by ±5%, ±10% and -1-15%. If further analysis 
of the results or confirmation of a pattern was required then the parameters were varied by 
±20% and ±50%. 
The results were initially analysed by looking for changes in the expected frequencies of 
explosions and in the frequency of the overpressures obtained. A typical offshore platform is 
designed to withstand overpressures of up to 3 bar, therefore particular attention was paid 
to the frequency that the overpressures exceeded 3 bar. Secondly, the degrees of importance 
attributed to each of the isolation and blowdown valves were compared to determine any 
significant changes. The contributions to the frequency due to leaks on particular sections 
were also considered. 
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To obtain a complete picture as to the nature of the effects arising from a change in a 
parameter two models were used. Both models assume that the leak is comprised of gas and 
condensate, escaping in proportion to the amounts within the vessel. The first model is the 
changing temperature model which assumes that there is no heat transfer within the system 
as the leak occurs. The second model is the constant temperature model which assumes 
total heat transfer within the system as the leak occurs. Should a leak occur on an offshore 
platform there is likely to be some, but not total, heat transfer in the system, therefore these 
models provide an upper and lower bound for the results. When the two models exhibit the 
same effect to the change in parameter we may assume that the true scenario will follow the 
same behaviour. 
A leak may occur on an offshore platform in the separation, compression and wellhead mod- 
ules. The results attributed to the three modules are all dependent on the key parameters. 
The modules each contain sections that may contribute to the leak and are subject to differ- 
ent environmental and initial conditions. Each module is considered to determine whether 
the changes in the parameters have similar effects in different conditions. 
Within this analysis the parameters are each considered separately. 
10.2 The frequency of ignition. 
For all three modules, the frequency of an ignition source being in the vicinity of the gas 
cloud is 0.0028/hour. This was varied as shown in Table 10.1. 
Change Frequency Change Frequency 
+5% 0.00294 -5% 0.00266 
+10% 0.00308 -10% 0.00252 
+15% 0.00322 -15% 0.00238 
+20% 0.00336 -20% 0.00224 
+50% 0.0042 -50% 0.0014 
Table 10.1: The variation of ignition frequency per hour. 
The results generated for the separation, compression and wellhead modules with the two 
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different temperature state models revealed the same pattern as seen in Tables 10.2 and 10.3. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-15% 0.4953 x 10-5 0.2526x 10-4 0.1023xIO-5 
-10% 0.5244xlO-5 0.2674x 
10-4 0.1083x 10-5 
-5% 0.5536xlO-5 0.2823x 10-4 0.1143x 10-5 
0% 0.5827xlO-5 0.2971 X 10-4 0.1203xlO-5 
+5% 0.6118xlO-5 0.3120x10-4 0.1263x10-1 
+10% 0.6409xlO-5 0.3269x 10-4 0.1323x10-1 
+15% 0.6700xlO-5 0.3417X 10-4 0.1383x10-1 
Table 10.2: The changes in explosion frequencies (per year) due to ignition frequency varia- 
tion using the changing temperature model. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-15% 0.7550X10-5 0.4759x10-4 0.9526xIO-c' 
-10% 0.7994xlO-' 0.5039X 10-4 0.1008 x 10-5 
-5% 0.8438xlO-' 0.5318 x 10-4 0.1064xlO-' 
0% 0.8882x10-1 0.5598x 10-4 0.1120xIO-' 
+5% 0.9326x10-1 0.5878x 10-4 0.1176x 10-5 
+10% 0.9769x10-5 0.6158x 10-4 0.1232xIO-5 
+15% 0.1021xlO-5 0.6438x 10-4 0.1288 x 10-5 
Table 10.3: The changes in explosion frequencies (per year) due to ignition frequency varia- 
tion using the constant temperature model. 
There is a direct correlation between the frequency of an ignition source per hour and the 
frequency of an explosion for the module concerned. A correlation was to be expected as the 
frequency of an explosion is directly dependent on the frequency of an ignition source being 
present. The probability of an ignition source occurring in the simplest case is described by 
the following equation 
t2 t2 
P(E) fi(v)dv Aie-AI'dv = e- e -Ajt2 (10.1) 
it 
I 
ft 
I' 
This shows that there is an exponential relationship between Ai, the frequency of an ig- 
nition source being present and the probability of an ignition source occurring. For small 
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changes in Ai a linear relationship will be seen between the changes in P(E). The percent- 
age increase/decrease of the ignition frequency per hour produces the equivalent percentage 
increase/decrease of the module explosion frequency. For example, increasing the ignition 
frequency per hour by 20% increases the frequency that an explosion will occur in the module 
by 20%. 
The importance measures of the sections and valves do not alter. This is because the 
frequency of ignition is a parameter of small magnitude which has an approximately linear 
effect. The gas leak flow and the subsequent module concentration, generated from a leak 
on a particular section with a certain combination of valves is derived without reference 
to the ignition frequency. Therefore each simulation will be the same up until the ignition 
frequency is introduced, this then has a linear effect, leaving the relative importance of the 
sections and valves unchanged. 
The frequencies of the expected overpressures vary by the percentage increase/decrease of the 
parameter. Therefore the frequency of exceeding an overpressure of 3 bar is increased by 5% 
should the frequency of an ignition be increased by 5%. Figure 10.1 shows the overpressure 
exceedence curve centered around 3 bar for each of the modules using both of the models. 
Hence it can be seen that anýerror of e% made in determining the ignition frequency per hour 
will produce results for the expected explosion frequencies and the overpressure-frequency 
distribution in error of e%. This relationship is demonstrated for the separation, compression 
and wellhead modules using both temperature state models. 
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Figure 10.1: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to the ignition frequency variation. 
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10.3 The probability that the deluge system fails to 
activate. 
The probability that the deluge system fails to activate (unavailability of deluge) is dependent 
upon the module being considered. For the separation module it is originally 0.0691, for the 
compression module it is 0.0551 and for the wellhead module it is 0.0415. The variations are 
tabulated in Table 10.4. 
Separation module 
Change Unavailability I Change Unavailability 
+5% 0.072555 -5% 0.065645 
+10% 0.07601 -10% 0.06219 
+15% 0.079465 -15% 0.058735 
Compression module 
Change Unavailability Change Unavailability 
+5% 0.057855 -5% 0.052345 
+10% 0.06061 -10% 0.04959 
+15% 0.063365 -15% 0.046835 
Wellhead module 
Change Unavailability I Change Unavailability 
+5% 0.043575 -5% 0.039425 
+10% 0.04565 -10% 0.03735 
+15% 0.047725 -15% 0.035275 
Table 10.4: The variation of the unavailability of the deluge. 
All three modules and both models produce the same pattern of variation in the frequencies 
i of the explosions generated when the unavailability of the deluge is changed. 
The total explosion frequencies for leaks attributed to specific sections and the total ex- 
plosion frequency for the module do not change with variations in the unavailability of the 
deluge system (final column in Tables 10.5 and 10.6). However, the frequencies of explosions 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.3422 x 10-6 0.1105 X 10-6 0.1083X10-1' 0.5374xlO-5 0.5827xlO -5 
-10% 0.3624x 10-6 0.1101X10-6 0.1079x10-10 0.5354xlO-' 0.5827X 10-5 
-5% 0.3825xlO-6 0.1097x 10-6 0.1075 x 10-10 0.5335XIO-5 0.5827xlO-5 
0% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.1093 X10-6 0.1071xIO-10 0.5315x10-1 0.5827X10-5 
+5% 0.4228 x 10-6 0.1089X 10-6 0.1067X10-10 0.5295X10-5 0.5827x1O-I 
+10% 0.4429x 10-6 0.1085X 10-6 0.1063X10-10 0.5275x10-1 0.5827xlO-' 
+15% 11 0.4630 x 10-6 1 0.1081xlo-, 1 0-1059X10-10 1 0.5256xlO-5 0.5827X 10-5 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.1391xlO-' 0.2456X 
10-5 0.2151 x 10-10 0.2587X 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-10% 0.1473x 
10-5 0.2449X10-5 0.2145 x 10-10 0.2579X 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-5% 0.1555x10-1 0.2442 x 10-5 0.2139x1O-'O 0.2572x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
0% 0.1637xlO-' 0.2435XIO-r' 0.2132x10-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+5% 0-1719X 10-5 0.2428X 10-5 0.2126xlO-'o 0.2557X 10-4 0.2971 x 10-4 
+10% 0.1801x10-1 0.2421 x 10-5 0.2120x10-10 0.2549x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+15% 11 0.1883x 10-5 0.2414xlO-' 1 0.2114X10-10 1 0.2542x10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4245x10-7 0.3161 X 
10-7 0.1658xlO-" 0.1129x 10-5 0.1203x10-1 
-10% 0.4495X10-7 0.3154x10-7 0.1654xlO-" 0.1127xlO-' 0.1203x10-1 
-5% 0.4744 x 
10-7 0.3147X 10-7 0.1651X10-11 0.1124xlO-5 0.1203xlO-' 
0% 0.4994 x 10-7 0.3141 XJO-7 0.1647xIO-11 0.1122x 10-5 0.1203 X 10-5 
+5% 0.5244x 10-7 0.3134 x 10-7 0.1644xlO-" 0.1119X10-5 0.1203xlO-' 
+10% 0.5494x 10-7 0.3127x 10-7 0.1640xlO-" 0.1117X10-5 0.1203X10-5 
+15% 1 0.5743 x 10-7 0.3120 x 10-7 0.1637xIO-11 0.1114xlO-' 0.1203X10-5 
Table 10.5: The changes in explosion frequencies (per year) due to the variation of the 
unavailability of the deluge system using the changing temperature model. 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.5217xIO-6 0.3581 X 10-6 0.1445xlO-10 0.8002xlO-5 0.8882X10-5 
-10% 0.5523 x 10-6 0.3568x10-6 0.1439xlO-10 0.7972xlO-' 0.8882x10-5 
-5% 0.5830x 10-6 0.3555X 10-6 0.1434xlO-" 0.7943xlO-' 0.8882x10-1 
0% 0.6137xIO-6 0.3542 X 10-6 0.1429xIO-10 0.7914x 10-5 0.8882XIO-5 
+5% 0.6444XIO-6 0.3529xlO-G 0.1423x10-10 0.7884xlO-5 0.8882xlO-5 
+10% 0.6751 X 10-6 0.3516xlO-6 0.1418X10-10 0.7855x10-1 0.8882x10-1 
+15% 11 0.7058x10-6 1 0.3503X 10-6 1 0.1413x10-10 I 0.7826xIO-5 I 0.8882x10-5 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.2622x10-1 0.2469x 
10-5 0.6993x10-10 0.5089x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
-10% 0.2776xlO-5 0.2462x 
10-5 0.6972 x 10-10 0.5074x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
-5% 0.2930xlO-5 0.2455x 
10-5 0.6952x10-10 0.5060x 10-4 0.5598xlO-4 
0% 0.3084x10-1 0.2448x 10-5 0.6932xIO-10 0.5045X10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
+5% 0.3239x10-1 0.2440x 10-5 0.6912xIO-10 0.5030x10-4 0.5598 x 10-4 
+10% 0.3393x 10-5 0.2433 X 10-5 0.689IX10-10 0.5016x 10-4 0.5598 x 10-4 
+15% 11 0.3547x 10-5 0.2426xlO-'5 1 0.6871X10-10 1 0.5001 X 10-4 
1 
0.5598x10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.3953 X 
10-7 0.2602 X 10-7 0.1422x10-11 0.1055X10-5 0.1120x10-1 
-10% 0.4186 x 
10-7 0.2596x 10-7 0.1419xlO-" 0.1052xlO-' 0.1120xIO-' 
-5% 0.4418 x 
10-7 0.2591 X 10-7 0.1416xIO-11 0.1050X10-5 0.1120X10-5 
0% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2585 XIO-7 0.1413xlO-" 0.1048xlO-r' 0.1120X'10-r' 
+5% 0.4883 x 10-7 0.2580x 10-7 0.1410x1O-11 0.1046xlO-5 0.1120x 10-5 
+10% 0.5116X 10-7 0.2574x 10-7 0.140N10-11 0.1043X10-5 0.1120xIO-5 
+15% 0.5348x 10-7 0.2568x 10-7 0.1404xlO-" 0.1041x10-1 0.1120xlO-5 
Table 10.6: The changes in explosion frequencies (per year) due to the variation of the 
unavailability of the deluge system using the constant temperature model. 
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are categorised dependent on the state of the mitigation system at the point that ignition 
occurs. Explosions may occur when the deluge system fails to activate, prior to the deluge 
system activating, when the deluge system is not maintained or when the deluge system is 
fully operational. The frequency of the deluge system failing to activate affects the type of 
explosion expected, as demonstrated in Tables 10.5 and 10.6. 
When determining the frequency of an explosion, the failure rate of the deluge system is 
introduced following the calculation of the release rates and hence tile times at which an 
explosion is possible. Combining the probability that ignition occurs, the probability of tile 
leak scenario arising, the frequency of the leak and tile probability that the deluge system 
fails to activate gives the frequency of an explosion occurring during a specific concentration 
level. The frequency of an explosion occurring given that the deluge fails to activate is 
Frequency of an explosion : -- P (E) P (S) ALP (WSFA) 
Where P(E) is the probability that the ignition occurs, P(S) is the probability that the 
scenario arises, AL is the frequency of occurrence of the leak hole and P(WSFA) is the 
probability of the deluge failing to activate. 
The other types of explosions all assume that the deluge system does initially activate there- 
fore the frequency of an explosion has the probability that the deluge system activates as a 
multiplication factor. 
Frequency of an explosion =P (E) P (S) AL (1 -P (WSFA)) 
When the unavailability of the deluge is increased the frequency of explosions occurring 
when the deluge fails to activate is increased by the same percentage (second column in 
Tables 10.5 and 10.6). For example, increasing the unavailability of the deluge by 10% 
for the compression module using the changing temperature model gives the frequency of 
an explosion occurring when the deluge system fails to activate of 0.18013 x 10-1 per year 
compared to the original value of 0.16375 x 10-1 per year. This is a 10% increase (0.16375 x 
10-5 x 1.1 = 0.18013 x 10-5). 
The frequencies of explosions from the other categories decrease proportionally, but not at 
the same percentage as the increase in the variable. The frequency of these explosions is 
decreased by 
(1 - (I + a) P (WSFA)) X 100% (1 -P (WSFA)) 
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Where (a x 100) % is the increase of the unavailability of deluge. 
For example the unavailability of the deluge system for tile separation module is 0.0691, 
increasing this by 10% gives 0.07601. The frequency of an explosion when tile deluge system 
fails to activate increases by 10%. The frequency of explosions prior to tile deluge activat- 
ing, when the deluge is not maintained and when the deluge system operates continuously 
(1 decrease by 100% = 0.742%. 1-0.0691 
The importance measures do not alter for isolation and blowdown valve contributions to 
the expected explosion frequency, however they do change for the category of explosions 
generated. The values with which leaks on particular sections contribute to the explosion 
frequencies remain unaltered. 
The frequencies of exceedence of the overpressures vary according to the variation in the 
unavailability of the deluge. Figure 10.2 demonstrates the effects for each of the modules 
with both temperature state models. 
Mitigation systems act to reduce the overpressures generated by a gas cloud. Therefore 
increasing the unavailability of the deluge system decreases the mitigation causing the fre- 
quency of higher overpressures to increase. 
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a) Separation module: changing temperature model d) Separation module: constant temperature model 
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Figure 10.2: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to variation of the unavailability of deluge. 
199 
11 31 34 a1 31 
Overprotsurs pa r) 
a) Compression module: constant temperature model 
2 as 24 as IIIU 14 36 4 
Overpressure (bar) 
b) Compression module : changing temperature model 
11 24 11 U3 $1 34 31 
Overpressure (bit) 
c) Wellhead module : changing temperature model 
It JA IIaaI It 24 
overp rot sure (bar) 
1) Wellhead module: constant temperature model 
Sensitivity analysis. 
10.4 The activation time for the deluge. 
The activation time for the deluge was originally determined to be 45 seconds for all modules. 
This has been varied to give the values in Table 10.7. The special case of reducing the time 
taken to 30 seconds (i. e. percentage decrease of 33.33%) was also considered. 
Change Time Change Time 
+5% 47.25 -5% 42.75 
+10% 49.5 -10% 40.5 
+15% 51.75 -15% 38.25 
+50% 67.5 -50% 22.5 
Table 10.7: The variation of the time to activate the deluge system in seconds. 
The total explosion frequencies for the modules and the individual sections do not vary. 
However the frequencies of the category of explosions will be influenced. Rom Tables 10.8 
and 10.9 it can be seen that the frequencies of explosions when the deluge fails to activate 
will not be affected by the activation time of the deluge system. The frequencies of the other 
categories of explosions will alter as demonstrated in the tables. 
The frequencies of explosions prior to the deluge commencing demonstrate the greatest 
change where the frequencies increase as the activation time increases. These are dependent 
on the time of activation relative to the times at which the gas concentration reaches the 
explosive range. The calculations have a contribution which takes the following form. 
ta 
if tl < ta < t2 then P(E) = fi (v) dv 
Where tj is the time the concentration band is reached, t2 is the time the band is exceeded, 
t,, is the activation time of the deluge and fi(v) is the probability density function for the 
ignition source. Therefore increasing the activation time of the deluge leads to a general 
increase in the likelihood of such explosions occurring. 
The frequencies of explosions when the deluge is not maintained are dependent on the acti- 
vation time as shown for the case when t,, < tl. 
P(E) = 
It. 't 1 
f. 
-, 
(U) 
[it, t2 
fi (v) dv + 
ft. 
ý, 
t4 
fi (v) dv] du + 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.6985 X 10-7 0-1081X10-10 0.5354x10-1 0.5827x10-1 
-10% 0.4026x10-1 0.8023 x 10-7 0.1078xIO-10 0.5344xlO-5 0.5827xlO-5 
-5% 0.4026 x 10-1 0.9508 x 10-7 0.1074xlO-" 0.5329xlO-, 9 0.5827xIO-I 
0% 0.4026x 10-6 0.1093 XIO-6 0.1071xIO-10 0.5315xIO-I 0.5827XIO-ra 
+5% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.1234x10-1 0.1068X10-10 0.5301 x 10-5 0.5827xlO-5 
+10% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.1379x 10-6 0.1065xlO-10 0.5286xIO-1 0.5827x1O-I 
+15% 11 0.4026 x 10-6 
1 
0.1527x 10-6 1 0.1062 x10-10 1 0.5271 x 10-5 0.5827x1O-I 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.1391x10-1 0.2026xlO-' 0.2197x1O-II 0.2630x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-10% 0.1391x10-1 0.2169xlO-5 0.2181 x 10-10 0.2615 x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-5% 0.1391x10-1 0.2313x 10-5 0.2166x10-10 0.2601 X 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
0% 0.1391xIO-5 0.2456xlO-r' 0.2151xlO-10 0.2587x ]LO-4 0.2971 X10-4 
+5% 0.1391X10-5 0.2601 x 10-5 0.2136xIO-10 0.2572x10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+10% 0.1391x10-1 0.2756X10-5 0.2121 x 10-10 0.2557x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+15% 11 0.1391x10-1 0.2919xlO-' 0.2106x10-10 I 0.2540x10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4994x10-7 0.2793x 
10-7 0.1667xlO-" 0.1125x 10-5 0.1203xlO-5 
-10% 0.4994 x 
10-7 0.2925x 10-7 0.1661xlO-" 0.1124xlO-' 0.1203x10-1 
-5% 0.4994 x 
10-7 0.3052x 10-7 0.1654xIO-1' 0.1123xIO-5 0.1203xIO-5 
0% 0.4994xIO-7 0.3141 XIO-7 0.1647xIO-11 0.1122xIO-'I 0.1203X10-r' 
+5% 0.4994xIO-7 0.3229x10-7 0.1641x10-11 0.1121x10-1 0.1203xlO-5 
+10% 0.4994xIO-7 0.3318x 10-7 0.1634xIO-11 0.1120xlO-5 0.1203xlO-5 
+15% 11 0.4994x 
10-7 
1 0.3406x 10-7 1 0.1628xlO-" , 
0.1119XIO -5- 1 0.1203X10-5 
Table 10.8: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the activation time 
of the deluge system using the changing temperature model. 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.6137x 
10-6 0.2682x 10-6 0.1443xlO-" 0.8000x10-1 0.8882xlO-5 
-10% 0.6137x10-6 0.2967x 10-6 0.1438xIO-1' 0.7971xlO-" 0.8882x10-1 
-5% 0.6137x 
10-6 0.3252x 10-6 0.1433X10-10 0.7943xlO-, 5 0.8882xlO-, 5 
0% 0.6137x 10-6 0.3542xIO-6 0.1429xlO-10 0.7914xIO-II 0.8882x10-1 
+5% 0.6137x 10-6 0.3841 x 10-6 0.1424x10-10 0.7884x10-1 0.8882x10-1 
+10% 0.6137x 10-6 0.4135 x 10-6 0.1419x10-10 0.7854xIO-1 0.8882xIO-5 
+15% 11 0.6137x1O-I I 0.4427x 10-6 1 0.1415X10-1' 1 0.7825xlO-5 1 0.8882xlO-" 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.2622x 
10-5 0.2039x 10-5 0.7083X10-10 0.5132x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
-10% 0.2622x 
10-5 0.2182xlO-5 0.7052x10-10 0.5118x 10-4 0.5598xlO-4 
-5% 0.2622x10-5 0.2325x 
10-5 0.7022x10-10 0.5104 x 10-4 0.5598X 10-4 
0% 0.2622 XIO-5 0.2469xlO-r' 0.6993XIO-10 0.5089 XIO-4 0.5598X 10-4 
+5% 0.2622 x 10-5 0.2615 X 10-5 0.6963XIO-10 0.5075x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
+10% 0.2622 x 10-5 0.2771 X 10-5 0.6933X10-10 0.5059x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
+15% 1 0.2622xlO-5 0.2929xlO-5 0.6904 x 10-10 1 0.5043x 10-4 0.5598 x 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4651 x 
10-7 0.2508x 10-7 0.1432xIO-1I 0.1049xIO-I 0.1120x10-1 
-10% 0.4651 X 
10-7 0.2554x 10-7 0.1425xIO-1' 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120xIO-' 
-5% 0.4651 X 
10-7 0.2583 x 10-7 0.1419XIO-" 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120xlO-5 
0% 0.4651 XIO-7 0.2585 XIO-7 0.1413xIO-11 0.1048XIO-' 0.1120XIO-ra 
+5% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2587xlO-' 0.1407XIO-11 0.1048 x 10-5 0.1120x 10-5 
+10% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2589x 10-7 0.1401xlO-" 0.1048X10-5 0.1120X 10-5 
+15% 1 11 0.4651 
X 10-7 
1 0.2591 
X 10-7 
1 0.1395xlO-" 1 
0.1048xlO-5 
-I 
0.1120xIO-5 I 
Table 10.9: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the activation time 
of the deluge system using the constant temperature model. 
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Where f,,, (v) is the probability density function of the failure of the deluge system. 
The frequencies of explosions which are mitigated are also dependent on the activation time 
of the deluge as shown. 
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In both of these cases if t,, is greater than the times tj, t2) t3 or t4 then the frequency 
becomes more dependent on the activation time. However it is unlikely that this will occur 
with regularity therefore changing the activation time has less effect than for the frequency 
of explosions prior to the deluge commencing. In general an increase in the activation time 
leads to a decrease in the frequencies of explosions occurring when the deluge system is not 
maintained and when the deluge system is fully operational. 
Although the wellhead module is not typical some interesting results may be seen when this 
module is investigated more thoroughly. Gas clouds in the wellhead module arise due to 
leaks occurring on sections 9,10 or 11. 
Looking closely at the gas cloud build up for sections 10 and 11 shows that no matter what 
combination of valves work or fail or leak hole sizes exist, the concentration with respect to 
time will appear as Figure 10.3, where the concentration exceeds the upper flammable limit. 
Results also show that the activation time occurs between t2 and 6. Therefore all explosions 
prior to mitigation must occur between tj and t2 and all explosions which are mitigated or 
when the deluge is not maintained must occur between t3 and t4- 
For section 10, t2 has a maximum of 33.7s and t3 has a minimum of 177S, so to affect the 
frequencies of explosions occurring prior to the mitigation activating the activation time 
must be reduced below 33.7s or increased above 177s. Reducing the activation time to 30s 
reduces the explosion frequencies prior to deluge in the 13 - 14% and 14 - 15% concentration 
bands, see Table 10.10. 
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Concentration 
UFL 
LFL 
tl t2 t4 Time 
Figure 10.3: The concentration within the module with time, exceeding the flammable region. 
Concentration level Frequency of explosion 
45 seconds 30 seconds 
5-6 % 0.3143x10-1 0.3143 x 10-1 
6-7% 0.3400x10-1 0.3400xlO-9 
7-8% 0.3663x10-9 0.3663xlO-9 
8-9% 0.3821 x 10-1 0.3821 x 10-9 
9-10% 0.4249 x 10-9 0.4249xlO-9 
10-11% 0.4447x10-1 0.4447xlO-9 
11-12% 0.4822xlO-9 0.4822x10-1 
12-13% 0.5223xlO-9 0.5223xlO-9 
13-14% 0.5868xlO-9 0.5866 x 10-9 
14-15% 0.6440xlO-9 0.6177xlO-9 
Table 10.10: The frequency of explosions occurring prior to deluge due to section 10 in the 
wellhead module when the activation time of deluge is 30 seconds. 
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Concentration 
UFL 
LFL 
Time 
Figure 10.4: The effects of mitigating the gas cloud. 
The frequencies of the explosions when deluge is not maintained and when it operates per- 
fectly increase in all bands when the time is lowered suggesting that the deluge has a mitigat- 
ing effect, as depicted in Figure 10.4, which suppresses the concentration rise whilst retaining 
the possibility of an explosion occurring. For section 11, t2 has a maximum of 41.9s and t3 
has a minimum of 483s. Therefore increasing the activation time within our percentage lim- 
its has no effect. Decreasing the time by more than 10% reduces the frequencies of explosions 
prior to deluge in the latter concentration bands and increases the frequencies of explosions 
when the deluge is not maintained and when the deluge operates fully in all bands. Reducing 
the activation time to 30s affects the explosion frequencies prior to deluge in the 11 - 12% 
concentration band and upwards, Table 10.11. 
Section 9 may lead to a concentration profile of Figure 10.3 or Figure 10.5. Due to the 
mixture of profiles obtained increasing or decreasing the activation time results in a change 
of frequency. In general the frequency of the explosions prior to mitigation, increase with 
an increase in time and the explosions when the deluge is not maintained or when it is fully 
operational, decrease with an increase in time. The overpressures obtained for the wellhead 
module do not differ significantly with the change of parameter as seen in Figure 10.6(c and 
f). 
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Concentration level Requency of explosion 
45 seconds 30 seconds 
5-6% 0.1038x 10-8 0.1038 x 10-8 
6-7% 0.1056x 10-8 0.1056X10-8 
7-8% 0.1103xlO-8 0.1103xIO-I 
8-9% 0.1089x 10-8 0.1089x10-1 
9-10% 0.1170xlO-8 0.1170x 10-8 
10-11 % 0.1164x 10-8 0.1164x10-8 
11-12% 0.1211 X 10-8 0.1033x10-1 
12-13% 0.1278x 10-8 0.5954xlO-9 
13-14% 0.1317x 10-8 0.5954xlO-9 
14-15% 0.1360xlO-'3 0.5954xlO-9 
Table 10.11: The frequency of explosions occurring prior to deluge due to section 11 in the 
wellhead module when the activation time of deluge is 30 seconds. 
Concentration 
UFL 
LFL 
ti t2 Time 
Figure 10.5: The concentration within the module with time, remaining within the flammable 
region. 
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However, the wellhead module is not typical, the separation and compression modules contain 
sections demonstrating profiles such as those shown for section 9. No direct relationship 
between the parameter variation and the change in frequency is obvious. In general it can 
be said that increasing the time increases the frequency of explosions occurring prior to the 
deluge activating, but decreases the frequency of explosions occurring when the mitigation 
is not maintained and when the mitigation system operates continuously. The frequency of 
exceedence of the overpressures for the separation and compression modules increase with 
an increase to the activation time, Figure 10.6(a, b, d, & e). The importance measures for the 
valves do not alter, but the contribution to the frequency for the categories of explosions 
do. As demonstrated by the Tables 10.8 and 10.9, the frequency of an explosion for the 
module has a greater contribution from mitigated explosions and a lower contribution from 
explosions occurring prior to the deluge activating when the activation time is decreased. 
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a) Separation module: changing temperature model d) Separation module: constant temperature model 
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Figure 10.6: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to the variation of the deluge activation time. 
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10.5 The leak hole size distribution. 
Leaks typically appear as a result of flange failures, the sizes of the holes are therefore small 
in comparison with the dimensions of the modules. Not every size of hole can be considered, 
however from observational data, the hole sizes have been divided into three groups. Each 
member of a group has been assigned the average value for that group. The average leak 
ý ;, 
- 
2 
hole diameters are taken to be 18mm, 50mm and 100mm for all of the modules. These hole 
sizes have been varied as shown in Table 10.12. 
Change Hole 1 Hole 2 Hole 3 1 Change Hole 1 Hole 2 Hole 3 
+5% 18.9 52.5 105 -5% 17.1 47.5 95 
+10% 19.8 55 110 -10% 16.2 45 90 
+15% 20.7 57.5 115 -15% 15.3 42.5 85 
Table 10.12: The variation of leak hole diameters. 
In order to determine the frequency of an explosion, the frequency of ignition occurring is 
required. This is dependent upon the times at which the concentration level of gas-in-air, 
of concern, is reached. The leak hole size controls the rates that the gas and condensate are 
able to escape, hence influencing the gas cloud build up with time. Therefore the hole sizes 
will, indirectly, affect the explosion frequencies expected. 
In general a larger hole size results in a lower time period within the explosive range. For 
most sections the smallest hole size of 18mm diameter leads to a concentration profile of 
Figure 10.5, whereas the holes of diameters 50mm and 100mm have profiles of Figure 10.3. 
Both temperature state models provide comparable results for the wellhead module but 
not for the separation and compression modules, Tables 10.13 and 10.14. For the wellhead 
module the increase in the hole sizes leads to a decrease in the explosion frequencies generated 
whilst a decrease in the hole sizes leads to an increase in the explosion frequencies for 
both models. For the separation module decreasing the hole sizes decreases the explosion 
frequencies, increasing the hole sizes also leads to a decrease in explosion frequencies centred 
about the -10% level for the constant temperature model and the 5% level for the changing 
temperature model. The compression module demonstrates a pattern of increase in the 
explosion frequencies as the hole size distribution increases for the changing temperature 
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model up to the 10% level. For the constant temperature model there appears to be a critical 
region within which the frequency of an explosion fluctuates. The differences between the 
models is because the temperature state of the model controls the release flow of gas into the 
module. When the section is held at constant temperature the driving pressure of the leak 
remains higher than that for the changing temperature model, therefore in general there is 
a higher release rate of gas into the module. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-15% 0.5167xlO-5 0.2678X 
10-4 0.1277x1O-I 
-10% 0.5367xlO-5 0.2808x 
10-4 0.1274xlO-5 
-5% 0.5575xlO-' 0.2907x 
10-4 0.1235xlO-5 
0% 0.5827xlO-' 0.2971 X 10-4 0.1203xIO-5 
+5% 0.6085xlO-' 0.3002 x 10-4 0.1185XIO-5 
+10% 0.6041 X 10-5 0.3039 x 10-4 0.1174xlO-5 
+15% 0.6127x 10-5 0.3008x 10-4 0.1167x1O-I 
Table 10.13: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the hole size 
distribution using the changing temperature model. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-15% 0.8173 x 10-5 0.4917x 
10-4 0.1133xlO-5 
-10% 0.8517xlO-' 0.5557x 
10-4 0.1129xlO-5 
-5% 0.9147xlo-5 0.5379x 
10-4 0.1124xlO-5 
0% 0.8882X10-5 0.5598XIO-4 I 0.1120xIO-5 
+5% 0.8434x10-1 0.5315X10-4 0.1117xlO--5 
+10% 0.7743x 10-5 0.5279x10-4 0.1115xlO-5 
+15% 0.7267x 10-5 0.5116 x 10-4 0.1113xIO-5 
Table 10.14: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the hole size II 
distribution using the constant temperature model. 
These results suggest that for each module there exists a critical level for the leak holes. As 
can be seen from the results there appears to be no general pattern as to the variation of 
the leak hole sizes. This is due to the complex interaction between the hole size and the 
ventilation. The hole sizes play a major part in determining the gas release rate into the 
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module following a leak, the rate of air changes per hour controls the dispersion of the gas 
from the module. The interaction between these two factors determines the times at which 
the concentration is at a level for ignition to occur. 
The wellhead module is the simplest to analyse in detail due to there being a constant 
ventilation rate of 12 air changes per hour, hence sliall be looked at first. Sections 10 and 
11 located in the wellhead module both show that an increase of the hole sizes leads to a 
decrease in the explosion frequencies. This is due to the original concentration profile of 
Figure 10.3, increasing the hole sizes allows more gas to escape rapidly therefore leading 
to an earlier time for the upper flammable limit to be exceeded and hence less time in the 
explosive range as seen in Figure 10.7. Decreasing the hole sizes may generate a profile which 
still exceeds the upper flammable limit, but at a later time, the growth of the gas cloud will 
be slower leading to more time in the explosive range. Alternatively the profile may not 
exceed the upper flammable limit hence also allowing a longer period of time within the 
explosive range. Section 9 has the opposite effect, as the holes are made larger the explosion 
frequency is increased. Again this may be related to the original concentration profile of 
Figure 10.5. As the hole size is increased there is a faster initial release of gas leading to 
a higher concentration of gas within the region. Tile concentration profile exhibits growth, 
Figure 10.7, but not so much that the upper flammable limit is exceeded, therefore giving 
more time in the explosive range. Due to the complex coupling of the hole size and the 
ventilation rates in determining the overpressures, it is difficult to determine a relationship 
between the variation of the hole sizes and the overpressures produced. 
For the wellhead module a pattern may be seen due to there only being one ventilation rate. 
From Figure 10.8 it can be seen that reducing the hole diameters increases the frequency 
with which certain overpressures are exceeded, however no formal mathematical relationship 
is apparent. 
The compression and separation modules are more typical in that to represent the effects 
of natural ventilation, a distribution of air changes per hour are assumed. Sections 1 and 
3, located in the separation module, and sections 4,5,6 and 8, located in the compression 
module, exhibit concentration profiles which vary between those of Figures 10.3 and 10.5 
therefore making it difficult for any full analysis to be carried out. In some situations, when 
the hole size is decreased, an original profile of Figure 10.3 may reduce to one of Figure 10.5 
which leads to a greater time within the explosive region therefore an increased chance of 
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Figure 10.7: The possible variation of the concentration profile occurring with the variation 
of the hole sizes. 
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explosion occurring meanwhile a profile of Figure 10.5 may be reduced to one which never 
enters the explosive region decreasing the chance of an explosion. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 10.7. Similarly increasing the hole sizes may decrease or increase the explosion 
frequency. Due to the interaction of these factors and the profiles obtained following a change 
of parameter no generalisation may be made regarding the effects. 
Figure 10.8 shows the changes in the overpressure distributions obtained. Although the two 
temperature state models differ in the way the gas is released therefore varying the explosion 
frequencies obtained, the overpressure distributions are similar for each model. 
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Figure 10.8: A comparison of the overpressure distributions for each module, with each 
model when the hole sizes are varied. 
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10.6 The frequency of occurrence of the leak holes. 
The frequency with which the hole sizes are expected is not only dependent on the module 
being analysed, but also on which of the sections may contribute to the leak within that 
module. For each module the frequencies of the leak hole sizes were altered for each section 
connected to that module. It was expected that there would be a straight forward pattern 
relating to the change in this parameter due to the frequency of occurrence of a leak being 
a linear multiplying factor in the model, therefore to confirm this only a small range of tests 
were done. Table 10.15 reflects the tests done, varying the parameter up and down by 10% 
and up by 50%. 
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Separation Module: Section 1 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.05194 0.06295 0.00610 
+10% 0.05713 0.06925 0.00671 
-10% 0.04675 0.05666 0.00549 
+50% 0.07791 0.09443 0.00919 
Compression Module: Section 4 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.05567 0.03532 0.00534 
+10% 0.06124 0.03885 0.00588 
-10% 0.0501 0.03179 0.00481 
+50% 0.08351 0.05298 0.00802 
Compression Module: Section 6 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.07285 0.02759 0.00391 
+10% 0.08014 0.03035 0.00429 
-10% 0.06557 0.02483 0.00352 
+50% 0.10928 0.04139 0.00586 
Wellhead Module: Sections 9 and 10 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.00132 0.00976 0.00088 
+10% 0.00146 0.01074 0.00096 
-10% 0.00119 0.00879 0.00079 
+50% 0.00199 0.01465 0.00131 
Separation Module: Section 3 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.04521 0.02956 0.00267 
+10% 0.04973 0.03252 0.00294 
-10% 0.04069 0.02660 0.00240 
+50% 0.06782 0.04434 0.00401 
Compression Module: Section 5 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.03114 0.03543 0.00519 
+10% 0.03425 0.03897 0.00570 
-10% 0.02803 0.03189 0.00467 
+50% 0.04671 0.05315 0.00778 
Compression Module: Section 8 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.01089 0.02697 0.00229 
+10% 0.01198 0.02967 0.00253 
-10% 0.00980 0.02427 0.00207 
+50% 0.01634 0.04046 0.00345 
Wellhead Module: Section 11 
Change 18mm 50mm 100mm 
0% 0.00026 0.00195 0.00018 
+10% 0.00029 0.00215 0.00019 
-10% 0.00024 0.00176 0.00016 
+50% 0.00039 0.00293 0.00026 
Table 10.15: The variation of the frequency of occurrence of the leak holes for the separation 
module. 
Should there have been no visible pattern further tests would have been carried out. However 
as expected the increase seen in the explosion frequencies and the overpressure exceedence fre- 
quencies was the percentage increase of the hole size frequency range. Table 10.16 shows the 
change in the explosion frequencies due to the variation for each module using the changing 
temperature model and Table 10.17 displays the results for the constant temperature model. 
These two tables demonstrate the same relationship between the variation of the parameter 
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and the explosion frequencies generated. The overpressure distributions generated are shown 
in Figure 10.9. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-10% 0.5244x10-1 0.2674 x 
10-4 0.1083x 10-5 
0% 0.5827x 10-5 0.2971 X 10-4 0.1203xIO-I 
+10% 0.6409xIO-1 0.3276x 10-4 0.1323x10-1 
+50% 0.8740xlO-5 0.4457x 10-4 0.1805x10-1 
Table 10.16: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the frequency of 
occurrence of the leak holes using the changing temperature model. 
Change Separation Module Compression Module Wellhead Module 
-10% 0.7994xlO-' 0.5038X 
10-4 0.1008xlO-' 
0% 0.8882 X JLO-5 0.5598 XIO-4 0.1120xlO-5 
+10% 0.9776xlO-'5 0.6165X 10-4 0.1232xIO-5 
+50% 0.1332x 10-4 0.8398 x 10-4 0.1681X10-5 
Table 10.17: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the frequency of 
occurrence of the leak holes using the constant temperature model. 
The generated explosion frequencies are dependent upon the accuracy of the frequency of the 
leak. This study has considered an increase in the frequency of occurrence of all the sizes of 
holes, i. e., if the frequency of the 18mm hole increases then so too do the frequencies of the 
50mm and 100mm holes. The frequencies of leaks occurring are taken from empirical data, 
such data has inaccuracies which may mean that the leak holes have been wrongly classified 
in terms of average size. Such inaccuracies will alter not only the frequencies of the holes of 
an average size occurring but also the sizes of the average holes. Therefore the frequencies 
of occurrence of the holes may not change as a group, it may be more accurate to assume 
that if one group increases another falls. This argument also applies to the distribution of 
the hole sizes. 
j, 2 
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Figure 10.9: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to the variation of the frequency of occurrence of the leak holes. 
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10.7 The distribution of ventilation rates. 
The ventilation distribution for the three modules differ. For the wellhead module a constant 
ventilation rate of 12 air changes per hour is assumed. For the separation and compression 
modules the distribution has been discretised into five ventilation rates which have equal 
probability of occurrence of 0.2. For the separation module these are 10.5,106.5,210,252 
and 282 air changes per hour. For the compression module these are 33,81.6,157.8,260.4 
and 343.8 air changes per hour. Table 10.18 shows the changes. 
Separation Module 
% Air changes 
I% Air changes 
+5 11.03 111.83 220.5 264.6 296.1 -5 9.98 101.18 199.5 239.4 267.9 
+10 11.55 117.15 231 277.2 310.2 -10 9.45 95.85 189 226.8 253.8 
+15 12.08 122.48 241.5 289.8 324.3 -15 8.93 90.53 178.5 214.2 239.7 
Compression Module 
% Air changes % Air changes 
+5 34.65 85.68 165.69 273.4 361 -5 31.35 77.52 149.9 247.4 326.6 
+10 36.3 89.76 173.6 286.4 378.2 -10 29.7 73.44 142 234.4 309.4 
+15 37.95 93.84 181.5 299.5 395.4 -15 28.05 69.36 134.1 221.3 292.2 
Wellhead Module 
% Air changes % Air changes 
+5 12.6 -5 11.4 
+10 13.2 -10 10.8 
+15 13.3 -15 10.2 
Table 10.18: The variation of the air changes per hour. 
The ventilation rate affects the gas concentration build up within the module and controls the 
dispersion from the module once the leaking vessel is exhausted. Increasing the ventilation 
rates may not have a beneficial effect. The ventilation acts to reduce the level of concentration 
in the module. However explosions may only occur if the concentration is within the explosive 
region. If the concentration has been exceeding the upper flammable limit then increasing 
the ventilation rate may lower the concentration to within the explosive region, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of an explosion occurring. Alternatively, the concentration may be 
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reduced below the lower flammable limit therefore reducing the likelihood of an explosion. 
The results obtained for the changing temperature model and the constant temperature 
model are presented in Tables 10.19 and 10.20 respectively. 
From the final columns in Tables 10.19 and 10.20 it can be seen that there is a general 
decrease in the explosion frequencies when the ventilation rates are increased. For the 
separation module there is a general decrease for all types of explosions. For the compression 
and wellhead modules the frequencies of explosions occurring prior to deluge increase whilst 
the other categories show a decreasing trend. However there are irregularities in the results. 
The results generated due to the ventilation rate changes appear more complex than for the 
other parameter changes. First, the comparatively simple case of the wellhead module with 
only one ventilation rate is considered. 
In this case increasing the ventilation by c% leads to a decrease in the explosion frequencies of 
e%. The isolation valve failures remain with the same importance although the corresponding 
contributions to the explosion frequency decrease by e%. 
When the ventilation rates are increased the frequencies of exceedence of the overpressures 
decrease. From Figure 10.10(c and f) it can be seen that the greater the decrease in the 
ventilation rate the greater the increase in the frequencies of exceedence and the greater the 
increase in the ventilation rate the lower the decrease in the frequencies of exceedence. There 
appears to be an increase in the overpressure exceedence frequencies of about ae% for an 
increase in the ventilation rate of c%. 
The contribution to the frequency of an explosion when the ventilation rate is increased 
differs for each section. In the wellhead module there are three sections, sections 9,10 and 
11. The explosion frequency contributions of sections 9 and 11 due to the effect of the 
ventilation increase should the ventilation rate increase, but for explosions due to a leak 
on section 10 the contributions decrease. All three sections produce initially high flow rates 
which in turn give high concentration levels above the explosive range and consequently short 
time periods for an explosion to occur. The flow rates for sections 9 and 11 are such that 
when the ventilation rate is increased the time that the concentration is within the explosive 
range is increased, therefore increasing the likelihood of an explosion. However, for section 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4641 X 10-6 0.1343x 10-6 0.1302XIO-10 0.6119X10-5 0.6717XIO-5 
-10% 0.4414x10-6 0.1248X 10-6 0.1217x1O-'O 0.5821 x 10-5 0.6388xlO-5 
-5% 0.4220 X 10-6 0.1186 X 10-6 0.1142x10-10 0-5567X10-5 0.6108X10-5 
0% 0.4026x 10-6 0.1093 X10-6 0.1071xlO-" 0.5315xlO-' 0.5827xlO-r: ' 
+5% 0.3856x10-6 0.1040 x 10-6 0.1008XIO-10 0.5091 x 10-5 0.5581 x 10-5 
+10% 0.3734 x 10-6 0.1018x 10-6 0.9611 x 10-11 0.4928xlO-' 0.5403x10-1 
+15% 11 0.3584 x 10-6 
1 0.9902x 10-7 1 0.9043xlO-" I 0.4729xlO-, 5 I 0.5187xIO-5 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.1839x10-1 0.2392 x 10-5 0.2617x10-10 0.2914x 10-4 0.3338 x 10-4 
-10% 0.1762x10-5 0.2442 x 10-5 0.2430X10-10 0.2777x 10-4 0.3198 x 10-4 
-5% 0.1705xIO-5 0.2434xlO-'5 0.2291 x 10-10 0.2681 X 
10-4 0.3095 X 10-4 
0% 0.1637xIO-5 0.2435XIO-r' 0.2132xIO-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X10-4 
+5% 0.1580x 10-5 0.2475x 10-5 0.1995X10-10 0.2462 x 10-4 0.2867x 10-4 
+10% 0.1517xlO-5 0.2470xlO-5 0.1862X10-10 0.2355 x 10-4 0.2754x 10-4 
+15% 11 0.1461 X 10-5 0.2468x 10-5 0.1745x10-10 I 0.2258x10-4 0.2651 X 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.5757x 
10-7 0.3119x 10-7 0.2222xlO-" 0.1298xlO-' 0.1387x1O-rI 
-10% 0.5470 x 
10-7 0.3127x 10-7 0.1998xlO-" 0.1232xlO-' 0.1318xlO-5 
-5% 0.5217x 
10-7 0.3135 X 10-7 0.1809xlO-" 0.1173X10-5 0.1257X10-5 
0% 0.4994x 10-7 0.3141xIO-7 0.1647xlO-" 0.1122xIO-5 0.1203x10-1 
+5% 0.4796x 10-7 0.3146x 10-7 0.1508. xlO-" 01076X10-5 0.1155xlO-5 
+10% 0.4620 x 10-7 0.3152x10-7 0.1388xlO-" 0.1035X10-5 0.1113X10-5 
+15% 0.4464 x 10-7 0.3159 x 10-7 0.1283xlO-" 0.9994xlO-G 0.1075X10-5 
Table 10.19: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the ventilation 
rates using the changing temperature model. 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.6406x10-6 0.3759x 10-6 0.1528xlO-" 0.8254X10-5 0.9271 x 10-5 
-10% 0.6347x 10-6 0.3698 x 10-6 0.1493XIO-'o 0.8181 X 10-5 0.9186x10-5 
-5% 0.6222x10-1 0.3628X10-6 0.1456xlO-" 0.8020X10-5 0.9005X10-5 
0% 0.6137xlO-6 0.3542XIO-6 0.1429xlO-3-0 0.7914x10-1 0.8882xlO-' 
+5% 0.6074xlO-6 0.3426x 10-6 0.1416X10-10 0.7840x10-1 0.8790 x 10-5 
+10% 0.5955x 10-6 0.3270X10-' 0.1397X10-10 0.7695XIO-5 0.8618xlO-5 
1 +15% 11 0.5434x 10-6 1 0.2863x 10-6 1 0.1360x10-10 1_. 0.7034xlO-, ' 0.7864xlO-' 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.2708xIO-5 0.2368xlO-5 0.7135x10-10 0.5276x 10-4 0.5784x 10-4 
-10% 0.2602xIO-1 0.2447x 10-5 0.6949x10-10 0.5051 X 10-4 0.5556x 10-4 
-5% 0.2618xlO-5 0.2478x 10-5 0.6962 x 10-10 0.5080x 10-4 0.5590xlO-' 
0% 0.2622 X10-5 0.2469XIO-r' 0.6993xIO-10 0.5089 X 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
+5% 0.2402xlO 5 0.2470xlO-' 0.6636 x 10-10 0.4643 x 10-4 0.5130x 10-4 
+10% 0.2400xlO-5 0.2476xIO-5 0.6626x10-10 0.4636 x 10-4 0.5124x 10-4 
+15% 0.2364x 10-5 0.2514xlO-' 0.6379x10-10 0.4559 x 10-4 0.5047x 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.5430x 
10-7 0.2557X 10-7 0.1941x10-11 0.1228x 10-5 0.1308xlO-' 
-10% 0.5141 X 
10-7 0.2566x 10-7 0.1736xlO-" 0.1161XIO-' 0.1238xlO-5 
-5% 0.4883 x 
10-7 0.2577x 10-7 0.1562xlO-" 0.1102xlO-' 0.1176xlO-' 
0% 0.4651 X10-7 0.2585x 10-7 0.1413xlO-" 0.1048X 10-5 0.1120XIO-rj 
+5% 0.4441 X 10-7 0.2595x 10-7 0.1285xlO-" 0.9999XJO-G 0.1070X10-5 
+10% 0.4252 X10-7 0.2609x 10-7 0.1175xlO-" 0.9560X10-r' 0.1024X10-5 
+15% 1 0.40793x 
10-7 
1 0.2619x 10-7 0.1079xlO-" 0.9159X10-6 1 0.9829XIO-o 
Table 10.20: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the ventilation 
rates using the constant temperature model. 
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10 the flow rate is considerably greater therefore the results suggest that the increases in 
the ventilation rates do not have a significant effect on reducing the concentration whilst the 
leak is occurring but once the leak source is exhausted the concentration is rapidly reduced 
in a short period of time, hence reducing the time spent in the explosive region and the 
likelihood of explosions. 
The separation module is considered with five ventilation rates acting upon it. When using 
both temperature state models the frequency of an explosion occurring decrease for all cate- 
gories with an increase in ventilation rate. In general the higher ventilation rates contribute 
less to the overall frequency of explosions occurring. For the lowest ventilation rate of 10.5 
air changes per hour, the smallest hole produces a concentration profile as that seen in Figure 
10.5, whereas the larger two hole sizes produce the profile of Figure 10.3. Increasing the ven- 
tilation rate leads to there being no explosions for the smallest hole sizes and the frequency of 
the profile remaining within the explosive region (Figure 10.5) increases with the frequency 
of the profile exceeding the range decreasing. Therefore, in general, the increase in the ven- 
tilation rate causes a decrease in the explosion frequency for the module. It appears that the 
frequencies of explosions occurring in the lower concentration bands increases this could be 
due to the ventilation prohibiting the rise of the concentration level. However in some cases 
the frequency of an explosion increases due to the extra time spent in the explosive range 
when the concentration profile does not exceed the upper flammable limit when it previously 
did. Due to the other factors involved no immediate pattern can be suggested to describe the 
relationship between the change in ventilation rate and the explosion frequency expected. 
The overpressure exceedence frequencies are compared in Figure 10.10(a & d). Increasing 
the ventilation rates leads to a decrease in the exceedence frequencies for the overpressures. 
The same arguments may apply to the compression module as stated for the separation 
module. It appears in this case that increasing the ventilation rates leads to a decrease in 
explosion frequencies but decreasing the rates does not necessarily increase the explosion 
frequencies. To decrease the ventilation rate by 10% when using the constant temperature 
model incurs a decrease in the explosion frequencies when an increase was expected to 
follow the pattern demonstrated by the other results. However a pattern should not be 
expected due to the coupling between the leak flow rate and the ventilation in determining the 
concentration of gas within the module. The ventilation rate acts to lower the concentration 
of gas within the module. Certain levels of ventilation may have a detrimental effect. If the 
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concentration profile was originally one that exceeded the upper flammable limit, increasing 
the ventilation rate could reduce the concentration to within the flammable range, therefore 
increasing the likelihood of an explosion occurring. Alternatively a concentration profile 
remaining within the flammable range could be reduced below the lower flammable limit by 
an increase in ventilation therefore reducing the likelihood of an explosion occurring. Since 
the compression module involves both of these profiles then increasing the ventilation rate 
will in some cases reduce the explosion frequency whilst in others it will increase it. However 
the lower ventilation rates are more dominant in contributing to the explosion frequency 
therefore it seems natural to generalise and say that the more the ventilation rates are 
decreased the higher the explosion frequencies will become. 
As with the hole size distribution there is no pattern to the decrease/increase of the over- 
pressure exceedence due to changes in the ventilation rates. 
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Figure 10.10: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to the variation of the ventilation rates. 
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10.8 The failure frequency of the deluge once opera- 
tional. 
The failure rate of the deluge system once operational is 9.446 x 10-' per hour for all modules. 
This parameter was varied as in Table 10.21 
Change Failure Rate Change I Failure Rate 
+5% 9.9183 x 10-6 -5% 8.9737xlO-G 
+10% 1.03906xlo-5 -10% 8.5014 X 10-6 
+15% 1.08629xlO-5 
1 
-15% 8.0291 x 10-r, 
Table 10.21: The variation of the deluge failure rate per hour. 
The failure rate of the deluge when operational is not a parameter involved in the calculation 
of the frequencies of explosions when the deluge system fails to activate or when the explosion 
occurs prior to the deluge activating. It is involved in the frequency of explosions that are 
mitigated and those that occur when the deluge has activated but fails prior to ignition. The 
calculations for the frequency of ignition when the deluge is activated but is not maintained 
takes the following form. 
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where f,,,, (u) is the failure density function for the deluge system. Tile deluge system is 
assumed to have a constant rate of failure, A,,,,, leading to a probability density function for 
the failure of the deluge system of 
fws(u) = Awse-Awsu (10.3) 
The calculations for mitigated explosions takes the following form 
P (E) 1- 
44 
f,,, (u) du] 
[f 42 
fi (v) dv + 
44 
fi(v)dv 
I, 
ti, 
ItIM 
+ 
142 
f.., (U) fi (v) dv du + 
43 
f. 
" 
(U) 
42 
fi (v) dv du 
ti I 
til 
ft12 
44 42 u 
ti ti 
1. 
+ fWS (U) 
[I 
fi(v)dv + fi (v) dv du (10.4) 
It. 
ti 31 43 
226 
Sensitivity analysis. 
Although both of these calculations are dependent on the failure rate of the deluge, the 
explosions when the deluge fails are more heavilY dependent. 
Changing this variable only changes the frequency of an explosion should the deluge activate 
but fail to be maintained as seen in Tables 10.22 and 10.23. The percentage change of the 
variable incurs the same percentage change in the frequency of this type of explosion. How- 
ever, an explosion when the deluge is not maintained is of negligible frequency compared to 
the other explosion frequencies therefore there is no change in the overall explosion frequen- 
cies or the distribution of overpressure frequencies. The overpressure frequencies are shown 
in Figure 10.11. 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4026 x 10-1 0.1093x 10-6 0-9109XIO-11 0.5315XIO-5 0.5827x 10-' 
-10% 0.4026xIO-6 0.1093x 10-6 0.9645xlO-" 0.5315xlO-' 0.5827xlO-, 5 
-5% 0.4026x 10-6 0.1093x 10-6 0.1018X10-1' 0.5315 x 10-5 0.5827xlO-5 
0% 0.4026 X 10-6 0.1093 XIO-6 0.1071xIO-3LO 0.5315xIO-5 0.5827xlO-' 
+5% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.1093x 10-6 0.1125xIO-10 0.5315 x 10-5 0.5827x 10-5 
+10% 0.4026 x 10-6 0.1093x 10-6 0.1178x10-10 0.5315x10-5 0.5827x 10-5 
1 +15% 11 0.4026x 10-6 
1 
0-1093X 10-6 0.1232xIO-10 0.5315xIO-5 0.5827x 10-1 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.1637xlO-5 0.2435xlO-5 0.1828xlO-" 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-10% 0.1637x10-1 0.2435xlO-5 0.1936x10-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
-5% 0.1637x1O-I 0.2435 X 
10-5 0.2043 x 10-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
0% 0.1637xlO-' 0.2435xlO-r' 0.2132xIO-10 0.2564X10 -4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+5% 0.1637x10-1 0.2435X10-5 0.2259x 10-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+10% 0.1637x 10-5 0.2435x 10-5 0.2366x10-10 0.2564x 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
+15% 11 0.1637xlO-5 1 0.2435X 10-5 0.2474x10-10 1 0.2564 X 10-4 0.2971 X 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4994xIO-7 0.3141 X 
10-7 0.1400xIO-I1 0.1122x10-1 0.1203x10-1 
-10% 0.4994 x 10-7 0.3141 x 
10-7 0.1483xIO-11 0.1122xIO-I 0.1203x1O-I 
-5% 0.4994 x 
10-7 0.3141 X 10-7 0.1565xIO-11 0.1122xIO-5 0.1203X10-5 
0% 0.4994x 10-7 0.3141 X 10-7 0.1647xIO-11 0.1122xlO-' 0.1203 X 10-5 
+5% 0.4994xlO-7 0.3141 X 10-7 0.1730X10-11 0.1122xlO-5 0.1203X10-5 
+10% 0.4994x10-7 0.3141 X 10-7 0.1812xIO-11 0.1122x 10-5 0.1203X10-5 
+15% 0.4994 x 10-7 0.3141 x 10-7 0.1895xlO-" 0.1122x 10-5 0.1203XIO-5 
Table 10.22: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the failure rate of 
the deluge system using the changing temperature model. 
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Separation module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0-6137x1O-I 0.3542xlO-' 0.1214xlO-" 0.7914X10-5 0.8882xlO-, 5 
-10% 0.6137x 10-1 0.3542 x 10-6 0.1286 x 10-10 0.7914xlO-' 0.8882 x 10-5 
-5% 0.6137x10-1 0.3542 x 10-6 0.1357x10-10 0.7914xlO-, 5 0.8882xlO-' 
0% 0.6137x 10-6 0.3542x 10-6 0.1429x10-10 0.7914x 10-5 0.8882xlO-r' 
+5% 0.6137x10-6 0.3542x 10-6 0.150OX10-10 0.7914xlO-5 0.8882x 10-5 
+10% 0.6137x 10-6 0.3542x 10-6 0.1572x10-10 0.7914x10-1 0.8882x 10-5 
+15% 11 0.6137x 10-6 1 0.3542 x 10-6 1 0.1643X10-10 1 0.7914xlO-5 I 0.8882x1O-I 
Compression module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.3084x10-1 0.2448xlO-5 0.5944x10-10 0.5045 x 10-4 0.5598x10-4 
-10% 0.3084x10-1 0.2448xlO-5 0.6293 x 10-10 0.5045 x 
10-4 0.5598 x 10-4 
-5% 0.3084x 
10-5 0.2448 x 10-5 0.6643 x 10`0 0.5045x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
0% 0.3084x 10-5 0.2448xlO-r' 0.6932xIO-10 0.5045 X 10-4 0.5598X10-4 
+5% 0.3084x 10-5 0.2448x 10-5 0.7342x10-10 0.5045x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
+10% 0.3084xlO-' 0.2448X 10-5 0.7692x10-10 0.5045x 10-4 0.5598 x 10-4 
+15% 11 0.3084xlO-' 0.2448x 10-5 0.8041 x 10-10 1 0.5045 x 10-4 0.5598x 10-4 
Wellhead module 
Change Deluge fails Prior to deluge Deluge not Mitigated Total 
to activate maintained 
-15% 0.4651 X 
10-7 0.2585 x 10-7 0.1201x1O-11 0.1048XIO-5 0.1120x10-1 
-10% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2585x 
10-7 0.1272xlO-" 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120xIO-I 
-5% 0.4651 X 
10-7 0.2585x 10-7 0.1342xlO-" 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120X10-' 
0% 0.4651 X10-7 0.2585xIO-7 0.1413xIO-11 0.1048XIO-r' 0.1120xlO-" 
+5% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2585 X 10-7 0.1484xlO-" 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120xlO-5 
+10% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2585x 10-7 0.1554xlO-" 0.1048xlO-' 0.1120X10-5 
+15% 0.4651 X 10-7 0.2585x 10-7 0.1625xIO-11 0.1048XIO-5 0.1120xlO-5 
Table 10.23: The changes in explosion frequencies due to the variation of the failure rate of 
the deluge system using the constant temperature model. 
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d) Separation module: constant temperature model 
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Figure 10.11: A comparison of the exceedence frequency of the overpressures produced, due 
to the variation of the failure rate of the deluge system. 
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10.9 Discussion. 
This analysis has indicated that there are two types of parameters involved in determining the 
frequency of an explosion and the consequences arising therefrom. The first category include 
those parameters that affect the concentration build up of gas in the module. The second 
category include parameters that are introduced to the modelling to determine the frequency 
of the different categories of explosion given the time periods at which the concentration is 
between the flammable limits. 
The first category includes the distribution of leak hole sizes and the distribution of ventila- 
tion rates. The initial environmental conditions of the leaking section, such as the pressure 
and temperature, combine with the leak hole to give a mass flow rate into the module. 
Combining this flow rate with the ventilation rate supplies a concentration within the mod- 
ule. Due to the reducing driving pressure of the leak, the flow rate diminishes causing the 
ventilation to become the dominant force in determining the concentration levels with time. 
Because of the influence of the initial conditions on the flow rate and the time on the sys- 
tem, the relationship between the concentration build up, ventilation rates and hole sizes is 
complex. 
The first stage of calculations and parameters provide a concentration time profile. The times 
at which the concentration bands are reached are then used to determine the frequency of 
ignition occurring under the specific conditions. 
The second category includes the frequency of ignition and of the leak occurring and the 
deluge parameters. These parameters are combined with the times at which ignition may 
occur to determine the frequency of an explosion occurring. The parameters in the second 
category have a more obvious relationship to the overall results due to them being predomi- 
nantly linear multiplying factors. The frequencies of ignition and leak are linear parameters 
affecting the overall explosion frequencies in all categories and the overpressure distribution. 
The deluge parameters affect the types of explosions occurring specific to the parameter and 
hence affect the overall overpressure distribution. 
The parameters in the second category may be seen to be the most sensitive due to the 
obvious effects on the overall results. However the parameters in the first category generate 
a change in the concentration time profile which leads to a more complex change in the 
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explosion frequencies and overpressure distribution. 
It has been seen that the two temperature state models; changing temperature throughout 
the release and constant temperature during the phase when both condensate and gas are 
within the section followed by reducing temperature when the condensate has evaporated, 
lead to comparable results. For the second category of parameters the two models produce 
identical results. The first category of parameters are those in which the concentration 
build up within the -module is affected. However the concentration build up is dependent 
on the release rate of the gas into the module, the initial environmental conditions influence 
the release rate however they are constant in both models. The temperature state of the 
models combined with the initial conditions and the leak hole sizes dictates the initial release 
rates when the section contains condensate, therefore differences were seen between the two 
temperature state models when the hole sizes were varied. 
U, 
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configuration of the safety systems. 
11.1 Introduction. 
On an offshore platform an accidental release of gas may lead to catastrophic consequences. 
Ignition of the gas may lead to an explosion which generates excessive overpressures. A 
platform can be designed to withstand overpressures of up to around 3 bar. Assuming that 
a platform has this strength limit we must minimise the likelihood of the overpressures 
exceeding 3 bar. SAROS is a tool which can predict the frequency of an explosion and the 
frequency of exceeding any level of overpressure. These predictions are based on knowledge 
of the safety systems in place and their reliabilities. The safety systems include isolation 
valves, blowdown valves, the deluge system and the gas detection system. These features 
have an associated unavailability, inspection interval, time to test and cost. 
In order to reduce the frequency of an explosion exceeding 3 bar occurring these safety 
systems must have an unavailability which is as low as possible whilst retaining a reasonable 
cost. Inspection of the components helps to achieve low unavailabilities, however testing the 
components takes time and money therefore the time spent in the testing process should 
be as low as possible. An optimisation procedure is required to select the best possible 
parameters for use in the predictions. The optimisation being undertaken in this chapter 
provides an example to illustrate the practicality of this type of approach. 
11.2 The objective function. 
The objective is to minimise the frequency of an explosion generating an overpressure ex- 
ceeding 3 bar i. e., 
min fo (x) (11.1) 
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where fo (x) is the frequency of the overpressure exceeding 3 bar, x is the design vector 
which includes 9 parameters: type of isolation valve, type of blowdown valve, type of deluge 
system and type of detection system; inspection interval of the isolation valves, blowdown 
valves, deluge'systern and detection system; position of the isolation valves. 
fo (x) is evaluated by SAROS which is a computer program with an average running time 
of six hours, depending on the platform characteristics and the processor power of the com- 
puter. The SAROS data files contain information regarding the potential leak inventory, the 
atmospheric environment and the specifications of the module safety systems. The offshore 
platform is considered in terms of three modules, separation, compression and wellhead, 
data files must be created for each module and evaluated by the SAROS program individ- 
ually. Changing one detail in the specification of the safety systems requires the creation 
of six new data files (two per module) and three further evaluations of SAROS. The values 
of fo (x) can not be directly obtained from the output files of SAROS. The frequencies of 
the overpressures are generated at discrete points dictated by the concentration levels. In 
order to obtain results for exceeding 3 bar, interpolation between the results is required. 
The distribution appears to be of an exponential form, however around the 3 bar values it 
demonstrates an approximately linear relationship. Therefore to gain the values of exceeding 
3 bar, linear interpolation between neighbouring values is employed. This process is done 
for each module then to obtain the frequency of exceeding 3 bar for the platform the sum 
of the module values is taken. The three computer runs, tile linear interpolation and the 
summation required to obtain f o(x) is referred to as a platform evaluation. 
11.3 The components and the design vector. 
There are fourteen isolation valves on the platform considered in this design exercise, for the 
purpose of this study each valve is assumed to be of the same type. When optimising there is 
a choice between three types of valve, each with a different unavailability and cost. Table 11.1 
shows the unavailabilities and costs for each valve type. Choosing valves of type 1 will cost 
400 units per valve, type 2 costs 300 units and type 3 costs 100 units. The inspection interval 
chosen for the valves affects the unavailability. Inspecting the type 1 valves every 6 months 
gives an unavailability of 0.01 per valve, whereas inspecting every 12 months increases this 
to 0.02. This gain in unavailability may be traded off against the reduction in the time spent 
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in the inspection process and hence the time spent with the platform off line. Each valve 
takes 3 hours to inspect, therefore inspecting every 6 months means that within a year 6 
hours have been spent on each valve, with 14 valves on the platform a total of 84 hours is 
lost in the inspection process. An inspection every 12 months results in an off line period of 
42 hours, Table 11.2. The cost for inspection is assumed to be 100 units per hour, therefore 
the greater the time spent in the testing process the greater the cost of maintaining the 
platform becomes. 
Valve ý1 12 3 
Unavailability (6 month inspection) 0.01 0.04 0.1 
Unavailability (12 month inspection) 0.02 0.08 0.2 
Cost (per valve) 400 300 100 
Table 11.1: Data for the isolation and blowdown valves. 
Inspection interval (months) 6 12 
System Isolation Blowdown Is owdown 
Time to test system (hours) 84 72 
1 42 36 
Table 11.2: Data for the isolation and blowdown system inspection. 
There are twelve blowdown valves on the platform which are again all assumed to be the 
same. The data for these valves is the same as for the isolation valves given in Tables 11.1 
and 11.2. However that does not restrict us to selecting the same type of blowdown valve as 
the chosen isolation valve. 
Each module has a deluge system which is designed to activate on detection of a leak in 
that module. There are four types of deluge system to choose from, that differ in their 
unavailabilities, probability of failure once running, cost and time to test. The unavailabilities 
are tabulated in Table 11.3, these are again dependent on the inspection interval which 
may be 3,6 or 12 months. The longer the time between the inspections the higher the 
unavailability is, however the time spent in testing and the cost incurred in doing so is 
reduced as seen in Table 11.4. 
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tern - 11 12 3 47] 
Unavailability (3 month inspection) 0.021 0.025 0.031 0.05 
Unavailability (6 month inspection) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.1 
Unavailability (12 month inspection) 0.08 0.099 0.12 0.2 
Cost (per module) 2200 2100 2000 
Table 11.3: Data for the deluge system. 
Inspection interval (months) 1 13 16 1 12-1 
Time to test system 1 (hours) 576 288 144 
Time to test system 2 (hours) 432 216 108 
Time to test system 3 (hours) 576 288 144 
Time to test system 4 (hours)_ 
l 
288 144 72 
Table 11.4: Data for the deluge system inspection. 
It can be seen that the lower the unavailability is does not necessarily mean that a higher 
cost is incurred. Taking deluge system type 2 and inspecting this every 3 months yields 
an unavailability of 0.025 (Table 11.3) with a cost of 432 units (Table 11.4). Upgrading 
the deluge system to type 1 reduces the unavailability and increases the cost, as expected. 
Moving to a system of type 3 would be classed as downgrading since the unavailability is 
increased, 0.031, however such a downgrading incurs a higher cost, 576. Therefore in the 
optimisation a deluge system of type 3 will not be selected. This demonstrates that there is 
not necessarily any relationship between the components unavailability and its cost to install 
and maintain. Each component has a discrete unavailability and cost unconnected with any 
alternative component. 
The detection systems within each module are assumed to be the same type. There are five 
detection systems to chose from which differ in their failure rates, repair times and cost. The 
unavailabilities are shown in Table 11.5, these are again dependent on the inspection interval 
which may be 3,6 or 12 months. 
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Detection system 1 2 3 4 5 
Unavailability (3 month inspection) 0.00119 0.01143 0.05715 0.1119 0.2238 
Unavailability (6 month inspection) 0.002214 0.02238 0.1119 0.2214 0.4428 
Unavailability (12 month inspection) 0.004404 0.04428 0.2214 0.4404 0.8808 
Cost (per module) 14000 12000 11000 10000 9000 
Table 11.5: Data for the detection system. 
Inspection interval (months) 1 13 16 1 12 
Time to test system 1 (hours) 576 288 144 
Time to test system 2 (hours) 576 288 144 
Time to test system 3 (hours) 288 144 72 
Time to test system 4 (hours) 288 144 72 
Time to test system 5 (hours) 288 144 72 
Table 11.6: Data for the detection system inspection. 
Twelve of the fourteen isolation valves were in fixed positions between process vessels, there- 
fore only two could be allowed any movement. Both these valves were connecting to section 
4, valves 35XV104 and 34XV001. Allowable movement of valve 35XV104 decreases the 
inventory of section 4 whilst increasing the inventory of section 5. Moving valve 34XV001 
again decreases the inventory of section 4 whilst increasing that on section 1. Any further 
movement of the valves, including moving both valves simultaneously, would result in elim- 
inating a valve hence reducing the reliability of the isolation system. These valves may be 
seen in the schematic diagrams in Appendix A. 
The design vector is therefore comprised of nine parameters which must take on integer 
values. 
* x, is the type of isolation valve which may take values of 1,2 or 3. 
* X62 is the type of blowdown valve which may take values of 1,2 or 3. 
0 -1ý3 is the type of deluge system which may 
be 1,2,3 or 4. 
* X4 is the type of detection system which may be 1,2,3,4 or 5. 
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9 x, 5 is the inspection interval of the isolation valves which may, take values of I or 2,1 
representing 6 months and 2 representing 12 months. 
* X6 is the inspection interval of the blowdown valves which may take values of 1 or 2,1 
representing 6 months and 2 representing 12 months. 
* X7 is the inspection interval of the deluge system which may take values of 1,2 or 3,1 
representing 3 months, 2 representing 6 months and 3 representing 12 months. 
x8 is the inspection interval of the detection system which may take values of 1,2 or 
3,1 representing 3 months, 2 representing 6 months and 3 representing 12 months. 
* xg is the position of the isolation valves, position 2 represents the original location, 
moving 35XV104 is position I and moving 34XV001 is position 3. 
The components in each parameter set have been ordered according to their unavailability 
with component I having the lowest unavailability. 
The design vector consists of one element from each of the nine component sets. 
11.4 Applicable optimisation techniques. 
Explicit enumeration of the problem is an infeasible option as there are 19440 (3 x3x4x 
5x2x2x3x3x 3) alternative solutions. The frequency of the overpressure exceeding 
3 bar is determined via a cpu intensive computer program, it is therefore infeasible to opt 
for an optimisation scheme which requires many system evaluations. A scheme is required 
to optimise the safety systems using as few system evaluations as possible. 
The literature survey in Chapter 5 demonstrated that there are no specific optimisation. 
methods applicable to this type of problem. The variables must take on integer values and the 
objective function may be determined as a 'black box' process. As each variable must feature 
within the model once, the closest description to this problem is that of an integer multiple 
choice problem. However standard solution schemes require a linear objective function, 
otherwise they involve many system evaluations. This chapter introduces three schemes for 
optimising the problem. The first scheme is described as a stepping process, this uses the 
idea that the problem may be linear within the locality of the point and allows movement 
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to neighbouring points only. The second scheme advances on this and assumes that a linear 
function may be derived from local information to describe movement to anywhere within 
the feasible design space. The third scheme is heuristic and considers the contributions of 
each of the safety systems to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar. Each of these schemes are 
iterative and require some constraints to provide a feasible framework. 
11.5 Limits and bounds. 
If the best components, in terms of lowest unavailability, are considered then the data set is 
1-271 
--` 
1) X2 --: 
11 X3 : -- 11 X4 --` 
Ii X5 --` 
11 X6 : --: 11 X7 "11 X8 --` 
11 X9 --'ý 
1} 
The valve positioning, variable xg, could not be ordered in terms of unavailability. However 
from an observational level it appeared that the lowest frequencies of exceeding 3 bar were 
generated whilst the valves were in position 1. This system has the maximum cost at 255200 
units and maximum time to inspect of 1308 hours and generates a frequency of exceeding 
overpressures of 3 bar of 3.73 x 10-7 per year. The worst components in terms of unavailability 
were also considered, these are 
fxl =3, X2 = 3, x3 =4, X4 = 5, x5 = 2, xr, = 2, X7 = 3, x8 = 3, xg = 3} 
Such a system had the minimum cost of 111800 units and a time to inspect of 222 hours. 
The frequency of exceeding 3 bar is 6.55 X 10-6 per year. 
If a relationship between the costs and the frequency of exceeding 3 bar existed then it may 
be feasible to say that the best components produce the lowest frequency of exceeding 3 bar 
and the worst components produce the highest. This would set upper and lower bounds on 
the frequency of exceeding 3 bar possible. Without a relationship, the values obtained may 
be used as a guide to obtaining convergence of a method. 
When optimising there needs to be some constraints placed on the amount that the engineer 
is prepared to pay for a lower frequency of exceeding 3 bar and the time spent in the inspection 
process. Possible costs range between 111800 and 255200 units and the times spent in testing 
the system between 222 and 1308 hours. For the design optimisation presented the maximum 
feasible values were assumed to be 
cost < 183500units 
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time to inspect < 765hours 
Out of a total of 19440 combinations only 12783 were feasible according to these constraints. 
11.6 The stepping process. 
This method is based on the assumption that the variables may step to values within a 
neighbourhood of the current values. For example movement may be made from a detection 
system of type 3, forward stepping to type 2 or backward stepping to type 4, however from 
a system of type 3, types 1 and 5 may not be reached. 
Consider a point in the feasible design space, x, this is determined by nine variables which 
represent the components of the safety system. This point is the initial case which evaluates 
to a frequency of exceeding 3 bar of fo (x). Depending on the location of the point within 
the design space, the variables, except xg may be stepped up to a component of reduced 
unavailability or down to a component of increased unavailability. The valve positioning, 
xg, is not described in terms of unavailability, instead movement is made in terms of the 
ordering given previously. As there are only two choices for the inspection interval of the 
isolation and blowdown valves these variables may only step in one direction. Tile feasible 
design space can not be left. 
Allowing multiple stepping either up or down to neighbouring components leads to a possible 
6858 combinations. This is a significant reduction on the possible 12783 feasible combina- 
tions, however it remains impractical to evaluate them all. This method proposes that it is 
possible to estimate the values of the frequency of exceeding 3 bar in all 6858 neighbouring 
locations from knowledge of the values at 16 points. This is achieved by considering the 
points where only one of the variables has been stepped. In certain locations seven of the 
nine variables may be stepped up or stepped down, giving 14 possible combinations. The 
remaining two variables may only step in one direction. There is no relationship between 
the change in unavailability and the change in cost of a component when stepping, therefore 
platform evaluations are carried out for each possible movement, i. e. lip and down, which 
will lead to a maximum of 16. 
If x represents an initial point then x+ 6xi is used to represent the variable xi being stepped 
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upwards whilst the remaining variables retain their current values. Stepping xi downwards 
is represented as x- bxi. The corresponding platform evaluations with these data sets yields 
the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of fo (x + bxi) and fo (x: - 6xi). 
From the 16 platform evaluations, gained by stepping one variable at a time, it is possible to 
generate all the neighbouring nodes by considering the upward and downward differentials 
(superscripted u and d respectively). 
0 fo' f0 (X + öxi) - fo (x) 
exi öxj 
Ofod f0 (X - 5xi) -f0 (X) 
oxi öxj 
The stepping occurs from one discrete value to another therefore 6xi = 1. For the node 
which steps n variables, Xk, upwards and m variables, xj, downwards where n+M<9 
and k, jEf0,1, .., 9}, k =A j the frequency of exceeding 3 bar for this point is given by the 
following equation 
fo +E öXk 
(X 
-Z ÖX 7 
) 
f0 (X) +Z 
Ofou 
äXk +Z 
LfodbXj 
kEU 
. 
jeD kEU 
OXk 
jED 
oxj 
The -combinations of variables stepped relating to the neighbouring nodes are determined. 
The possible combinations of variable steps are placed in a set, S. Each subset of S is a 
combination of stepped variables relating to a neighbouring node, these subsets include N 
elements, N<9, where N=n+m with n being the number of upward steps and m is the 
number of downward steps. The set U includes the identification numbers of the variables 
stepped upwards and set D includes those which step downwards. Using the appropriate 
upward and downward differentials each frequency of exceeding 3 bar may be estimated. For 
all the combinations which satisfy the financial cost and inspection time period restrictions 
comparisons are made to identify the lowest frequency. 
The point with the lowest estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar becomes the intermediate 
solution. The platform is then evaluated to give the SAROS model frequency of exceeding 
3 bar. All possible variable steps are determined about this intermediate solution and the 
procedure repeats until convergence is obtained. 
11.6.1 A two variable example. 
Such a scheme may be represented geometrically in the two variable case, Figure 11.1. 
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X2 
X1 
Figure 11.1: Geometric interpretation of the linear optimisation procedure 
The initial point x is chosen as (X1 i X2) . 
Using the stepping process the variable x, may be 
stepped upwards to x, + 6x, whilst X2 remains constant giving (xi + 6X1 I X2) and x, may 
be stepped downwards to give (XI - 6X1) X2). The variable X2 may be stepped both upwards 
and downwards whilst keeping x, constant giving (X1 i X2 + 
6X2) and (xi , X2 - 
6X2). These 
four points are indicated by 0 on the diagram. Platform evaluations are carried out for 
these points, allowing the upward and downward differentials to be calculated. The stepping 
process allows movement to the neighbouring nodes, the combinations of the steps are placed 
in set S, where 
116XI} 
i 
1-6Xl} 
7 
f6X2} 
i 
1-6X2} 
i 
16XI 
i 
6X2} 
i 
J-6XI) 6X2} 
i 
16X') 
-6X2} i 
{-6XI 
i -6X2}} - 
This set has eight elements four of which have been evaluated, the remaining four points, 
indicated by A on the diagram, are calculated by Equation 11.4. For example the final 
element has N=2 subelements, these are stepping the two variables downwards therefore 
-n=0 and m=2. The set U is an empty set, U= J} as no variable is stepped up. The 
set D has two elements D= fl, 2}. Using Equation 11.4 the frequency of exceeding 3 bar is 
estimated for this point by 
fo (X - 6X1 - 5X2 )= fo (X) + 
Ofod 
, 
Ofod 
d9X1 0X2 
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11.6.2 The stepping algorithm. 
The algorithm for the stepping process may be summarised as follows. 
I. Take a point in the design space, x. 
2. Run a platform evaluation on this point to give fo (x). 
3. Determine the possible movements from this point by stepping one variable either up 
or down as the others remain constant. (maximum of 16 movements) 
4. Run these platform evaluations to give fo (x + 6xi) &fo (x - 6xi). 
5. Calculate the upward and downward differentials, as in Equations 11.2 & 11.3. 
6. Create the set S of all possible stepping combinations about x. (maximum of 6858) 
7. Estimate the frequency of exceeding 3 bar using Equation 11.4 for each neighbouring 
node (i. e. each subset in S). 
8. Compare to find the lowest estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar which is within the 
specified constraints. 
9. Accept the point corresponding to the lowest estimation as the intermediate solution. 
10. Perform a platform evaluation, if this is an improvement on the previous value then 
repeat the process from step 3 otherwise stop. 
Creating a set which may involve up to 6858 subsets is a tedious task. Therefore the steps 
from 6 to 8 in the algorithm have been automated in the form of a MAPLE procedure 
into which the user must input the upward and downward differentials and the possible one 
variable movements. 
11.6.3 Results from the stepping process with a mid case initiator. 
In order to use the stepping process a point must be chosen from the feasible design space. 
To get the maximum possible steps a central point was taken to be the initial case. This 
point consisted of the components shown in Table 11-7. 
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Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 
Blowdown inspection X6 
Deluge inspection X7 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 2 
Table 11.7: The system components used in the first stepping procedure from a mid range 
initiator. 
A platform evaluation using these components led to a frequency of exceeding 3 bar of 
fo (x) = 5.994 x 10-1 per year. Such a combination lias a cost of 175800 units and involves 
an inspection time of 660 hours. There are a possible sixteen steps that may be taken from 
this point, these are illustrated in Table 11-8. 
Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge system X3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown inspection XG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Deluge inspection X7 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Valve position xg 21 21 2 2 2 2 2 11 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Table 11.8: The steps that may be taken during the first stepping procedure from a mid 
range initiator. 
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For each of these cases the platform evaluations were performed giving 
fo (X + 6xi) i Ei U 
fo (X - 6xi) iE 
where U is the set of the variables which could move upwards, U= 11,2,3,4,7,8,9} and 
D is the set of the variables which could move downwards, D=f1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. This 
then allowed the calculation of the upward and downward differentials. Using the MAPLE 
procedure, to create the estimated function value for the cases within the constraints, the 
lowest frequency of exceeding 3 bar was estimated to be 4.148 x 10-7 per year. This has a 
cost of 182000 units and has an inspection time of 696 hours. Table 11.9 illustrates the case 
chosen. 
Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position X9 1 
Table 11.9: The system components used in the second stepping procedure from a mid range 
initiator. 
Comparing Table 11.9 with 11.7 it can be seen that the types of isolation and blowdown 
valves selected improved, whilst the inspection interval for the isolation valves remained 
the same and it was decided to inspect the blowdown valves less often. The deluge and 
detection systems remained at type 2. The deluge system is to be inspected more often but 
the detection system is to be inspected less often. The isolation valve 35XV104 is to be 
moved so that the inventory of section 4 is decreased with that of section 5 increasing. 
Performing a platform evaluation using this data set yielded a frequency of exceeding 3 bar 
of 4.18 x 10-' per year which is very close to the estimated value using the stepping process. 
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In order to repeat the process the possible steps must be identified. These are as shown in 
Table 11.10. In this case there are only eleven movements possible as four components which 
could move both ways in the last run have been selected as their highest type and therefore 
can no longer move upwards and one component can not move downwards. 
Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Deluge system X3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Blowdown. inspection X6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 I I 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Valve position xg 11 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Table 11.10: The steps that may be taken during the second stepping procedure from a mid 
range initiator. 
In this case there are four variables that may move upwards, the identifications for these 
variables are placed in set U=f3,4,6,8}. Seven variables can move downwards these are 
D=f1,2,3,4,5,7,9}. Repeating the stepping procedure yields an estimated frequency of 
exceeding 3 bar of 4.18 x 10-7 per year at a cost of 182000 units and a time to test of 696 
hours. This data set is identical to the previous iteration. The nature of this process will 
mean that further iterations will result in a repetition of this solution. Hence this stepping 
process has converged in a relatively short period of time. Table 11.11 shows the iterations 
needed to gain convergence. The optimal configuration for the safety systems using the 
stepping process is as shown in Table 11.12. This configuration was found by performing 29 
platform evaluations. 
246 
Approaches to optimise the configuration of the safety systems. 
Iteration 11 1 12 3 
Isolation valve X1 2 1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 2 1 1 
Deluge system X3 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 2 1 1 
Detection inspection X8 2 3 3 
Valve position Xg 2 1 1 
Estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar 4.148 x 10-7 4.18 x 10-7 
SAROS frequency of exceeding 3 bar 5.994 x 10-7 4.18 X 10-7 4.18 X 10-7 
Table 11.11: The intermediate solutions generated with the stepping process with a mid 
range initiator. 
Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 I 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position Xg 1 
Requency of exceeding 3 bar 4.18 X 10-7 
Requency of explosion 3.74 X 10-5 
System cost 182000 
Inspection time 696 
Table 11.12: The system components used in the optimal configuration with the stepping 
process, initiated from a mid range case. 
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This method has a large limitation in its movement capabilities. Due to the nature of the 
method and the quick convergence obtained, many combinations were not considered as 
options. 
11.6.4 The results from the stepping process with a worst case 
initiator. 
As a test of its robustness this process was performed on an initiating data set which used 
the 'worst' components, apart from the valve positioning. The initiating case was therefore 
as shown in Table 11.13. 
Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 3 
Blowdown valve X2 3 
Deluge system X3 4 
Detection system X4 5 
Isolation inspection X5 2 
Blowdown inspection XG 2 
Deluge inspection X7 3 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position X9 1 
Table 11.13: The system components used in the first stepping procedure from a Nvorst case 
initiator. 
This point had a platform evaluation yielding a frequency of exceeding 3 bar, fo(x), of 4.96 x 
10-6 per year which cost 111800 units and took 222 hours to inspect. The possible movements 
in this case totalled nine, eight of which were upward steps and the valve positioning was a 
downward step. The set D comprised of D= 19} and the set U= 11,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}. The 
movements are shown in Table 11.14. 
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Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward 
Isolation valve X, 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Blowdown valve X2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Deluge system X3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Detection system X4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Isolation inspection X5 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Detection inspection X8 3 
L3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Valve position xg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Table 11.14: The steps that may be taken during the first stepping procedure from a Nvorst 
case initiator. 
Platform evaluations were done for each of the above cases, then the upward and downward 
differentials were calculated. Using the stepping procedure the estimated frequency of ex- 
ceeding 3 bar is -1.963 x 10-6 per year with a cost of 159600 and a time to test of 588 
hours. This estimated frequency is unrealistic as frequencies can not take negative values. 
The upward steps made such an improvement that the upward differentials used had such a 
large negative magnitude causing the estimation to be so far out. Even though the estimated 
frequency is clearly incorrect, this data set is taken as the intermediate solution. The com- 
ponents are shown in Table 11.15. The platform evaluation yielded a frequency of exceeding 
3 bar of 8.78 x 10-' per year. It can be seen that each of the components was upgraded in 
its type and the inspection interval. The possible steps that could be taken from this point 
increased to 15 as movement can now be made in either direction, these are shown in Table 
11.16. 
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Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 
Deluge system X3 3 
Detection system X4 4 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 
Deluge inspection X7 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 1 
Table 11.15: The system components used in the second stepping procedure from a worst 
case initiator. 
The upward steps may be taken on the 6 variables in set U= {1,2,3,4,7,8}, the downward 
steps are D= 11,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. The upward and downward differentials were created 
for these variable sets, following the platform evaluations. The MAPLE procedure is then 
utilised to find the possible steps to the neighbouring nodes and the estimated frequency of 
exceeding 3 bar for each node within the constraints. 
Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge system X3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Detection system X4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 
Isolation inspection X5 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown. inspection X6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Deluge inspection X7 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Valve position xg 11 
1 
11 
11 11 11 11 11 1 
11 
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 2 
Table 11.16: The steps that may be taken during the second stepping procedure from a 
worst case initiator. 
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The best position was found to have an estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar of 3.16 x 10-7 
per year with a cost of 182600 units and a time to test of 732 hours. This data set is shown 
in Table 11.17. Following a platform evaluation the frequency of exceeding 3 bar from the 
SAROS model was found to be 4.5 x 10-7 per year. 
Component 
_77 
=Type 
Isolation valve X1 I 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 I 
Deluge inspection X7 1 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 1 
Table 11.17: The system components used in the third stepping procedure from a worst case 
initiator. 
The possible steps that may be taken from this data set involve three upward steps and nine 
downward steps, U= 13,4,8} and D= fl, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. These steps are shown in 
Table 11.18. After creating the upward and downward differentials from the results of the 
platform evaluations for these 12 cases, the best point chosen was identical to the previous 
iteration. 
The optimum configuration was achieved after 40 platform evaluations had been carried out. 
The steps leading to the optimum configuration from a worst case initiator are as shown in 
Table 11.19. A summary of the optimal configuration gained from a worst case initiator is 
shown in Table 11.20. 
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Component x Possible steps 
upward downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown. valve X2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deluge system X3 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Detection system -14 
3 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Deluge inspection X7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Detection inspection X8 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Valve position xg 11 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Table 11.18: The steps that may be taken during the third stepping procedure from a worst 
case initiator. 
Iteration 11 1 12 3 
Isolation valve X1 3 2 1 
Blowdown valve X2 3 2 1 
Deluge system X3 4 3 2 
Detection system 'X4 5 4 3 
Isolation inspection X5 2 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 1 1 
Deluge inspection X7 3 2 1' 
Detection inspection X8 3 2 2 
Valve position Xg 1 1 1 
Estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar -1.96 X 
10-6 3.16 x 10-7 
SAROS frequency of exceeding 3 bar 4.96 X 
10-6 8.78 X 10-7 4.5 X 10-7 
Table 11.19: The intermediate solutions generated with the stepping process with a worst 
case initiator. 
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Component Type J 
Isolation valve X1 I 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 
Deluge inspection X7 I 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 1 
Frequency of exceeding 3 bar 4.5 x 10-7 
Frequency of explosion 4.47 x 10-5 
System cost 182600 
Inspection time 732 
Table 11.20: The system components used in the optimal configuration with the stepping 
process, initiated from a worst case. 
11.6.5 An evaluation of the stepping process. 
The stepping process was initiated from a mid range base case so that it had the opportunity 
of moving in all directions. After only two iterations and 29 platform iterations the method 
had converged. This meant that very few combinations had been available as options since 
stepping was only permitted to neighbouring nodes. As a test of this method a worst case was 
selected as an initiator, this meant that during the first iteration only improved components 
could be selected unless the component did not alter. By doing this it was hoped that more 
combinations would be considered as an option. From this initiator the method converged 
in three iterations and 40 platform evaluations. Unfortunately the two initiating cases did 
not converge to the same solution. Table 11.21 shows the two solutions gained. 
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Component Mid case 
I Worst c 
Isolation valve X1 1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 1 
Deluge system X3 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 1 
Deluge inspection X7 1 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 2 
Valve position Xg 1 1 
Requency of exceeding 3 bar 4.2 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7 
Requency of explosion 3.74 x 10-5 4.4736 x 10-5 
System cost 182000 182600 
Inspection time 696 732 
Table 11.21: A comparison of the system components used in the optimal configuration with 
the stepping process. 
The solutions gained differ in their detection type and inspection and the inspection of the 
blowdown valves. It is clear that the solution gained from the mid case initiator is better 
than that gained from the worst case. 
The components that differ between the two cases may be stepped to in one iteration. It is 
therefore interesting to consider why the solution from the worst case initiator (lid not step 
further to reach the solution from the mid case. The estimating function for the frequency 
of exceeding 3 bar is 
Ofo u+E Ofod 
fo +Z äXk - 
EöXj f0 (x)+ Z -ý 
(X 
kEU jED kEU 
q Xk 
jED 
oxj 
For the worst case solution to reach that of the mid case solution X4 must upgrade and xr, S-, 
x8 must downgrade whilst the other components remain constant. The subset of S referring 
to this case is U= f4} and D= f6,8}. This means that the estimating 
function for the movement required is 
Ofo, 0 fo d0 fod 
f0 (X + 6X4 - 
6X6 
- 
5X8) 
---: 
f0(X) + ä74 + ä= + 
XG 0,8 X xr, X 
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This function requires the upward differential for X4 and the downward differentials for xr, and 
x8. These are obtained from the platform evaluations obtained when stepping one variable 
at a time. 
Ofe 
= -4.35 x 
10-8 
0914 
19 f0d 
_ 
10_'O 
0916 
19 f0d 
_ 
10-8 
a-4 
Substituting these upward and downward differentials into the estimating function yields the 
following result. 
f0 (X + 6X4 - 5X6 - 6X8) = 4.5 x 10-7 - 4.35 x 
10-8 + 4.09 x 10-10 + 5.32 x 10-8 
= 4.6 x 10-7 
This value is higher than the current f o(x) and so it was not selected as a possible minimum 
even though the true platform evaluation for this case gives a lower frequency of exceeding 
3 bar. This demonstration shows why the worst case initiated solution (lid not evolve to 
that of the mid case initiated solution. The reasons for this lie in the calculation of the 
differentials and the specification of the design parameters. 
fo(x) was calculated with a detection system of type 3 which was inspected type 2. This 
combination led to an unavailability for the detection system of 0.1119, taken from Table 
11.5. The stepping procedure calculates differentials based on only one component changing 
whilst the rest remain constant. Therefore changing the detection type involved the detection 
system being of type 2 whilst the inspection remained at type 2. This combination had 
an unavailability of 0.02238 which improved the reliability of the platform and led to 11 
differential of -4.35 x 10'. Changing the inspection interval of the detection system to type 
3 whilst the detection system remains at type 3 leads to a combination for the detection which 
has an unavailability of 0.2214. This reduction in the reliability is shown in the differential 
calculation which gave a value of 5.32 x 10-8. The combination of these differentials led 
to a positive contribution for the estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar which is not an 
improvement. However the combination that was required was to have the detection system 
at type 2, inspected type 3, if these could have been changed together then the unavailability 
for the detection system would have been 0.04428 which is an improvement on the current 
status. 
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This highlights deficiencies in the definitions of the parameters. An alternative approach 
would be to consider the safety system and its inspection interval as one variable and reorder 
these according to unavailability. 
11.7 The linearisation process. 
This method assumes that the change in the frequency of exceeding 3 bar may be represented 
as a linear function. This is based on successive linear optimisation where linearisation takes 
place about a point to determine a better point whereby linearisation occurs again. 
Consider a point in the design space, x, which yields a frequency of exceeding 3 bar f o(x). 
Assuming a linear relationship in the locality of x, a Taylor series expansion of first order 
accuracy gives the frequency of exceeding 3 bar at any point within the design space as 
fo(x + dx) =f o(x) + bxi 
19 fo 
ýX-i 
where 6xi is the step made by variable xi, this may be forwards or backwards to any possible 
value of xi. is the first order differential for the change in f o(x) with respect to a change axi 
in xi. This differential may be approximated by forward, central or backward differences. 
Whenever possible central differences were used for greater accuracy. These take the form 
(9 f0f O(X + 6xi) - fo(x - 6xi) 
5 Ti 26xi 
For each variable describing x it was determined whether this could move forwards or back- 
wards. If a component was capable of moving both ways, the data sets were created by 
moving the component either way whilst keeping the rest constant. The two platform evalu- 
ations were carried out to give the terms for the central difference equation. If a component 
could only move downwards, backwards differencing was used as in the following equation. 
09 f0 fo(x) - fo(x - Jxj) 
axj Jxj 
Otherwise forward differencing was used. 
afo f O(X + &j) - fo(x) axi bxj 
Every movement within the feasible design space is considered using E quation 11.6 to deter- 
mine the lowest estimation of the frequency of exceeding 3 bar. Once the point representing 
this frequency value is identified this is classed as the intermediate solution the linearisation 
process is then employed about this point until convergence is obtained. 
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11.7.1 The linearisation algorithm. 
The algorithm for the linearisation process may be summarised by the following steps. 
1. Take a point in the design space, x. 
2. Run a platform evaluation on this point to give fo (x) . 
I Determine the possible movements from this point by stepping one variable either up 
or down as the others remain constant. 
4. Run these platform evaluations to give fo (x + Sxj) & fo (x - Sxi) - 
5. Create the central, forward or backward differences. 
6. Create the linear function as in Equation 11.6. 
7. Run this function through all combinations of variables. 
8. Select the combination which gives the lowest frequency of exceeding 3 bar whilst 
remaining within the constraints. 
9. Run a platform evaluation on this point, if it is an improvement on the previous case 
then relinearise about this point by repeating the process from step 3 otherwise stop. 
11.7.2 Results from the linearisation process with a mid case ini- 
tiator. 
As a comparison between the linearisation process and the stepping process, the linearisation 
process was initiated with the same mid range base case. This is shown in Table 11.22. 
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Component Type. 1 
Isolation valve X1 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 
Deluge inspection X7 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 2 
Table 11.22: The system components used in the first linearisation procedure from a mid 
range initiator. 
In order to create a linear function the differentials for the change in each variable Nvere 
required. To determine whether these were to be central, forward or backward differences 
the possible steps were identified. These are shown in Table 11.23. 
Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Blowdown valve X2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge system X3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Isolation inspection X5 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown. inspection X6 I 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Deluge inspection X7 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Detection inspection X8 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Valve position xg 11 2 11 21 21 21 21 
21 21 1 
11 
21 
_2 1 
21 21 21 21 21 21 3j 
Table 11.23: The steps that may be taken during the first linearisation procedure from a 
mid range initiator. 
As in the stepping process the sets U and D can be created to identify those variables that 
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are able to move upwards and those that move downwards. U= 11,2,3,4,7,8,9} and D= 
11,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. Variables present in both sets may be used for central differencing, 
variables in U only for forward differencing and those in D only for backward differencing. 
Running platform evaluations on the data sets in Table 11.23 provides f O(x + 6xi) iEU 
and f o(x - 6xi) iED. The base case evaluates to fo(x) = 5.99 X 10-7 per year. This leads 
to the linear function about x being 
0 (X + (5x) = 5.99 x 10-7 - 1.085 x 10-7X1 -4x 10-9X2 - 5.25 x 10-7 X3 
-6.1 x 10-8 14 - 9.56 x 10-8x. 5 - 3.78 x 10-9xG 
-1.96 x 10-7 X7 - 1.85 x 10-8X8 - 2.09 x 10-9xg 
When using this function the types of components must be renumbered, with the current 
type being 0, moving backwards being negative and forwards positive. 
This function was evaluated at all nodes in the feasible design space. The optimum, esti- 
mated, value was found to be 3.1 X 10-7 per year with the data set shown in Table 11.24. 
The true frequency of exceeding 3 bar was evaluated by SAROS as 4.18 X 10-7 per year. 
Component 
7ý] ýpe 
Isolation valve X1 I 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 I 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position Xg I 
Table 11.24: The system components used in the second linearisation procedure from a inid 
range initiator. 
The linearisation procedure must now take place around this point. To do this the movements 
must again be identified to determine whether central, forward or backward differencing 
should be used. These movements are shown in Table 11.25. 
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Component x Possible steps 
upward steps downward steps 
Isolation valve X, 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Deluge system X3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 
Isolation inspection X5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Valve position xg I1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Table 11.25: The steps that may be taken during the second linearisation procedure from a 
mid range initiator. 
The set U comprises of f3,4,6,81 and the set D has elements fl, 2,3,4,5,7,9}. Central 
differencing may only be performed for -C3 and . 14, the other elements of U and D must, be 
used for forward and backward differencing respectively. Following the platform evaluations 
and the creation of the differentials the linear function is determined to be 
o (x + öx) = 4.18 x 10-7 - 5.47 x 10-8xi - 2.49 x 10-9X2 - 2.45 x 10-8x3 
-5.3 X 
10-8X4 - 1.85 x 10-8X5 - 4.4 x 10-10xr, 
-1.23 x 10-7 X7 - 1.06 x 10-8x8 - 5.99 x 10-9xg 
The point with the best estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar from this linear ftinction 
is shown in Table 11.26. The estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar was 3.86 x 10-1 per 
year, a platform evaluation on this data set gives an actual value of 4.2 x 10-7. Since this 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar is higher than the current intermediate solution, the process is 
halted. 
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Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 2 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 I 
Isolation inspection X5 2 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 I 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position Xg 1 
Table 11.26: The system components used in the third linearisation procedure from a mid 
range initiator. 
This method has now converged. Table 11.27 shows the results of each linearisation up to 
convergence being obtained. 
11 1 12 3 
Isolation valve X1 2 1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 2 1 2 
Deluge system X3 2 2 2 
Detection system X4 2 2 1 
Isolation inspection X, 5 1 1 2 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 2 1 1 
Detection inspection X8 2 3 3 
Valve position Xg 2 1 1 
Estimated frequency of exceeding 3 bar 3.1 
X 10-7 3.86 x 10-7 
SAROS frequency of exceeding 3 bar 5.99 X 10-7 4.18 X 
10-7 4.2 x 10-7 
j 
Table 11.27: The intermediate solutions generated with the linearisation process with a mid 
case initiator. 
The algorithm defined for this linearisation process states that iteration 2 should be selected 
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as the optimal solution as the frequency of exceeding 3 bar gained from the SAROS program 
was lower than for iteration 3. Iteration 2 had a lower financial cost although a longer period 
of time was spent inspecting it. The optimal solution is shown in Table 11.28. This optimal 
was reached after performing 30 platform evaluations and creating 2 linear functions. The 
deciding criteria between the final two intermediate solutions was based on the magnitude of 
the frequency of exceeding 3 bar, however the two solutions had very similar results. It may 
be appropriate to say that the linearisation method generated two alternative solutions. This 
linearisation method generated the case that was chosen as the optimum with the stepping 
process but continued to iterate to an alternative solution. As with the stepping process 
the linearisation method was carried out with a worst case initiator as a comparison of the 
methods. 
Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 1 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 2 
Isolation inspection X5 I 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 1 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position Xg 1 
Requency of exceeding 3 bar 4.18 x 
10-7 
Frequency of explosion 3.74 X 10-5 
System cost 182000 
Inspection time 696 
Table 11.28: The system components used in the optimal configuration with the linearisation 
process, initiated from a mid range case. 
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11-7.3 The results of the linearisation process from a worst case 
initiator. 
The linearisation process was initiated from the worst case described for the stepping process, 
this has components shown in Table 11.29. 
Component Type 
Isolation . -alve X1 3 
Blowdown x-alve -T2 3 
Deluge systern X3 4 
Detection system X4 5 
Isolation inspection X5 2 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 3 
Detection inspection X8 3 
Valve position X9 1 
Table 11.29: The system components used in the first linearisation procedure from a worst 
case initiator. 
As for the stepping process the possible movements were determined which are shown in 
Table 11.14. In this case central differencing could not be used as there were no components 
that could move both ways. Formard differencing was required on the variables in set U, 
U= 11,2,3,4,5,6,7,81 and back-A%-ard differencing was used for the valve positioning, D 
J9}- The linear function generated -, %-as 
f0 (X + bx) = 4.96 x 10-6 - 9.27 x 10-8x, - 1.83 x 
10-8 X2 - 1.87 x 10-6x3 
-1.26 x 10-6x4 - 
7.65 x 10-8X5 - 1.55 x 10-8X6 
-1.25 x 
10-6X7 - 2.34 x 
10-6 X8 - 1.59 x 
10-6xg 
Running this function through all possible nodes in the feasible design space 
led to an 
intermediate solution of -9.36 X 10-6 per year. As in the case of the stepping process 
this 
solution is infeasible because a frequency can not be negative. The data set relating to this 
frequMcy, Table 11.30, %%-as taken to be the intermediate solution and performing a system 
evaluation yielded a frequency of exceeding 3 bar of 5.14 x 10-7 per year. As this frequency 
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of exceeding 3 bar was lower than the pre%rious case (4-96 X 10-6 per year) the linearisatim 
process continued froin here. 
Component Type 
Isolation -, -alve X1 1 
BloivdoN%, n N-alve X2 3 
Deluge systern X3 1 
Detection systern X4 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 
Deluge inspection X7 2 
Detection inspection X8 
Valve position X9 
Table 11.30: The system components used in the second linearisation procedure from a worst 
case initiator. 
The Possible steps from this Point ivere determined, these are shown in Table 11.31. 
Component x Possible steps 
upmard steps downward steps 
Isolation x-alve X1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown -, -al%, c X2 3 2 3 3 
1 
3 
1 
3 3 
1 
3 
1 
3 3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
Deluge system -T3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Detection sy. sten, X, 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Isolation inspection X! i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Deluge inspection X7 1) 1) 2) 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Detection inspection X's 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Valve position T9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 
Table 11-31: The steps that. may be taken during the second linearisation procedure 
from a 
worst range initiator. 
FrOln this table U= 12,4,6,71 and D= [1,3,4,5,7,8,9}. Central differencing could only 
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be performed on X4 and X7, forward and backward differencing was required for the other 
variables. The linear function generated was 
fo (x + 6x) = 5.14 x 10-7 - 7.06 x 10-8x, - 8.13 x 10-9X2 - 5.44 x 10-8 x3 
-4 x 10-8. T4 - 2.38 x 10-8 05 - 6.84 x 10-9. T6 
-1.61 x 10-7 X7 - 4.35 x 10-8x8 - 7.27 x 10-9xg 
This linear function generated the intermediate solution shown in Table 11.32 which is the 
same case as that found to be the solution for the stepping process from a worst case initiator. 
The linear function estimates the frequency of exceeding 3 bar to be 4.27 x 10-1 per year 
but the platform evaluation of this case yields 4.5 X 10-7 per year. 
Component Type 
Isolation valve X1 1 
Blowdown valve X2 I 
Deluge system X3 2 
Detection system X4 3 
Isolation inspection X5 1 
Blowdown inspection X6 1 
Deluge inspection X7 1 
Detection inspection X8 2 
Valve position Xg 1 
Table 11.32: The system components used in the third linearisation procedure from a worst 
case initiator. 
The possible steps are shown in Table 11.18 where U= f3,4,81 and D= 11,2,3,5,6,7,8,91. 
The linear function generated was 
fo (x + bx) = 4.5 x 
10-7 
- 5.07 x 10-8xi - 1.17 x 
10-9X2 
- 3.15 x 
10-8 x3 
-9.6 x 
10-8 274 - 1.72 x 10-8X. 5 - 4.09 x 10-10X6 
-1.59 x 
10-7 X7 - 3.95 x 
10-8 X8 - 1.15 x 10-8X9 
This function yielded a data set identical to iteration 3 from the mid case initiator. As this 
case has been reached the process will now follow the same pattern as that generated for the 
mid case initiator. The intermediate solutions are as demonstrated in Table 11.33 
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Iteration 1 2 3 4 5 
Isolation valve 3 1 1 1 1 
Blowdown valve 3 3 1 2 1 
Deluge system 4 1 2 2 2 
Detection system 5 3 3 1 2 
Isolation inspection 2 1 1 2 1 
Blowdown inspection 2 2 1 2 2 
Deluge inspection 3 2 1 1 1 
Detection inspection 3 1 2 3 3 
Valve position I 1 1 1 1 
Estimated frequency -9.36 x 
10-6 4.27 x 10-7 3.16 x 10-7 4.14 x 10-7 
of exceeding 3 bar 
SAROS frequency 4.96 x 10-6 5.14 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-7 4.2 x 10-7 4.18 x 10-7 
of exceeding 3 bar 
Table 11.33: The intermediate solutions generated with the linearisation process with a worst 
case initiator. 
As with the mid case initiator iteration 5 provides the optimum solution. 
11.7.4 An evaluation of the linearisation process. 
The linearisation process was initiated from a mid case and a worst case to observe any 
differences in the selection of the optimum. Both cases iterated to the same solution, with the 
worst case initiated process requiring two more iterations. During the linearisation process 
both cases generated with the stepping process were encountered. Due to the linearisation 
process having the capability to move to any point in the design space movement was made 
from these points. 
The linear function was not very accurate * in estimating the frequency of exceeding 3 bar. 
However its accuracy improved as the optimum was approached. 
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ll-, 8 A heuristic approach. 
This section describes a heuristic approach to finding the optimum configuration of the safety 
systems on an offshore platform. Heuristic methods do not follow any strict mathematical 
criteria, however to aim for a good heuristic model some guidelines should be followed. These 
state that the solution should be yielded in a reasonable amount of computer time and should 
be close to the optimum most of the time. 
To develop the heuristic scheme the aim, rules and strategy should be defined. 
Aim: To obtain the combination of the safety system components which generate the lowest 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar. 
Rules: Two rules must be strictly adhered to. 
1. the cost must be less than 183500 units. 
2. the time taken to inspect must be less than 765 hours. 
The basis of this scheme is the contribution supplied by each of the safety systems to the 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar. The SAROS code has been adapted to provide these percent- 
age contributions for the isolation system, blowdown system, deluge system and detection 
system. 
A platform evaluation has been used to describe running the SAROS code for the three 
modules on the platform, extracting the frequencies of overpressure exceedence, interpolating 
to obtain values for exceeding 3 bar and then summing these results to give the frequency of 
exceeding 3 bar for the platform. For the heuristic approach the term platform evaluation 
shall not be referred to, as the process differs, the term contribution evaluation shall be used 
instead. A contribution evaluation involves running the modified SAROS code for the three 
modules on the platform. This modified code produces a data file for each module detailing 
the contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar from each of the safety systems. The 
contributions provide the percentage of the frequency of exceeding 3 bar due to the failure 
of the safety systems. A short program then processes these data files to give the overall 
contributions for the platform. 
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11.8.1 The design vector. 
Because the contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar are determined for the safety 
systems and not for the type and the inspection intervals individually, the variables in the 
design vector need to be redefined. The design vector, x, is made up of xj, the isolation 
system, -"2, the blowdown system, 13, the deluge system and X4, the detection system. Each 
of these variables must take on an integer value identifying the type of system in use. 
The isolation system is one variable which combines the type of the isolation valves and 
their inspection intervals. These combinations are ordered according to the unavailability as 
seen in Table 11.34. It can be seen that there is no relationship between the unavailability 
and the time it takes to inspect the system or the cost involved. The new ordering for the 
blowdown system, deluge system and detection system are shown in Tables 11.35,11.36 and 
11.37 respectively. 
System type inspection unavailability cost time to test 
A 1 1 0.01 14000 84 
B 1 2 0.02 9800 42 
C 2 1 0.04 12600 84 
D 2 2 0.08 8400 42 
E 3 1 0.1 9800 84 
F 3 2 0.2 5600 42 
Table 11.34: The isolation systems in terms of the type and inspection interval ordered 
according to the unavailability. 
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System type inspection unavailability cost time to test 
A 1 1 0.01 1000 72 
B 1 2 0.02 8400 36 
C 2 1 0.04 10800 72 
D 2 2 0.08 7200 36 
E 3 1 0.1 8400 72 
F 3 2 0.2 4800 36 
Table 11.35: The blowdown systems in terms of the type and inspection interval ordered 
according to the unavailability. 
System type inspection unavailability cost time to test 
A 1 1 0.021 129600 576 
B 2 1 0.025 109200 432 
C 3 1 0.031 120600 576 
D 1 2 0.04 100800 288 
E 2 2 0.05 87600 216 
F 4 1 0.05 88800 288 
C 3 2 0.06 91800 288 
H 1 3 0.08 86400 144 
1 2 3 0.099 76800 108 
1 4 2 0.1 74400 144 
K 3 0.12 77400 144 
L 3 0.2 67200 72 
Table 11.36: The deluge systems in terms of the type and inspection interval ordered ac- 
cording to the unavailability. 
The design vector is therefore 
* x, is the isolation system which may take values from 1 to 6. 
* 2; 2 is the blowdown system which may take values from 1 to 6. 
* . 13 is the deluge system which may take values 
from 1 to 12. 
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System type inspection unavailability cost time to test 
A 1 1 0.00119 99600 576 
B 1 2 0.002214 70800 288 
C 1 3 0.004404 56400 144 
D 2 1 0.01143 93600 576 
E 2 2 0.02238 64800 288 
F 2 3 0.04428 50400 144 
G 3 1 0.05715 61800 288 
H 3 2 0.1119 47400 144 
1 4 1 0.1119 58800 288 
1 3 3 0.2214 40200 72 
K 4 2 0.2214 44400 144 
L 5 1 0.2238 55800 288 
M 4 3 0.4404 37200 72 
N 5 2 0.4428 41400 144 
0 5 3 0.8808 34200 72 
Table 11.37: The detection systems in terms of the type and inspection interval ordered 
according to the unavailability. 
* ', "4 is the detection system which may take values from 1 to 15. 
From the results of the stepping and linearisation processes valve position 1 appears to be the 
optimum position, therefore this is taken as standard with no changes optional throughout 
the process. 
11.8.2 The strategy. 
An initiating strategy for finding the optimum configuration has been developed. Although, 
due to the nature of heuristic models this may not always be strictly adhered to and may 
be modified at any time if results warrant it. The strategy is to consider the safety system 
which yields the greatest contribution to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar and then attempt 
to improve this in terms of unavailability. If improvements require more resources than 
are available then the lowest contributor is identified and resources are taken froin this. 
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In some cases resources may be saved when improving the unavailability of a component. 
For example, improving the isolation system from type C to type B will save 2800 units 
financially and 42 hours inspection time. Hence all systems should be considered to check 
that they are as good as possible whilst saving as many resources as possible. 
The algorithm for this procedure is as follows. 
1. Select a feasible point in the design space, x. 
2. Perform a contribution evaluation. 
3. Determine the system that contributes the most to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar. 
4. Ensure that each system is the best possible for the resources allocated to it. 
5. Identify all improvements that may be made to the major contributor in terms of 
unavailability. 
6. If any of these improvements can be made whilst remaining within the constraints, 
select this as the next* feasible design point and continue from step 2. 
7. If this can not be done then determine the system with the lowest contribution to the 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar. 
8. Identify all situations where resources can be reduced for the lowest contributor. 
9. Bearing in mind the potential resource savings choose which improvement will be made 
to the major contributor. 
10. Select the cost reduction for the lowest contributor whilst keeping the system as good 
as possible. 
11. If the chosen case is within the constraints then select this as the next feasible point 
and continue from step 2. 
12. If the chosen case is outside the bounds then resources must be reallocated, if it is not 
practical to take any more from the lowest contributor then consider the second lowest 
contributor. When a feasible case is decided upon begin from step 2. 
13. The process terminates when the controller decides that there are no more viable 
resource allocations available to try. 
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11.8.3 The heuristic method in practice. 
A guideline for a heuristic method is to keep close to the optimum if possible. As the stepping 
and linearisation processes both found an optimum in very few iterations from a mid case 
initiator, it was decided to begin the heuristic approach from the same initiator. In terms of 
the new variable definitions this case is defined as shown in Table 11.38. 
System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation C 12600 84 
blowdown C 10800 72 
deluge E 87600 216 
detection E 64800 288 
total 175800 660 
Table 11.38: The combination of safety system types selected as the initiator. 
The contribution evaluation gives a frequency of exceeding 3 bar for the platform of 5.99 x 
10-7 per year, this frequency is attributed to the separation, compression and wellhead 
modules as shown in Table 11.39. The compression module provides the greatest contribution 
accounting for 55% of the overpressures exceeding 3 bar. The separation module accounts 
for 41%. The wellhead module, accounting for 3%, rarely generates overpressures exceeding 
3 bar in comparison with the other two modules. The contributions for the failure of the 
safety systems are also shown in Table 11.39. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation C 32.5% separation 41.1% 
blowdown C 14% compression 55.6% 
deluge E 100% wellhead 3.3% 
detection E 5.8% 
1 
Table 11.39: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected as the initiator. 
The deluge failure is involved in 100% of the overpressures exceeding 3 bar, lience when the 
deluge system is operational the overpressures generated do not reach this level. Improving 
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the deluge system would lead to less situations involving deluge failure and therefore a 
lower frequency of exceeding 3 bar. Isolation valve failures are involved in 32.5% of the 
overpressures exceeding 3 bar. 14% are due to blowdown failure and 5.8% due to detection 
failure. These percentage values do not sum to 100% as the events could occur simultaneously 
and overpressures may exceed 3 bar when the isolation, blowdown and detection systems 
operate as designed. 
Since the deluge system failure is critical for generating overpressures exceeding 3 bar this 
system must be improved. Possible improvements in the unavailability are shown in Table 
11.40. This table gives details of the costs and times involved and the effect on the platform 
cost if everything else remains constant. 
1 1 Current Improvements 
type E D C B A 
unavailability 0.05 0.04 0.031 0.025 0.02 
financial cost 87600 100800 120600 109200 129600 
time to inspect 216 288 576 432 576 
platform Cost 175800 189000 208800 197400 217800 
total time 1 
1 660 732 1 1020 1 
876 
1 1020 
Table 11.40: Possible improvements to the deluge system from the initiating case. 
It can be seen that all improvements take the cost out of bounds, therefore the lowest 
contributor must be identified so that resources can be reallocated. The lowest contributor 
is the detection system contributing 5.8%. However before resources are taken from the 
detection system the other two systems should be considered to see if any improvements 
could be made in unavailability whilst saving resources. It is found that improving both the 
isolation and blowdown systems will save resources. Improving the detection system will 
also save resources. The system is now that shown in Table 11.41. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
TInspection 
time(hours) 
isolation B 9800 42 
blowdown B 8400 36 
deluge 
detection C 56400 144 
total 76400 222 
Table 11.41: Iteration 1: intermediate step to find a feasible combination. 
This gives 108900 units available to spend on a deluge system with 543 hours to inspect. 
From Table 11.40 it can be seen that the deluge system may be improved to type D. This has 
been accomplished by reducing the resources to the other three systems whilst also improving 
their unavailabilities. This system is shown in Table 11.42. 
System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hour 
isolation B 9800 42 
blowdown B 8400 36 
deluge D 100800 288 
detection C 56400 144 
total 175400 510 
Table 11.42: The combination of safety system types selected from the first selection process. 
A contribution evaluation was performed on this case, this gives a frequency of exceeding 
3 bar for the platform of 4.83 X 10-7 per year. Therefore improving all safety systems 
by reallocating resources has been beneficial. The percentage of overpressures exceeding 
3 bar due to isolation failure has fallen to 19.5%, the percentage due to blowdown failure 
has fallen to 4.9% and due to detection failure has fallen to 1.07%. The percentage due 
to deluge failure remained at 100%. Tile module contributions have been reallocated. The 
compression module now contributes 62% and the separation module contributes 35%. These 
contributions are shown in Table 11.43. 
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The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation B 19.5% separation 35% 
blowdown B 4.9% compression 62% 
deluge D 100% wellhead 3% 
detection C 1.07% 
1 
Table 11.43: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the first iteration. 
This system cost 8100 units below the limit set, rather than waste these resources they should 
be used to try and improve systems further. The deluge system is clearly the system that 
requires the most resources, however this amount of resources will not improve the system 
without taking further resources from another system. The detection system is the lowest 
contributor and should be the system to lose resources. To reduce the resources on this 
system would require a selection of type F which is a significant drop in availability. Since 
all safety systems rely on the detection system working, a break in the strategy is proposed. 
As an alternative these extra resources shall be spent on the second largest contributor, 
the isolation system. The isolation system may be improved to type A at an additional 
cost of 4200 and incurring an extra 42 hours in the inspection process. There are still an 
available 3900 units and 213 hours. The isolation system is at its highest type therefore 
these remaining resources will be used for the blowdown system. 3600 units and 36 hours 
are required to upgrade the blowdown system to its highest type, type A. The choice of 
systems is shown in Table 11.44. 
System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown A 12000 72 
deluge D 100800 288 
detection C 56400 144 
total 183200 588 
Table 11.44: The combination of safety system types selected from the second selection 
process. 
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The contribution evaluation for this system yielded a frequency of exceeding 3 bar of 4.59 x 
10-7 per year. Table 11.45 shows the contributions of the safety systems. The contribu- 
tions for the isolation and blowdown systems have fallen whilst the detection system has 
risen slightly to 1.13%. The deluge system is still the most critical system with its failure 
accounting for 100% of the overpressures exceeding 3 bar. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation A 11.1% separation 31.5% 
blowdown A 3% compression 65.5% 
deluge D 100% wellhead 3% 
detection C 1.13% 
1 
Table 11.45: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the second iteration. 
As the deluge system is the major contributor, resources sliall be reallocated to improve 
this system. Improvements to the deluge system are shown in Table 11.46. It is not worth 
improving the deluge system to type C as the resources requires are much higher then those 
required for type B. 
Current Improvements 
type D C B A 
unavailability 0.04 0.031 0.025 0.02 
financial cost 100800 120600 109200 129600 
time to inspect 576 432 576 
Table 11.46: Possible improvements to the deluge system from the second iteration. 
The additional resources necessary to change to type B are 8400 units and 144 hours. The 
hours required are available but the financial resources are not. Hence these shall be taken 
from the detection system, the lowest contributor. Table 11.47 shows the detection systems 
which use lower resources than the current type. 
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Current Cost reductions 
type C L F H K 
unavailability 0.004404 0.2238 0.04428 0.1119 0.2214 
financial cost 5 400 55800 50400 47400 44400 
time to inspect 144 288 144 144 144 
Table 11.47: Possible cost savings with the detection system from the second iteration. 
It is clear that detection system type L will not be selected as there are other types which 
have a lower unavailability whilst costing less. In order to make the saving required the 
detection system would need to change from type C to type H. This reduction does not 
seem reasonable for the system on which all other systems depend. Hence it is decided to 
reduce the detection system to type F. The combination of safety systems chosen so far is 
shown in Table 11.48. 
System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown A 12000 72 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection F 50400 144 
total 185600 732 
Table 11.48: Iteration 3: intermediate step to find a feasible solution. 
This system is over budget by 2100 units, so resources must be lost from somewhere. The 
second lowest contributor to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar was the blowdown system, 
lience resources shall be saved by dropping this to type B. The case decided on after the 
third iteration is shown in Table 11.49. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown B 8400 36 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection F 50400 144 
total 182000 696 
Table 11.49: The combination of safety system types selected from the third selection process. 
The contribution evaluation for this combination gives a frequency of exceeding 3 bar for 
the platform of 4.18 x 10-7 per year. This is again a better combination. The contributions 
are as shown in Table 11.50. The major contributor remains as the deluge system and the 
lowest contributor stays as the detection system even though this contribution has increased 
to 8.7%. However the blowdown system and the isolation system have switched places, with 
the blowdown system increasing to 12.4% and the isolation system dropping to 9.9%. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation A 9.9% separation 34.7% 
blowdown B 12.4% compression 62.3% 
deluge B 100% wellhead 3% 
detection F 8.7% 
Table 11.50: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the third iteration. 
This system configuration is currently the 'best' in lowering the frequency of exceeding 
3 bar. The deluge system can be improved one stage further to type A. This will have an 
additional financial cost of 20400 units and an additional time of 144 hours. The combination 
of resources is shown in Table 11.51. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown B 8400 36 
deluge A 129600 576 
detection F 50400 144 
total 202400 840 
Table 11.51: Iteration 4: intermediate step to find a feasible solution. 
This case is over budget by 18900 units and 75 hours. Resources must be reallocated to 
cope with this. The isolation system and the detection system must lose resources. It is 
undesirable to take the detection system any lower as its contribution to the overpressure 
exceedence is rising as this happens, therefore an attempt will be made to take resources from 
the isolation system. The number of hours spent in the inspection process lia-9 now become 
important. Dropping the isolation system to types B, D or F will save only 42 hours leaving 
another 33 hours to be found. The blowdown system already has its minimum number of 
hours so savings must be made on the detection system. This requires the reduction of the 
detection system to one of the types in Table 11.52. 
Current Time reductio s 
type F i M 0 
unavailability 0.04428 0.2214 0.4404 0.8808 
financial cost 50400 40200 37200 34200 
time to inspect 144 72 72 72 
Table 11.52: Possible time savings with the detection system from the third iteration. 
If the isolation system is reduced to type B, 35700 units are available to spend on a detection 
system. The only detection system this will buy is type 0. The combination is shown in 
Table 11.53. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation B 9800 42 
blowdown B 8400 36 
deluge A 129600 576 
detection 0 34200 72 
total 182000 726 
Table 11.53: The combination of safety system types selected from the fourth selection 
process. 
It is unlikely that this system will produce a lower frequency of exceeding 3 bar as the 
detection system is at its worst type and this determines the response of the other systems. 
This theory was confirmed when the contribution evaluation yielded a frequency of exceeding 
3 bar of 7.99 x 10-7 per year. Improving the deluge system to type A was too expensive as 
substantial reductions in resources for other systems was required. Therefore this decision 
shall be ignored and the previous case returned to. 
The compression module had the greatest contribution to the overpressures exceeding 3 bar. 
Within the compression module the blowdown system was the most critical system if deluge 
was neglected lience improvements shall be made to the blowdown system. Table 11.54 
demonstrates the effect on the costs. 
System Type I Financial cost Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown A 12000 72 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection 50400 144 
total 185600 732 
Table 11.54: Iteration 5: intermediate step to find a feasible solution. 
This combination is too expensive. Since the detection system is the lowest contributor, 
resources should be taken from it. For sufficient resources to be gained the detection system 
must drop to type H. This gives the case shown in Table 11.55. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation A 14000 84 
blowdown A 12000 72 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection H 47400 144 
total 182600 732 
Table 11.55: The combination of safety system types selected from the fifth selection process. 
A contribution evaluation for this case gives the frequency of exceeding 3 bar as 4.5 x 10-7 
per year. Table 11.56 shows the distribution of the contributions. The compression module 
now has a smaller influence. The frequency of exceeding 3 bar has increased and therefore 
this allocation of resources is not an improvement. The blowdown contribution has increased 
even though the resources to it increased. This can be explained by the reduction in the 
detection system, the contribution for which has increased to 20.6%. Resources should be 
given back to the detection system, to do this they shall be taken from the isolation system 
as this was the lowest contributor in this case. This gives the case shown in Table 11.57. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation A 8.7% separation 38.6% 
blowdown B 22.7% compression 57.8% 
deluge B 100% wellhead 3.6% 
detection H 20.6% 
Table 11.56: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the fifth iteration. 
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System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hour 
isolation B 9800 42 
blowdown A 12000 72 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection F 50400 144 
total 181400 690 
Table 11.57: The combination of safety system types selected from the sixth selection process. 
A contribution evaluation on this combination of systems gives a frequency of exceeding 3 bar 
of 4.36 x 10-1 per year which is again a worse case. Table 11.58 shows the Contributions 
the safety systems have on this frequency. The contribution due to the detection system 
failure has fallen back to 8.3%. The isolation contribution has risen whilst the blowdown 
contribution has fallen. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation B 17.4% separation 37.5% 
blowdown A 10.35% compression 59.5% 
deluge B 100% wellhead 3% 
detection F 8.3% 
Table 11.58: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the sixth iteration. 
At this point it is worth considering all the cases run so far. These are illustrated in Table 
11.59. 
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11 1 System configurations 
isolation C B A A B A B 
blowdown C B A B B A A 
deluge E D D B A B B 
detection E C C F 0 H F 
frequency of exceeding 5.99 4.83 4.59 4.18 7.99 4.5 4.36 
3 bar (X10-7)per year 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 11.59: All cases evaluated at present. 
It can be seen from the above table that the lower frequencies of exceeding 3 bar were 
generated when the deluge system was type B. Therefore this sliall remain as the deluge 
system type. The lowest contributions from the detection system are seen when it is type 
C, the isolation and blowdown systems also have low contributions when this is the case. 
Therefore the next case sliall revert to the detection system being type C. The next case 
shall therefore have components as seen in Table 11.60. 
System Type I Financial cost 
I Inspection time(hours) 
isolation 
blowdown 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection C 56400 144 
total 165600 576 
Table 11.60: Iteration 7: intermediate step to find a feasible solution. 
This combination of the deluge and the detection system leaves 17900 units to be split 
between the isolation and the blowdown systems. Comparing the fourth and the seventh 
cases in Table 11.59 it can be seen that they have identical deluge and detection systems 
whilst differing in whether the isolation or the blowdown takes the better type. The frequency 
of exceeding 3 bar is lower when the isolation is better than the blowdown system, therefore 
in this case the isolation system will have priority. If the isolation system is chosen to be 
type A at a cost of 14000 units then only 3900 units remain which is insufficient to purchase 
a blowdown system. If the isolation system is type B at a cost of 9800 units then 8100 units 
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remain which is sufficient to purchase a blowdown system of type D. The case to be used is 
therefore as shown in Table 11.61. 
System Type I Financial cost Inspection time(hours) 
isolation B 9800 42 
blowdown D 7200 36 
deluge B 109200 432 
detection C 56400 144 
total 182600 654 
Table 11.61: The combination of safety system types selected from the seventh selection 
process. 
The contribution evaluation for this data set gives a frequency of exceeding 3 bar of 4.2 x 10-7 
per year. The contributions due to the safety systems are shown in Table 11.62. Improving 
the detection system has led to a low contribution for this system and consequently a low 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar. However having a lower type of detection system and improved 
isolation and blowdown system provided a lower frequency of exceeding 3 bar, as seen in the 
fourth case evaluated. 
The system contributions The module contributions 
isolation B 18.4% separation 35.2% 
blowdown D 16.17% compression 62.2% 
deluge B 100% wellhead 2.6% 
detection C 0.8% 
1 
Table 11.62: The contributions to the frequency of exceeding 3 bar of the safety systems 
selected during the seventh iteration. 
At this stage it appears that the optimum configuration has been determined. Table 11.63 
shows the components used in this optimum and the second best configuration. 
284 
Approaches to optimise the configuration of the safety systems. 
Optimum configuration Second best 
frequency of exceeding 3 bar 4.18 x 10-1 4.2 x 10- 
System 
isolation A B 
blowdown B D 
deluge B B 
detection F C 
Resources 
financial cost 182000 182600 
inspection time 696 654 
Module contributions 
separation 34.7% 35.2% 
compression 62.3% 62.2% 
wellhead 3% 2.6% 
System contributions 
isolation 9.9% 18.8% 
blowdown 12.4% 16.2% 
deluge 100% 100% 
detection 8.7% 0.8% 
Table 11.63: The combination of safety system types selected for the optimum configuration. 
11-8.4 An evaluation of the heuristic method. 
The heuristic method is very subjective in the choices made. A background knowledge of 
the system was, required to understand why the system became poorer when the detection 
system was limited in its resources yet other components were improved. 
The optimum chosen and the second best case were very similar and if the variables are 
transcribed into those used for the stepping and linearisation processes, it can be seen that 
the three methods have all converged to the same points. The optimum generated with the 
heuristic method was reached after only four contribution evaluations had been performed, 
with seven being completed in total. This method was therefore very economical on computer 
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processing time compared to the stepping and the linearisation processes. 
The nature of the contribution evaluation allows the analyst to know what the systems 
contribute to the module frequency of exceeding 3 bar and the overall platform frequency 
of exceeding 3 bar. This then gives the opportunity to address the system contributing the 
most to the major module contributor even though this may not appear to be a critical 
component for the whole platform. For the optimisation processes, considered so far, the 
systems chosen for the platform were identical on each of the modules. With the stepping and 
linearisation processes there was no way to differentiate between the modules. However for 
the heuristic approach the modules may be treated differently. If, for example, the blowdown 
system failure was critical on the compression module but the detection system failure was 
critical on, the wellhead module, then it would be possible to upgrade the blowdown system 
on the compression module and the detection system on the wellhead module and analyse 
the effects on the whole system. 
11.9 Discussion. 
In order to determine the optimum configuration of the safety systems on an offshore platform 
in terms of the frequency of exceeding 3 bar generated, three methods have been presented. 
The safety systems have been defined in terms of the types of systems and the inspection 
intervals for these systems. The combination of the type of system and the inspection interval 
defined the unavailability for the system. An assumption was made that each of the three 
modules on the platform would receive the same type of detection and deluge system and 
that each isolation valve would be of the same type and also each blowdown valve would be 
the same type. 
The best possible components available would no doubt produce the optimum configuration 
for the platform. However there are no limitless supplies of resources available, therefore 
constraints were placed on the financial cost and the time spent in the inspection process. 
The first two methods described relied on performing platform evaluations on a set point 
and some of the neighbouring nodes. The stepping process used these results to produce 
upward and downward differentials. These were then used to determine whether it was 
worth stepping up or down to a neighbouring component. Once a step had been decided 
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upon, the platform evaluations were taken again and the process was repeated. This method 
was limited in the movement it could take since stepping was restricted to neighbouring 
components even though multi components could step at once. This method was relatively 
successful in finding an optimum configuration although the initial starting point played a 
major part in determining this. 
The linearisation process used the platform evaluations of tile neighbouring nodes to create 
central, forward or backward differences which were then used to create an estimating func- 
tion for the frequency of exceeding 3 bar. This function was evaluated at all points within 
tile feasible design space. Once a point had been selected as an improvement tile next linear 
estimating function was created. This method was not limited to its movement within tile 
design space, however it was using local differentials to determine whether points further 
away were preferable. At least with tile stepping process tile differentials calculated related 
to the movements that were carried out, whereas with tile linearisation process a differential 
for moving upward by one component type did not necessarily relate to moving upwards by 
three component types. However this method was slightly more successful than the stepping 
process as the optimums found were not dependent on the initiating case. 
The stepping and linearisation processes required many platform evaluations, using many 
hours of computer processing time. Tile third method proposed was tile lieuristic method. 
This method was based on performing one platform evaluation, processing the results through 
a short program to determine the contributions each system had on the frequency of ex- 
ceeding 3 bar and then analysing to decide whether resources should be reallocated. Each 
iteration therefore required one platform evaluation compared to tile 17 (maximum) for the 
other two methods. The method of reallocating resources is subjective but also minimises 
the risk that no erroneous cases are evaluated. This method also provides the chance for the 
systems to differ between modules should one module require resources spent on a system 
that the other modules did not require. 
The three methods produced the same cases as the optimum configuration. This involved 
having the best type of isolation valves inspected twice yearly, the best type of blowdown 
valves although only inspected once per year, deluge system type 2 inspected every 3 montlis 
and detection system type 2 inspected once per year. 
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12. Summary and conclusions. 
Within this thesis work is presented, the objective of which, is to minimise the risk posed to 
offshore platforms as a result of an explosion originating from an accidental release of gas. 
The literature survey showed that there was a general consensus on the factors involved 
in modelling an explosion, however varying techniques have been employed as modelling 
tools. In order to estimate the overpressures generated it is not necessary to use CFD tools, 
empirical models enable mathematical techniques to be employed without necessarily being 
computer intensive. Modelling the dispersion of the gas cloud is complex due to the obstacles 
on the platform. The literature suggests that the most effective method of determining the 
concentration build up is by the use of CFD, however combining the complex geometries 
with the number of potential leak positions would make this impractical. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis has presented SAROS, a methodology, developed by Andrews and 
Smith (1994)[31, to predict the frequencies of explosions occurring on an offshore platform and 
the magnitude of the overpressures generated. Predictions are required to be as accurate as 
possible to enable reliable risk estimations to be made. Simplifying assumptions were made 
in the original modelling calculations of SAROS. These assumptions have been investigated 
and addressed as described below. 
Chapter 7 considered the release flow modelling from a leaking pipe or vessel into a semi 
enclosed module on an offshore platform. The original modelling assumed a gas, condensate 
and oil release occurring with changing temperature, implying negligible entropy changes. 
New modelling was introduced which assumed a constant temperature release. The method- 
ology was adapted to deal with a gas and condensate release and a gas only release. Rom 
the results obtained it was concluded that a gas and condensate release Nvas most appro- 
priate. A suite of subroutines was added to the SAROS code as an alternative to BANG, 
the original release modelling subroutine. These subroutines assumed that the leak was oc- 
curring whilst the leaking section remained at constant temperature as evaporation of the 
condensate occurred. This model led to higher initial release rates and results demonstrated 
higher explosion frequencies and higher frequencies of the overpressures generated. In reality 
288 
Summary and conclusions. 
there is likely to be heat transfer occurring within the system but not sufficient to retain the 
section at constant temperature. Hence the creation of this model has provided an upper and 
lower bound for the explosion frequencies. This bound was of small magnitude suggesting 
that either of the models could be used with confidence to predict the explosion frequencies. 
Chapter 8 considered the explosion frequency calculations. The frequencies of explosions 
were assumed to be dependent only on the ignition source probability density function and 
the time periods that the concentration was within the flammable range. These calculations 
would provide an over estimation of the frequency as they did not account for previous 
ignitions. A previous ignition could have destroyed the platform or produced an escalation 
of the initial hazard to further releases and fires. The calculations were adapted to account 
for previous ignitions by assuming that if ignition had previously occurred it could not 
happen again. The results showed negligible differences in comparison with the original 
results. Hence concluding that the results produced with this simplifying assumption were 
both accurate and pessimistic. 
Chapter 9 considered the dispersion of the gas cloud. The original modelling assumed im- 
mediate mixing of the gas and air within the specified volume, therefore giving uniform 
concentration throughout. Due to the presence of obstacles and the semi enclosed nature 
of the module, the concentration may not build up uniformly or immediately. To obtain 
correlations for the cloud volume enclosed between a specific concentration range the use 
of computational fluid dynamics is required. The aim being to produce an empirical for- 
mula. The applicable Navier Stokes equations required to model the concentration build up 
are presented in this chapter with background on the appropriate solution schemes. Due 
to computational resource restrictions correlations were not obtained. However a scheme is 
presented for calculating the frequencies of an explosion using such correlations. In these 
models the probability of ignition occurring at a specific concentration level is a function of 
the cloud size since this influences the chances of encountering an ignition source. The use 
of such a scheme will account for the position of the ignition source relative to the volume 
concentration. 
Once the modelling assumptions had been addressed the next step Nvas to consider the 
data used within the methodology. Chapter 10 presented a sensitivity analysis of some of 
the parameters in the model. The parameters Nvere taken in turn and altered by varying 
percentages to assess the effects on the frequency due to their uncertainty. The results show 
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that some of the parameters have a linear effect, these were those associated calculating the 
frequency. Parameters associated with determining the gas concentration within the module 
tended to demonstrate non-linear effects. 
As a means of reducing the risk posed should an explosion occur, the configuration of the 
safety systems on the platform was considered. Chapter 11 presented three approaches for 
finding an optimum configuration within the limitations set. To demonstrate the techniques 
hypothetical data was assumed for the variety of the safety components available for selection. 
The methods developed were applied assuming heavy constraints due to the platform already 
existing. This approach is more flexible if used at the design stage and is intended as a design 
tool. Each of the three proposed strategies for determining the optimum all converged on 
a configuration within a reasonable time scale. Without exhaustive enumeration it is not 
certain that these methods found the global optimum, however they were all successful in 
improving the system. 
12.1 Conclusions. 
This thesis has achieved the following objectives. 
Reviewed the literature concerning offshore hazards, particularly explosion and dis- 
persion modelling. There is a great deal of information available on explosions and 
dispersion, the physics of which are not fully understood, therefore models applicable 
to offshore' scenarios are generally crude approximations. 
Adapted SAROS to consider different constituents within its release flow modelling and 
compared the results. Rom this it is concluded that when modelling the frequency of 
the overpressure generated from an explosion, the gas and condensate release, which 
considers the leakage of oil as a factor in reducing the volume, is the most appropriate. 
An alternative release flow model is presented which assumes constant temperature 
whilst the leak occurs. This model and the original model, with the assumption of 
changing temperature, provide upper and lower bound for the explosion frequency. 
The negligible differences between the results from the two models infers that the 
less computer intensive model of the original changing temperature scenario is a valid 
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simplification. 
" The frequency calculations in SAROS have been adapted to account for the likelihood 
of previous ignitions. The modelling equations presented are more accurate in their 
calculations, however comparison of the results shows negligible differences between 
these and the original simplifications. Therefore concluding that the simplification 
incurred no loss of accuracy. 
"A technique for integrating CFD generated dispersion correlations into the frequency 
calculations was developed. This accounts for the gas dispersion within the module 
compared with the ignition source location. Due to resource constraints when using the 
commercial CFD packages there were no correlations available to assess the accuracy 
of the new technique. 
A sensitivity study on the parameters which may have incurred errors in there colla- 
tion was conducted, to assess the effects on the explosion frequency results. A linear 
relationship was demonstrated with alterations to five of the parameters. Two of the 
parameters, the leak hole size distribution and the ventilation rate, appeared to have 
non linear effects on the explosion frequency. 
In optimising the offshore platform in terms of the safety systems and the overpressures 
generated, an optimisation procedure which uses integer variables and does not rely on 
a defined objective function was required. A review of current optimisation techniques 
was performed to assess whether any were applicable. 
Three approaches for optimising the configuration of the safety systems were suggested 
and tested their effectiveness on a hypothetical platform. These three approaches 
all converged to the same optimum, although they may not have found the global 
optimum. 
12.2 Extensions to this work. 
Chapter 9 has presented a methodology for integrating dispersion correlations into the fre- 
quency calculations, however this has not been implemented due to correlations not having 
been determined. Such correlations may be obtainable with sufficient computer resources, 
291 
Summary and conclusions. 
time and CFD expertise. If these could be found and the methodology implemented, the 
results would determine whether the initial assumption of immediate perfect mixing was 
valid. 
This thesis has been concerned with the major hazard of explosions and the overpressure 
consequence. Another major hazard is that of fires and the thermal load imparted onto 
the structure. The factors controlling fires are similar to those presented in Chapter 3, as 
the influencing factors for explosions. The hydrocarbon release mechanisms are the same as 
those considered in the explosion model. The complex geometry offshore makes it difficult to 
model the length and speed of the flame due to distortion and the generation of turbulence. 
Although empirical models exist for determining the behaviour of flames, these work most 
effectively when the geometry is simple, the literature suggests that CFD is most effective 
when studying the effects of a fire. If correlations could be obtained for the flame movement 
and heat generated within the module then the SAROS code could be adapted to determine 
the frequency of a fire generating a specific thermal load occurring. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Figure A. l: Section 1- the atmospheric separator. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Figure A. 2: Section 3- the inlet separator. 
301 
Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Figure A. 5: Section 6- the medium pressure scrubbers and compressors (stage 2). 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Figure A. 7: Section 9- the wellhead and production header lines. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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Figure A. 8: Section 10 - the gas injection line. 
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Schematic diagrams of the sections on the platform. 
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